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ABSTRACT
This dissertation concerns the status of theoretical
constructs in linguistics. Part One addresses the question of
whether these ought be interpreted instrumentally or
realistically. The discussion of this question is centred
around the instrumentalist/realist debate in the philosophy of
science. In chapter 1, I argue for a version of realism and try
to defend this metatheoretical position against instrumentalist
objections.
In chapter 2, I show how this realist position applies to
theory construction in linguistics; I also discuss problems
encountered within the instrumentalist tradition in linguistics.
Part Two concerns what has been called the ontological
question in the philosophy of linguistics, that is it addresses
the question of the ontological status of the object of inquiry.
I show that this question is closely linked to the sorts of
problem discussed in Part One.
In chapter 3, I discuss versions of the view that the
object of inquiry is psychological in nature, and thus able to
be viewed as an object of psychological theory. In chapter 4, I
deal with philosophies of linguistics which claim that
linguistic objects are social realities. Having argued that
neither of these approaches is satisfactory, I examine, in
chapter 5, proposals that the object of inquiry is neither
social nor psychological. I show why Platonism, as a version of
this approach, is unsatisfactory. I then present a
metatheoretical position (Interactionism), which is based on the
later work of Popper, particularly his notion of objective
knowledge. The dissertation thus presents a coherent philosophy
of linguistics which has realism and interactionism as its two
principle components.
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My concern in part one is with the status of theoretical
constructs in grammatical inquiry, particularly the question of
what kind(s) of relationship they bear to the domain which they
are designed to account for. The discussion centres on the
instrumentalist/realist debate in the philosophy of science* and
is an attempt to see whether the issues raised in this debate
shed any light on the problems associated with evaluating the
status of theoretical constructs in grammatical inquiry. I
argue that they do. Furthermore, I argue for a version of
realism in the philosophy of theoretical linguistics and against
instrumentalist interpretations of theoretical linguistic
constructs.
Chapter 1 argues for a particular version of realism, and
chapter 2 tackles the objections raised by instrumentalists to
such a realism. Each chapter proceeds by discussing the issues
in the philosophy of science and then relating these to the
interpretation of constructs in theoretical linguistics
I think that a brief (and necessarily oversimplified)
outline of realist and instrumentalist positions in t lie
philosophy of science is in order at this point. A realist view
of theoretical constructs in science may be stated thus: sucli
constructs may refer to, or be descriptive of, extra-theoretical
realities. In this respect, the realist may wish to distinguish
the following: (1) theory construction, (2) observable phenomena
or sense data and (3) a 'hidden' reality 'behind' these sense
impressions. The task of the realist is then to devise,
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with the aid of (2), theoretical constructs in (1) which are
descriptive of the reality in (3). The realist wants to claim
for the propositions expressed as sentences containing his
theoretical terms, that they are true or false descriptions of
reality. For a statement of various realist philosophies of
science, cf Popper (1963), Lakatos (1970) and Putnam (1975). I
discuss each of these below.
The instrumentalist view might be stated thus: it is a
mistake to take theoretical constructs as being descriptive of
some 'hidden reality' over and above the observable data.
Rather, they are best seen as instruments for systematising,
imposing order on, and predicting, our sense impressions (or
'observable phenomena'). Propositions expressed as sentences
which contain theoretical terms are neither true nor false,
since our theoretical terms are not observational terms, but are
tools, and nothing more than tools, for the ordering and
predicting of observations. Theoretical terms cannot be used to
refer to 'real' entities; the entities which we may say they are
used to refer to are fictitious objects which we devise in order
to predict the phenomena.
This rather simplistic summary of the instrumentalist and
realist positions should suffice to set the context for the
discussion in part one. The subject matter of part two is the
question of the ontological status of the object of inquiry in
theoretical linguistics. I hope to show in part one that this
question is closely related to the methodological concerns
discussed in the first two chapters, and that the two parts
3






There are many different versions of realism in the
philosophy of science; in order to distinguish between them and
to define the version which I want to adopt, it is necessary to
describe the different philosophical strands that usually
function as components of realism. To do this, I will take as
my starting point a version of realism (Harre's, as exemplified
in his 1970, 1972) which contrasts with the one I will adopt.
Take, for example, the following statements on the status of
theoretical constructs (and their corresponding terms) in
scientific inquiry:
(1) Some theoretical terms can be used to make reference
(verbal) to hypothetical entities.
(2) Some hypothetical entities are candidates for existence
(i.e. could be real things, qualities and processes in the
world).
(3) Some candidates for existence, for reality, are
demonstrable, i.e. can be indicated by some sort of gesture of
pointing in the appropriate conditions.
(Harre 1972:91)
(Realism).... is the view that the statements of the theory
are true or false, and that many of the entities referred to in
a theory do exist. They are as much in the real world as are
human beings, houses, stones, stars, and so on.
(op.cit.:90)
A number of aspects of these statements are of importance
for the discussion that follows, such as Harre's conception of
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demonstration and its status in his realism, the idea Lliat we
may verify, once and for all, the existence of some postulated
entity or process, and the ontological problems arising from the
use of the term 'real world'.
Concerning the first of these, Harre claims that
demonstration provides the final incontrovertible proof of the
existence of the entity demonstrated. Thus: '...if we can
demonstrate a thing to which we have previously made reference,
on this or other occasions, then we have proved that thing
exists.'(op.cit.:90-91). Similarly: 'To be able to indicate
something is the final, incontrovertible proof of its
existence.'(90)
This adherence to a notion of proof by demonstration is a
kind of verificationism: it is a claim that we may verify our
theories, show them to be true descriptions of the world, in
this case by means of ostension. It is a view of the nature of
scientific inquiry which, at least in the form in which Harre
states it, I do not want to adopt. Consider the act of
reference which accompanies the act of indication in Harre's
ostensive proof: this reference, to succeed, would require that
the object referred to be observable. But there are problems
with the notion that an entity is observable, and therefore
capable of being pointed to. Popper (1959 and elsewhere) has
often pointed out that all observation is theory-impregnated.
Take the following (apparently simple) example: while it may
seem rather evident that entities like fish are observable, it
is clear that what will count as a fish (and therefore what will
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count as a successful act of pointing out a fish) depends on out
definition of the term 'fish', and this depends on the framework
in which the term is defined. This framework is, of course, a
set of theoretical proposals concerning such entities and is
located within a more general set of theoretical assumptions
about the natural world, which is in turn tied in with our
theories about the physical world in general.
It is evident that our scientific theories develop and
evolve, and as they do, so do the meanings of the terms we use
to express them. If one considers a point in time at which our
theories of the natural world classify what we now call a whale
as a fish, and compare this with the present, where whales are
not considered to be fish, it is clear that what has changed is
our definition of 'fish', and this change comes about because of
a change in our set of theoretical assumptions. Clearly, if
'fish' is defined (rather crudely) in terms of certain features
of habitat (living entirely in the sea rather than on land),
behaviour (being a creature which swims underwater) and form
(having a tail of a certain sort) then whales can plausibly
count as being fish. We can say that, with an act of ostension
taking place while sucli a theory is accepted (and thus such a
defintion of 'fish'), that whales are observable and are
observably (demonstrably) fish: one can point to them, as in
Harre's test situation.
However, considering the case where we can now point to a
whale and successfully identify it as a mammal, it is clear that
a whale is demonstrably not a fish. What have changed are our
/
theoretical assumptions and thus our theoretical terms (such as
'mammal', 'reptile', 'amphibian', etc), and because of these,
the very acts of demonstration and observation themselves. It
is rather clear from this that the act of observation is rather
heavily dependent on theoretical states of affairs: our
theoretical assumptions enable us to engage in the act of
observation, and our observations are thus heavily theory-
dependent.
One of the points that Popper frequently makes in this
respect is that, in setting up a scientific experiment, out-
theoretical assumptions will determine what will count as an
observation; clearly, just any sense impression which occurs
during an experiment will not necessarily be relevant. An itch
in the experimentalist's elbow during an experiment on loss of
heat energy in a refrigeration system might well be determined
to be irrelevant to the experimental results, for instance, or
the colour of the room in which the experiment will take place.
And nor are such things self-evidently irrelevant: we must
decide, on the basis of our theoretical orientation, what is to
be counted as being part of tlier result and what is not. If we
are mistaken in this, we may not achieve the success we aimed
for. An itch in the experimentalist's elbow, or the colour of
the room, just might turn out to be relevant to the result, and
experiments have often taken place in which it turns out that
some factor considered unimportant and not part of the evidence
emerges as crucial for the experiment and the theory in
question. In these cases, we have to revise our theoretical
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proposals and our interpretation of the evidence.
Popper also suggests that our perceptual system works in
this way, with certain sense impressions being foregrounded and
others relegated to the background in accordance with our
hypotheses (some of them very deeply embedded in our perceptual
framework) as to what it is we are perceiving. Obviously, the
deeper a notion is embedded in our way of viewing the world
around us, the more such notions appear 'directly observable'.
The notion 'physical object', for instance, is thus deeply
rooted in our way of viewing the world to such an extent that we
take it as self-evident that physical objects exist. Notice
that this is so even when changes in our scientific theories
undermine the very notion 'physical object'.
Eddington (1927) makes a great deal of this in arguing for
an idealist philosophy of science, and while I do not wish to
adopt such a view, I accept his point that, with a notion as
quotidien as 'table' we begin to see two quite distinct 'tables'
emerging as realities as ou< theories develop: one which is solid
and exemplifies our standard notion of everyday, medium-sized
macrophysical object (of the sort whose existence in 'the real
world' Harre is so certain of), and another which consists
largely of space inhabited by energies and forces. I will
suggest below that we are justified in treating both of these
'tables' as inhabitants of the real world, and that we need not
resort to idealism to accommodate two such distinct
interpretations of what sort of thing a table is.
Consider the bearing these considerations have on Harre's
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idea that we provide the final incontrovertible proof of the
existence of something by successfully demonstrating it, having
referred to it. If the act of demonstration does depend , in
the way I have been suggesting, on our theoretical apparatus,
and if that apparatus is at all subject to revision, then so are
our acts of demonstration. Now, since it is evident that our
theories are thus subject to revision, it is clear that our acts
of demonstration are too. And if we consider whether our
theories are capable of being said to be incontroverLibly true,
we can decide whether the act of demonstration provides us with
the incontrovertible evidence of the existence of an entity that
Harre says it does.
It seems that, in our simple case of theories of the
natural world, this is not so. What appeared to be demonstrably
a fish at one stage in the development of our theories turned
out to be demonstrably not a fish at later stage. In fact, it
would be perverse to suggest that we should not build a rather
large amount of fallibilism into our view of scientific
theories, given that they so frequently change. And, with this
in mind, it would be absurd to assume that any given theory is
not subject to revision, often radical revision to the point
where the theory is abandoned altogether. This sort of
fallibilism is a central part of Popper's philosophy of science,
and with it goes the idea that falsifiability, rather than
verifiablity, is the hallmark of scientific theories: rather
than claiming that science provides us with theories which are
incontrovertibly proven to be true, Popper emphasises the fact
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that none of our theories are immune to the possibility of
future falsification, even if they have held up against all
testing up till now.
I am inclined to adopt Popper's view concerning fallibilism
and falsification, and indeed his proposal that falsifiability
be taken to function as a demarcation criterion for
distinguishing between scientific and non-scientific theories.
A theory which turns out to be true come what may, and for which
there is, in principle, no way of devising a means of
falsification, is not a scientific theory for Popper, and is in
fact lacking in content because it is not susceptible to
disconfirmation. That is, there must be states of affairs which
are ruled out as impossible by a theory, such that if we were
able to show that such a state of affairs held, we could show
the theory to be falsified. If one imagines a theory for which
no such state of affairs were describable, then it is clear that
it excludes nothing, and will be true no matter what. The
content of such a theory is minimal: it excludes nothing, and is
therefore uninformative*.
This sort of falsificationism is quite distinct from Harre's
verificationism and is, I think, a closer characterisation of how
scientific theories develop, and the provisional status which they
enjoy. One may argue, of course, that a theory which is
* Note that Popper's demarcation criterion is not a criterion of
meaningfulness. Unlike the logical positivists (cf 2.2), Popper
has never proposed that non-scientific theories, theories which
are unfalsifiable, are meaningless. For more on this and on the
relationship between scientific and metaphysical statements, cf
chapter 2.
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falsifiable, but which we have consistently failed to falsify
should be considered a true theory. Popper refers to this failure
to falsify a theory as the corroboration of the theory; this does
not, however, amount to saying that the theory is true. Rather,
one takes it to be our present best guess at what the object of
inquiry is like, but a conjecture which is still open to
refutation.
In this sort of conjectural realism, one allows (contra
Harre) that theories may be said to be false, but not that they
may be said to be true. However, there is a notion of
convergence upon the truth in Popper's philosophy of science.
That is, Popper allows that our theories may possess greater or
lesser degrees of what he calls verisimilitude: through the
process of falsification, we develop theories which come closer
and closer to a true description of their object of inquiry,
even though we can never claim that they are incontrovertibly
true descriptions. Thus, the notion of truth is still present
in Popper's philosophy, but in a form which is considerably
weaker than Harre's. The conception of falsification which
Popper uses is a very strong one, however, and is a very central
part of his realism. We shall see below that Popper's
falsificationism needs to be weakened in the face of what we
know about the historical devlopment of scientific theories.
This will leave us with a version of realism which is even more
fallibilistic than Popper's.
I should deal with a couple of possible objections to
Popper's proposals at this point. One of them is that Popper,
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in so emphasising the theory-dependence of observation, might be
said to be denying the possibility that there is a theory-
external world to be described by our theories. Popper's
position is that there is indeed a theory-external world, and
this is mirrored in his adoption of a correspondence theory of
truth (cf Popper 1959:274). In fact, this is a central part of
of his realism (for discussion of the problems in maintaining
it, cf 2.1). It has to be said that the claim that there is a
theory-external world is a metaphysical one. But then, so is
the the claim to the contrary. Such metaphysical positions are
an unavoidable part of the process of constructing and
evaluating scientific theories. Just how one should decide
between such competing metaphysical assumptions is a
philosophical matter; I try to show, particularly in 2.1, that
the assumption that there is a theory-external world is coherent
in that it allows us to understand why it is that our theories
should have varying degrees of success or failure. I postpone
discussion of this for the moment, however.
Another objection to Popper's convergent realism is this:
that there is surely some kind of continuity between the earlier
and later meanings of terms in our theories. That is, to return
to the 'fish' example, there are surely certain core semantic
notions which link our earlier and later conceptions of what is
to count as a fish. What has happened is that we have simply
refined our fundamental definition of 'fish': the fundamental
meaning remains the same from original to successor theory. An
even stronger version of this objection would claim that it is
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the essential defintion that remains unchanged, and that to
define an entity is to isolate its essential properties.
This second objection is an interesting one. It certainly
seems as if much of the original definition of fish (which
included whales) is unchanged in our current definition. This
is an entirely post-hoc assumption, however. There is no way of
knowing in advance which aspects of our theories, and thus our
definitions, will change, and it is only from the perspective of
the later theory and definition that we establish what we take
the essential or central components of the definition to be.
Thus essentialist realism (or essentialism), the view that we
arrive at a definition of the essence of an entity via our
theories, does not reflect the provisional nature of theory
construction and refutation. With the adoption of Popper's
version of realism, we move away from the idea that we can
incontrovertibly establish what the properties of the external
world are.
This relates to the fact that single terms do not change
their meaning independently of the entire conceptual system
within which they are located: as the entire network of
theoretical assumptions changes, so do the single terms embedded
within them, and since we cannot tell just how our theories will
change, so we cannot tell which aspects of a definition will
count as the central ones and which not. This point bears very
closely on the question of falsification: it is arguable (and I
am convinced of the argument) that single hypotheses alone are not
susceptible of disconfirmation (cf 1.2 for discussion of this
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argument, often referred to as the Duheni-Quine Thesis), since a
given hypothesis, and the terms contained in it, gain their
meaning from an entire network of theoretical assumptions*. This
means that, in attempting to falsify a single hypothesis, we
attempt to falsify the set of assumptions underlying it. In my
example, it means that our definitions of 'fish' and 'mammal', and
much of our theoretical apparatus concerning the natural world,
are subject to revision, and that incontrovertible proof of
existence is therefore not available to us.
There are other aspects of Harre's claims about
incontrovertible proof of existence via demonstration which are
worrying, and these involve considerations which are even more
radical (in terms of the sort of realism they allow us) than
Popper's arguments. It is arguable, for instance, that aside
from the problems concerning observability and fallibilism which
I have been discussing, Harre's notion of pointing to the object
of reference misrepresents the act of reference* Putnam
(1960) makes an interesting comment on this matter, namely that
any statement of even the most observational sort will
necessarily contain terms which are informal in nature, and not
quite explicitly defined. This suggests something like
referential 'open-endedness' for our theoretical terms, and
also suggests that ostension is not the sine qua non for the act
* We will see below (2.1) that this is in fact taken as an
argument against the sort of realism I am proposing to adopt.
However, I will argue that it is a point in favour of, rather
then against, realism.
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of reference that Harre supposes it to be.
In this regard, Boyd (1979) makes a comment regarding the
nature of reference in science which I think is important. It
concerns what he refers to as 'theory-constitutive' metaphors
and the 'implicit' reference that they allow us:
'There exists an important class of metaphors which play an
important role in the development and articulation of theories
in science They are used to introduce theoretical
terminology where none previously existed...their success
depends on their 'open-endedness', i.e. they do not convey quite
specific respects of similarity and analogy....Theory-
constitutive metaphors, when they refer, refer implicitly, in
the sense that they do not correspond to explicit definitions of
their referents, but instead indicate a research direction
toward them. The same thing is apparently true of theoretical
terms in science generally.'
(363)
Boyd claims that this use of metaphor is a device for
'accomodating our linguistic categories to the causal structure
of the world so that they 'cut the world at its joints'.'(358).
Thus the reference of a general term is 'its role in making
possible socially coordinated epistemic access' to a particular
sort of thing or natural phenomenon. Ostension, under this sort
of view, is still embedded in a realist philosophy of science,
but is defined in a sufficiently sophisticated way to allow for
the complexity of theory change and the resultant changing
meaning of our theoretical terms.
Under a sufficiently sophisticated realism, we can allow
that there is no such thing as final, incontrovertible proof
without abandoning the central realist notion that there is an
extra-theoretical world which our theories are designed to
describe.
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Consider how far we have now come from Harre's version of
realism: ostension and the act of reference are very much
theory-dependent, and if we allow that our theories are subject
to radical revision, then we allow that the acts of ostension
and reference are too. Further, if we allow for referential
open-endedness, we are even further from being able to claim
that we can provide final, incontrovertible proof of the
existence of an entity. And this has fairly major consequences
for Harre's notion 'the real world', since what counts as the
real world and its inhabitants is seen to be theory-dependent,
open, and evolving. But if we take it that it is the properties
of a theory-external world that induce the results of our tests
then we can maintain the realist idea that we are attempting to
describe the properties of a world outside of our theories.
In my brief summary of the realist position in the
introduction, I said that realism was concerned with describing
a reality which induces our sense impressions, and that the
realist takes scientific hypotheses to be true or false in
relation to this reality. Indeed, this is what Harre claims.
We have now begun to see what the various components of the
realist position are, and what the issues are on which realists
and non-realists construct their philosophies of science. I
have mentioned the question of ostension and of reference with
regard to theoretical terms, and the problems connected with
observability in relation to theory. And I have tried to
discuss the question of the possibility of a theory-external
world in relation to Harre's claims about the 'real world'.
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There is undoubtedly much room for manoeuvre on the part of
the realist when it comes to reacting to these various issues.
I have indicated that one can still maintain a realist position
while abandoning Harre's claim that we may prove the existence
of an entity incontrovertibly. In response to Harre's
verificationist realism, I stressed the Popperian notion of
fasificationist realism. Thus, rather than saying that
hypotheses are taken to be either true or false by the realist,
I accept Popper's position which incorporates a considerably
weakened role for the notion of the truth of a theory. However,
I now want to consider weakening the role played by the notion
of the falsity of a theory.
Lakatos (1978) has suggested that, given an inconsistent
set of scientific statements (that is a set in which there is
some sort of clash or contradiction between the members of the
set) one must select from among them the following: (i) a theory
under test and then (ii) an accepted 'basic statement'1'', leaving
the rest of the set of statements to serve as background
knowledge against which a test will occur (these are the
* 'Basic statements' is an expression used by Popper (1959) to
cover what might be referred to as observational statements in a
philosophy of science which proposes a distinction between
observation and theory language. It reflects Popper's views on
the theory-impregnated nature of observation in that he does not
assume that statements of the form 'The oil is floating on the
water' are theory-free. Popper allows that there is a large
conventional element in such statements, and that they do not
represent the sort of hard core observational knowledge which
instrumentalists such as the Logical Positivists assumed they
did.
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interconnected theoretical assumptions which I have said are
present as an integral part of the context in which a single
hypothesis is tested).
Lakatos suggests a version of falsificationism which allows
for a weakened role for falsification as follows: we allow that
any part of the entire body of knowledge be amended in the light
of a clash or inconsistency, such that the apparently falsified
theory may be allowed to stand, even in the face of the
conflicting basic statement. What this means is that we do not
take falsification to be final and incontrovertible any more
than we took verification to be.
That is, since our theories are subject to radical
revision, we allow that (a) what we now see as a falsification
might be revised in the light of future theory development and
(b) what counts as a clash between 'observation' (basic
state ents) and theory can be accommodated by means of
adjustments elsewhere in the theoretical system.
There are several elements in this version of a
falsificationist realism that might appear to undermine the very
basis of realism. The non-realist might respond for instance,
by claiming that in allowing for the heavily theory-dependent
nature of both falsification and verification, we are close to
abandoning the idea that scientific theories are true or false
descriptions of reality. And in abandoning this, we abandon the
very core of realism, since it is precisely this claim that the
instrumentalist objects to.
The most appropriate response to this instrumentalist
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reaction (and there is a wide range of such reactions to
realism: cf 2.1) is to insist that the most important factor in
deciding whether a basic statement should be lead us to abandon
a theory is the question of whether adjustments elsewhere in the
system would result in a greater or lesser degree of empirical
yield. That is, if the adjustment to the system is
'progressive', to use Lakatos' term, and allows us to predict
novel facts, then such an adjustment is preferable to an
abandonment of the theory. Unfortunately, this response, which
strikes me as being a rational and justifiable one, is not
sufficient to pacify the instrumenatlist, since he need only
claim that greater degrees of empirical yield are all that the
instrumenatlist requires of a theory, and that the notion of a
reality which our theoretical constructs correspond to is
superfluous to an understanding of the growth of scientific
knowledge.
As I point out in 2.1, the realist can respond to this that
if we do not assume the existence of a theory-external world,
there is no explanation for the greater success of some theories
over others. In adopting the instrumentalist's position, we
simply accept the variation in the empirical yield of theories
without knowing, or asking, why there should be such variation.
I also suggest there that this leads to heuristic complacency.
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1.2 The instrumentalist case against realism
The previous section ends with a version of realism (which
could be called conjectural realism) based largely (though with
refinements) on Popper's proposals concerning falsification and
fallibilism, corroboration and verisimilitude. Here, I present
some of the principal instrumentalist arguments against a
realistic interpretation of scientific theories, and try to
indicate how the realist might respond to them.
Most of the instrumentalist's objections to realist
interpretations of theories centre on the relationship between
'observation' and theory. It is felt by instrumentalists of most
persuasions that science is best characterised as an activity
that values observability ('the observable facts') highly, and
this is probably a view that would gain widespread 'commonsense'
support. On the face of it, this certainly seems to be a fair
attempt at saying what science is all about. The dissatisfaction
that many instrumentalists feel with theoretical constructs
concerns the distinction between these and the observable facts,
whereby it is getting the facts right that counts, and
theoretical constructs are no more than our means of achieving
this. Any attempt to elevate theoretical constructs such that we
claim that they refer to extra-theoretical entities over and
above the data is regarded as overstepping the mark, and in
particular, any metaphysical content in scientific theories is
regarded with suspicion.
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These sorts of notion underlie, in the late nineteenth
century, the work of Mach, in early twentieth century philosophy
of science, that of Duhem and Poincarre and, in the thirties,
logical positivism. Nor have such views on the nature of
scientific theories ceased since the demise of logical
positivism; the anti-realist lobby is as strong today as ever
(cf van Fraassen's 'constructive empiricism' in his 1980 and the
Dummettian anti-realist lobby in the theory of language reported
in Dummett 1976, 1978, Luntley 1982, and elsewhere).
As one might expect, this emphasis on observation rather
than theory is often accompanied by an attempt to provide a
strict delimitation between observation language and theoretical
language (this is especially so of logical positivism).
However, since I have argued in the previous chapter that such a
delimitation is difficult to make, precisely because it is
methodologically ill-conceived, I will concentrate here on what
I take to be the strongest aspects of the 'instrumentalist
challenge to realism, rather than on the observation/theory
division, which is probably one of the weakest points in the
range of instrumentalist proposals. I do return to the
observation/theory dichotomy in my discussion of logical
positivism, in relation to instrumentalism in linguistics (in
2.2).
In order to get at the heart of this debate, it is
necessary to unpack the notion 'instrumentalism', and examine
the cluster of issues that have divided realists and
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instrumentalists. Once this is done, it becomes less important
whether a given philosopher is regarded as belonging to one camp
rather than another. Rather, what does matter is where different
philosophers stand on the various issues. (Thus such questions
as whether Duhem was 'really' a realist and whether Dummett is
an instrumentalist are seen to be less important than where
Duhem and Dummett stand on the core issues) . In order to make
some inroads into the relevant issues, I consider them under two
main headings: 'transcendence of data by theory' and 'overthrow
of theories'; under each heading, several distinct but related
issues are presented and discussed in relation to realism.
(i) Transcendence of data by theory.
One point made about the relationship between theories and
'the facts' is as follows: for any given empirical domain, there
will be more than one possible theory consonant with the facts.
This should suggest to us that we ought to be rather wary about
the claims we make for the constructs in a given theory (such as
interpreting them as descriptions of an underlying reality
behind the phenomena). Consider the following statements by
Duhem:
'When these hypotheses have enabled us to decompose the
complex movements of the planets into simpler ones, we should
not think that we have now come upon the real movements that lie
behind the apparent ones. The real movements are the apparent
ones. The end achieved is more modest: we have simply made the
celestial phenomena accessible to calculation.'
(1908/1969: 20)
'Since the astronomer's hypotheses are not realities but
merely fictions , the whole purpose of which is to save
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appearances, we should not be surprised that different
astronomers attempt to achieve this purpose by means of
different hypotheses.'
(op. cit. : 22)
'...the hypotheses of physics are mere mathematical
contrivances for the purpose of saving the phenomena.'
(op. cit. :112)
That is, the fact that theories transcend the data, or put
another way, theories are underdetermined by the data, is taken
as a reason for making fairly modest claims about the status of
theoretical constructs. Quine is frequently cited in this
respect too; according to Quine(1953), our theoretical
constructs (including those referring to physical objects) are
to taken to be 'myths':
'Viewed from within the phenomenalist conceptual scheme,
the ontologies of physical objects and mathematical objects are
myths. The quality of myth, however, is relative; relative, in
this case, to the epistemological point of view. This point of
view is one among various, corresponding to one among our
various interests and purposes.'
(1953: 19)
There are several related views connected with this. One is
the pragmatist position that our theories are best evaluated in
relation to our purposes rather than in relation to their
correspondence , or degree of correspondence, to an extra-
theoretical reality. This pragmatic strand is common among
instrumentalists, and can be easily detected in the above
quotations from Duhem and Quine. It is explicitly spelled out in
the following statement by Quine:
'Our standard for appraising basic changes of conceptual
scheme must be, not of a realistic standard of correspondence to
reality, but a pragmatic standard.'
(1953: 79)
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The two notions, theories as myths, and evaluation of
theories in purely pragmatic terms, are frequently linked, thus:
'the myth of physical objects is epistemologically superior
to most in that it has proved more efficacious than other myths
as a device for working a manageable structure into the flux of
experience.'
(Quine, op cit : 44)
Because theories are thus underdetermined by data, it is
therefore possible, for any given theory, to construct an
alternative, logically distinct theory which entails the same
body of data. This is often referred to as the
Underdetermination Thesis, and is closely linked with the
Duhem-Quine Thesis, which can be stated thus: any theory can be
protected from falsification, when faced with contradicting
evidence, by means of adjustments to some part (or parts) of the
theory, or to the background knowledge within which it is
located .
One of Quine's points in this respect is that single
hypotheses themselves are not susceptible to disconfirmation,
but only theories as wholes; thus a single consequence of a
theory, when in conflict with experience, can be saved by
adjustments to the theory. Quine (1953 and elsewhere) also
distinguishes between experiences which are on the 'periphery'
of our theoretical scheme of things and those closer to the
centre, so that ordinary everyday macrophysical objects such as
'table' are apparently observable, owing to their being
instances of 'physical object', a notion so central to our
conceptual scheme as not to appear theoretical at all. Note that
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this way of dealing with the difference between observation
language and theory language is distinct from the logical
positivist attempt (as in Carnap's Logical Syntax) to
distinguish sharply between observation and theory. The
principal problem with it is that, while it does allow that even
terms like 'table' are theoretical, i.e. are part of our
conceptual scheme, it creates a very vague scale of
theoreticity, where it isn't clear how we go about determining
the degree to which a term is theoretical. It is similar in this
respect to Lakatos' distinction between the 'hard core' and the
'protective belt' of theories.
How should the realist respond to these points, and to what
extent do they seriously undermine realism? Regarding the
interpretation of theories as myths, it need not concern the
fallibilist realist that this is so. Under Popper's version of
realism, many of our scientific theories do in fact start out as
myths, but the the important distinction between non-scientific
myths and scientific theories is that the latter are testable
(i.e. falsifiable); Popper is quite happy to allow that our
scientific theories are embedded in 'metaphysical research
programmes' which are a kind of general picture of the world,
much as myths are*.
* The point that our theories are thus embedded is stressed by
those, such as Boyd and Hesse, who view the background picture
as a kind of metaphor; Boyd goes further in taking theories
themselves to be a special kind of metaphor which allows us
'epistemic access' of the Quinean sort (cf his 1979), but adds
to this a rather strong realist claim that such metaphors then
'cut the world at its joints', a position which reflects his
belief that realism is 'an empirical hypothesis'.
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Of course, Quine allows that our scientific 'myths' are
epistemically superior in this way, but does not stress that in
thus being superior , they allow us something new, namely access
to the world, knowledge of it, and progress in developing that
knowledge.
The crucial point here is that at which the realist decides
that it is more likely that there are physical objects in the
world than it is that there are Homerian gods, but for Quine,
this is going to far: all we are warranted in claiming is that
the former is an epistemically superior myth, and therefore to
be believed in more readily than the latter. It is heuristic
fruitfulness, of the sort whereby a given construct really does
allow us progress, which is the major factor in favour of
realism; of course, the instrumentalist takes just this
fertility to be one of his major criteria for assessing
theories. However, the realist can respond with the following:
it is hardly likely to be mere chance that one particular
construct/set of constructs is more fertile than another. For
the instrumentalist, there is nothing to be said about WHY
one myth is superior to another, whereas the realist gives an
account of the success of particular constructs: they are fair
approximations at how the world is organised.
Regarding the pragmatic means of assessing theories, this
is at best trivially valid, at worst, inaccurate. Quine's claim
that we should appraise changes in theoretical framework from a
pragmatic RATHER THAN from a standard of correspondence to
reality becomes empty if our pragmatic goal, our purpose, is to
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approximate, through our theories, the structure of the world,
that is, if it is a reaiist purpose (and often it is). Duhem's
response to this was that, even if our successfui theories ARE
constructed because of a realist attempt to describe the world,
we should not confuse the motivation for a theory with its
degree of success. In Duhem's words, we must distinguish
between 'the chimerical hopes that have incited admirable
discoveries' and the notion that such discoveries 'embody the
chimeras that gave birth to them'(1906: 32). However, this again
undervalues HEURISTIC factors: if a realist approach gives rise
to progress, this suggests that it is the right approach, just
as a given cluster of theoretical constructs which gives rise to
success should be viewed as being on the right lines. Duhem's
attempt to weaken the heuristic value of a realist approach is
open to the following response: what can we do to validate a
particular metatheoretical appproach if not point to its success
in research and discovery?
It should also be noted that pragmatism of this sort easily
leads to the worst relativistic excesses of the Feyerabendian
sort whereby there is nothing to choose between one way of
describing the world and another, and where differences in
conceptual scheme are simply reflections of different cultural
outlooks. Kuhn (1970) is rather guilty of this too* ; the
* To be fair to Kuhn, he has modified the extremely relativistic
stance that seemed so salient in his Structure of Scientific
Revolutions and has proposed (Kuhn 1976) a 'non-paradigmatic'
rationality in an attempt to avoid the claim that there simply
is no rational justification for scientific theories.
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principal objection to it is Popper's, namely that it denies
the objectivity of science by viewing it as little more than a
manifestation of social, personal and political outlook. But
the difference between our current view of the world and that
which incorporates Homerian gods is not just a matter of
different cultures choosing different conceptual schemes: our
framework has allowed us knowledge, and more importantly,
progress, in a way which the panoply of Homerian gods could
never have done; we are justified in claiming that we know more
about our world via our scientific theories than was, or could
be, known via the postulating of Homerian deities.
If 'theories as myths' and pragmatism are not worrying
threats for the realist, and I do not think they are, the
Underdetermination Thesis is often taken to be so. It has led
realists such as Boyd (1973) to deny the possibility of
underdetermination, and Worrall (1982), in accepting its
possibilbity, to retreat to a very minimal realist position. It
has induced Newton-Smith to adopt a position which he says is
not realist in any currently understood sense, since, in his
view, the possibility of underdetermination seriously undermines
the realist position (cf his 1978).
In discussing the underdetermination thesis, it is as well
to follow Newton-Smith (1978) and distinguish between a weak
and a strong interpretation. The strong interpretation (Quine's
version) is that all theories necessarily are underdetermined by
the data, such that for any theory, there will always be an
alternative, logically distinct theory, which entails the same
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body of data. The weak interpretation states that theories can
be, but are not necessarily always so underdetermined. In
addition to this, one can make more progress with the
underdetermination thesis if one distinguishes, along the lines
suggested by Worrall(1978) betweeen the general sense in which
theory is underdetermined by data, and those cases where there
does seem to be an insurmountable difficulty in choosing between
alternative theoretical accounts of the same set of phenomena.
The general sense in which theories are underdetermined by data
is, as Worrall points out, a trivial consequence of the
transcendent nature of our theories. I take it to be a feature
of our theories which supports realism, since it reverses the
inductivist notion that observation is methodologically
privileged with respect to theory.
It is also interesting to note that in describing two
theories as equally warranted by the data, the instrumentalist
must consider that mere 'alignment' with the data is
insufficient to allow us to conclude that two theories are
empirically equivalent: it is clear that considerations such as
simplicity and unity or coherence internal to a theory will also
guide us in judging one to be better warranted by the data than
another (as both Duhem and Quine would allow). For the realist,
it is the latter which is the best candidate as our present best
guess.
Having said this, we have considerably reduced the range of
cases where there could be said to be two logically distinct but
empirically equivalent theories. However, there is a more
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worrying case, where there does seem to be a ready translation
from one theory to a logically distinct alternative one,which
does seem to be worrying for the realist: in this circumstance,
it would appear that either account of the world is possible,
and that the realist must either illogically accept one to the
exclusion of the other or abandon his realism.
There are two responses the realist can make to these
points: one is that it is not normally the case that with two
extant theories of the same phenomena, there does exist a
straightforward translation algorithm, and that the realist is
not therefore normally faced with such a situation; another is
that in the cases where there really is such a direct
translation, we simply do not have the means for deciding
between the two rival theories, and that this situation in turn
should be taken to indicate that we need to discover more, via
development of existing theories, which would make ready
translatability impossible, and a choice possible. This
suggests, again, that the realist position, as Feyerabend (1964)
points out, is heuristically fertile in a way that the
instrumentalist position is not: when faced with such a ready
translatabilty, where there appears to be nothing to choose
between two competing theories, the instrumentalist would simply
accept the situation (this would appear to be Duhem's response,
if one considers his comments above). The realist, however,
finds it unacceptable, and this spurs him on to richer
development of the theories in question, and the possibility of
discovery resulting from this.
31
The Underdetermination Thesis, then, is not as worrying to
the realist as it may seem, but the Duhem-Quine Thesis is a
major worry, for several reasons, the principal one being this:
if a major component of instrumentalism is the claim that
theories are neither true nor false, and if, as falsificationist
realists, we have abandoned any simple verificationism, whereby
theories can be said to be undubitably true, then it is
essential that falsification is possible, otherwise, we end up
accepting that our theories can neither be verified nor
falsified. To accept this is to abandon realism altogether and
allow that our theories are indeed neither true nor false.
The realist must deal with one of the points on which Duhem
and Quine express the same view, namely the possibility of
testing single hypotheses. Both point out that a given
prediction (upon which one might devise a crucial experiment) is
usually based on several assumptions which are either internal
to the theory or are part of the assumed background knowledge
within which the theory is located (part of the 'metaphysical
research programme' in Popper's terms). It is from a
combination of these factors that consequences of the theory are
deduced, and therefore any clash between the consequences so
deduced and experimental results does not constitute a direct
falsification of a single hypothesis, but a problem for the
theory and its background knowledge taken as a whole. Thus
disconfirmation can be avoided by suitable adjustments to either
the theory and/or its background knowledge.
In order to assess the degree of difficulty created for the
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realist, it is important to distinguish between various versions
of the Duhem-Quine thesis. A very strong interpretation, that
which Quine appears to be making (though see the reservations
expressed in his reply to Grunbaum, in Harding 1976) is that
auxiliary devices are always available when such a clash between
a theory and experimental results occurs. As Grunbaum notes, the
onus is on the proponents of such an interpretation to provide a
demonstration that for any set of data deduced from a specific
hypothesis (the 'target' hypothesis), there will be a set of
nontrivial auxiliary hypotheses which, together with the
'target' hypothesis, will guarantee the same set of results. It
is also important to stress the importance of the nontriviality
requirement here: if all Quine is saying is that there will be
some set of auxiliary hypotheses, no matter how ad hoc and
inelegant, then this is rather a trivial remark and certainly
not a matter for concern for the realist. Grunbaum points out
that, because it cannot be guaranteed that such a saving set of
hypotheses will exist in any given case, this strong version of
the Duhem-Quine thesis is a logical non-sequitur: from the
occasional inconclusiveness of crucial experiments, Duhem
assumes inconclusiveness to be the rule.
It seems clear that this strong version of the thesis is
not especially interesting. Consider, however, the weaker claim
that we may in fact find that an appropriate set of saving
hypotheses is available in some cases, and that falsification
becomes impossible under those circumstances, and following from
this, that we cannot ever be certain that such a set of devices
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is not available in any given case. This seems a valid enough
point. However, I do not think that it entirely undermines
the sort of falsificationist realism adopted by Popper, though
it does force some sort of retreat from the strongest versions
of falsificationism (the sort Lakatos 1970 refers to as 'naive1,
as distinct from his weaker 'sophisticated' version). Popper
allows that single hypotheses are tied both to the internal
structure of the theory and to the backgound data in the way
indicated, and he also accepts that there is a strong
conventionalist element in our background knowledge, which is
assumed, but not accepted as confirmed, or even probable. All of
this is part of Popper's fallibilism, in which we cannot be sure
of the foundations upon which our theoretical frameworks are
built, but we can nonetheless get falsifiable theories out of
this construction and thus make progress; furthermore, we may be
able to pinpoint the part of a theoretical network which is
responsible for the collision with experimental results.
The Duhem-Quine thesis does not, of course, amount to a
claim that entire theories are unfalsifiable, father it asserts
that only whole theories, and not specific hypotheses are
falsifiable. Thus, falsification, even if only of entire
theories, is still possible. The falsificationist realist also
has open to him the sort of avenue explored by Lakatos (1970),
whereby, even if we accept that 'instant' falsification of the
sort assumed by the naive falsificationist is rarely possible,
falsification is indeed possible in terms of 'progressive' as
opposed to 'degenerating' problem-shifts, where the odds against
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a particular theory mount as attempts to save it become not only
excessively ad hoc and inelegant, but decline into lower and
lower degrees of empirical yield. Once we get to this stage, of
course, we are dealing with a very much modified version of
realism, but it is one which is nonetheless workable.
Realism, then, is able to survive the set of
instrumentalist challenges which I have cited under the general
heading 'transcendence of data by theory'; however, these do not
exhaust the range of possible serious objections to realism, the
remainder of which I have grouped together under the heading
'overthrow of theories'. Furthermore, both the
underdetermination thesis and the Duhem-Quine thesis re-emerge
as being equally problematical when one comes to consider the
development of theories and the manner in which one theoretical
framework gives way to another.
(ii) Overthrow of theories
Major discontinuities in scientific theories seem to lend
credence to the instrumentalist claim that theories come and go,
but that what matters is that there is a steady build up of
empirical results which constitutes real progress. Attached to
this is the notion that the real descriptive part of a
superseded theory lives on when old theories are replaced. The
instrumentalist can claim that the realist is facwed with
insurmountable difficulties in trying to show that there is
either (a) semantic continuity from one theory to its successor
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or (b) any sort of convergence or approximation towards the
truth, in the sense of Popper's verisimilitude. If the
instrumentalist is right about this, then it does look as though
we have either discrete changes from one theoretical framework
to another, and only a build up in the range of phenomena dealt
with constituting progress, or old theories changing like
shifting networks, almost independently of the data. Either way,
our theories begin to look like dispensible instruments for
achieving greater degrees of empirical success.
Both the Duhem-Quine Thesis and the Underdetermination
Thesis are relevant here too: the idea that we can accomodate
recalcitrant experiences by means of adjustments to the system
supports the general picture of our theories as shifting
networks which are only tenuously connected to the phenomena we
want them to account for; this picture of theory development
strengthens the notion that they be treated as dispensible
instruments. And the Underdetermination Thesis would lead us to
expect radical discontinuities as the norm: they would follow
from the fact that it is always possible to construct a
logically distinct alternative theory for any given range of
phenomena.
I have argued that realism can be saved from the most
worrying aspects of these two theses, but how is the realist to
deal with the arguments about semantic continuity and
convergence? Regarding the notion that the semantic core of a
theory is transmitted to successor theories, I argued in the
previous chapter that Harre's verificationism was untenable
because we could only be certain that some part of the meaning
of theoretical terms would be thus transmitted, but not which
part, or how much. This argument against verificationist
realism rather rebounds on the falsificationist realist,
however. If we allow for such a heavy dose of fallibilism , we
begin to concede to the instrumentalist that our theoretical
constructs are divorced from the data in a rather disturbing
way. Our theories begin to look like shifting networks of
constructs whose internal changes, the changes in the meaning of
its terms, are triggered by the data, but in a very indirect
way, and in a manner such that we cannot point to any stable
part of the scheme.
One response to this is to claim that there is indeed some
kind of semantic continuity in the form of the semantic core of
a theory (cf Lakatos 1970 for this sort of suggestion) which, it
is claimed, will remain stable from one theory to its successor.
The principal objection to this is that we cannot identify what
the core is on anything other than a post-hoc basis; it is only
once we actually have the successor theory that we can outline
the aspects of the meaning of its terms which are shared with
its predecessor. It would be impossible to predict in advance
what the shared elements might be. Thus for example, what seems
to the Einsteinians to be the core of Newtonian mechanics is
unlikely to have appeared thus to the Newtonians.
This seems to lend credence to Feyerabend's (1975) notion
of the 'incommensurability' of theories: semantic continuity
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from a given theory to its superseding theory is impossible,
such that a term like 'electron' in one theory of the structure
of the atom has neither the same sense nor the same reference as
the same term in a later theory. Putnam's (1975, 1982 and
elsewhere) response to this is to appeal to what he calls the
Principle of Charity (or Principle of the Benefit of the Doubt):
scientific terms are not synonymous with descriptions; a term
such as Bohr's 'electron' may thus have a different description
from our current term of the same name, but the two are
'approximately' about the same thing. Thus, both Bohr's term
and ours refer.
However, one must then beware of claiming that any
theoretical construct, once postulated, refers. We must allow
that some terms are abandoned because their function in theories
causes complexity and failure to account elegantly for the
phenomena, and this is as good a reason as any for saying that
they do not refer. How then does the realist account for terms
like 'phlogiston' which, he claims, have never referred?
Putnam's proposal is that, for the Principle of the Benefit of
the Doubt to operate, other factors must be in place, such as
our capacity to account for the same range of phenomena dealt
with under the previous theory. Since such factors were not in
place when phlogiston theory was supersed, and the account given
of the phnenomena by 'phlogiston' did not live on as a limiting
case in the subsequent theory, we can conclude that the term did
not then and does not now refer. In this account, heuristic
and methodological criteria for decisions about the status of
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our constructs are stressed, and this, I think, is the right
approach.
These considerations bear directly on the second of the two
problems in question, namely the difficulty the realist has in
maintaining that science is convergent upon the truth, that we
achieve progress by means of greater and greater degrees of
approximation to the truth via the process of falsification
(Popper's notion of verisimilitude and its concomitant notion
'corroboration'). If we do face this difficulty in maintaining
that there is some sort of semantic continuity between
successive theories, how can we sustain the idea that our
theories gradually allow us to build up an increasingly faithful
picture of how the world is? The most extreme response that I
know of to this is Worrall's (1982) in which he abandons
verisimilitude altogether and concedes that our superseded
theories are not approximately true, but plain false. This
leaves him with an absolutely minimal version of realism: we
cannot know that our theories are true, nor can we claim that
they approximate a correct account of the structure of the world
via the process of falsification.
I do not think that we need go as far as Worrall does in
responding to the problem of convergence. We can make a fair
amount of headway in retaining convergent realism if we adopt
something like Boyd's (1973) version of approximation to the
truth, which runs along the following lines. Boyd makes the
(rather extreme) claim that realism should be taken to be an
EMPIRICAL HYPO THESIS, and furthermore, one which is true, and
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which has explanatory force in accounting for why scientists
(who he says are realists by virtue of their practice) behave as
they do and why science succeeds. Thus, the idea that science
approximates an objective truth is seen as an empirical
hypothesis supported by the facts of scientific practice*. I
have suggested that there is indeed something explanatory in the
realist position in that it does allow us to give an account of
why our theories succeed, though, unlike Boyd, I take this to be
a factor in favour of realism as a methodological stance rather
than as an empirical hypothesis. However, the point remains
that if we can maintain a version of a theory of correspondence
between our theories and the world, and if we suggest that it is
some kind of approximation to the structure of the world that
allows our theories to succeed, then the notion of
verisimilitude is salvageable, and with it semantic continuity.
The means of retaining continuity and convergence are,like
the realist arguments against underdetermination,
methodological, and heuristic in particular. And there is one
further such argument against instrumentalism, relating to
idealisation. It has been taken by some (eg Duhem) to be an
argument for instrumentalism that our theories possess a
precision that is not mirrored in the phenomena they account
* It has been pointed out to me (by J.R. Hurford) that if
metascientific propositions are empirical hypotheses, and
therefore falsifiable, then if we falsify the hypothesis that
scientific realism is an empirical hypothesis, we have falsified
a hypothesis which , by virtue of its being false, is not
falsifiable.
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for, and that we must therefore see them as idealised fictions
which are not to be confused with the real observable data.
This strikes me as being, along with the proposed distinction
between observation and theory language, one of the weakest
instrumentalist claims; it is easily turned to the realist's
advantage: not only are our theories thus idealised, but they
must be. It is not clear that we could gain any knowledge of our
world otherwise, and if idealisation allows us progress in the
way it does, this can be taken to suggest rather strongly that
our idealised theoretical constructs are indeed a fair guess at
the structure of the world which induces the phenomena. Again,
there is no other way of accounting for the success of our
theories other than by adopting this realist position, the
principal warrant for which is heuristic fertility.
Itkonen's (1983:129) objection to this, that there is no
non-circular definition of success, that the success of an
activity depends on its purpose, and thus the criterion for
success changes with changing puposes, is not something the
realist need worry about. It reflects just the sort of
relativism that one would expect in a philosophy of science,
such as those proposed by Kuhn and Feyerabend, which
overemphasises the social aspect of scientific activity. Contra
Itkonen and Feyerabend, I take it as rather evident that Western
science is more successful than African witchcraft; one need
only establish what the withchcraft practitioner himself wants
to count as success (let's say in the realms of physical healing
or weather prediction) to see that Western science is usually
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more successful ON THEIR TERMS as well as on ours (why should
Itkonen assume that these are so different anyway? It seems
fairly obvious what any culture will want to count as success in
the way of dealing with, say healing and weather prediction).
Note the pragmatist element in Itkonen's view, one which I
criticised as trivially self-evident in my discussion of the
pragmatic strand in Quine's position. It is clear that if we
take a position such as Itkonen's seriously, then the entirety
of the framework of rational inquiry descends into a rather
meaningless relativism, which is precisely what Feyerabend(197S)
proposes, of course. All that social relativism amounts to is
the trivially true claim that ANY framework will work better
for us then none at all; that does nothing to impugn the fact
that some frameworks are clearly better than others, and that we
set ourselves the task of selecting from among the available
ones and improving those we have.
This central theme of stressing heuristic fertility and the
desire to know why some frameworks are more successful than
others runs through all of the realist's responses to
instrumentalism, and is particularly relevant when it comes to
assessing instrumentalist trends in the interpretation of
linguistic theories, which I consider in the following chapter.
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CHAPTER 2
A REALIST PHILOSOPHY OF LINGUISTICS
2.1 The realistic interpretation of linguistic theories
Having considered the general issues connected with the
particular version of realism I want to adopt, I turn now to the
question of how it applies to theory construction in
linguistics. My aim will be to stick to the methodology of
theoretical linguistics, though I will inevitably refer to those
characteristics of the methodology of related disciplines (such
as psycho- and socio-linguistics) which I consider to be
methodologically distinct from theoretical linguistics.
It is interesting to consider Chomsky's remarks concerning
the question of the validity of a realist position on the
interpretation of theories in linguistics. That he would
describe himself as a realist is self-evident, but what is
interesting is the question of what this amounts to for Chomsky.
He frequently cites theory construction in physics as the model
upon which theories in linguistics are tested and developed, and
assumes that realism is the norm in the philosophy of physics.
Thus, arguing against the adoption of an instrumentalist
philosophy of linguistics, he says:
'...to say that linguistics is the study of introspective
judgements would be like saying that physics is the study of
meter readings, photographs and so on, but nobody says that.
Actually people did say that during the heyday of
operationalism, but that did not have a pernicious effect on
physics, because even the people who said it did not really
believe it at any relevant level, and they did their work
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anyhow. At any rate, it did not make any sense, and was rapidly
discarded.'
(Chomsky 1982: 33)
As my discussion of the instrumentalist tradition in
the philosophy of science (1.2) shows, this misrepresents both
the content and the history of instrumentalism. Not only was
such a philosophy of science not 'rapidly discarded', it is
still alive and well (cf van Fraassen 1980 for a recent
formulation of the principal instrumentalist arguments). Thus,
Chomsky's idea that physics enjoys a universally accepted
realist interpretation is quite mistaken. So too is his claim
that it 'does not make any sense': as I demonstrated in 2.1, the
instrumentalist's arguments against realism are rather powerful
and force the realist into major revisions of some central
realist claims.
Non-realist philosophies of science are only crudely summed
up in the way that Chomsky describes them, but so too are their
realist counterparts. Chomsky assumes, for example, that the
restriction of the data of theoretical linguistics to intuitive
(in his terminology, 'introspective'*) grammaticality judgements
is a consequence of the adoption of a non-realist philosophy of
linguistics:
'It seems absurd to restrict linguistics to the study of
introspective judgements, as is very commonly done....many
textbooks that concentrate on linguistic argumentation for
* Chomsky's use of the term 'introspective' as a synonym for
'intuitive' is unfortunate; in 5.1, I accept a definition of
intuition which marks it off clearly from introspective
phenomena such as remembering, believing, etc. I show there why
it is important to do this.
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example are more or less guided by that view. They offer
special sets of techniques for dealing with particular data and
thus reduce the field to problem solving, defining the field in
these terms. That is perhaps the natural definition if you
abandon any realist conception of the field.'
(op cit: 33 - 34)
Chomsky is, I think, conflating several different issues
here. When one speaks of 'the study of intuitive judgements',
one must distinguish between at least two distinct approaches.
In the first, one would allow that our object of inquiry is
something over and above any set of grammaticality judgements,
but in this approach, we accept that such judgements are the
principal data on which we test our theories. This is a realist
view, and is in fact the one I adopt. Under this approach, we
do not claim that theoretical linguistics has grammaticality
judgements as its object of study, but that these are its DATA,
its evidential basis. This is completely in accordance with
what realism is all about.
In the second approach, in contradistinction to the first,
we deny that there is some object of study over and above the
data, and then restrict the data to grammaticality judgements:
this is a non-realist position, but is quite distinct from the
first approach. Both of these are distinct from the position
which Chomsky says he wants to allow for (although there is
little evidence that in practice he actually does) whereby we
allow that evidence other than intuitive grammaticality
judgements is directly available for the testing of hypotheses
in theoretical linguistics.
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Chomsky is therefore mistaken in assuming that there are
only two methodological options to choose from here, namely an
instrumentalist 'purely problem-solving' approach, and a version
of realism which admits of more than grammaticality judgements
as evidence. And the option which Chomsky fails to admit of
(the first of the three I describe) is fully consistent with the
most central realist claims.
In adopting this option, I will therefore assume that it is
reasonable to take intuitive grammaticality judgements as the
evidential basis for theoretical linguistics, in the way that
generative grammarians have done for some time, and that it is
also feasible to assume a linguistic reality underlying these
which we are attempting to characterise. This basis for a
realist linguistics is a rather simple and in my view,
unsurprising proposal, and yet it is not without its opponents.
If we add to it the notion that evidence from neighbouring
disciplines do not enter directly into the testing of linguistic
hypotheses we have a version of autonomism which is even less
palatable to many. However, it is one that I want to defend.
Note that I have not characterised this linguistic reality as
psychological, and in fact I will argue (in part two) that to do
so is mistaken. With this added ontological ingredient, the
version of autonomism that I propose becomes even more extreme.
To see the extent to which such radical autonomism is
opposed, one only has to consider the views of those, such as
Derwing and Botha (cf chapters 5 and 3 respectively) , who would
object to the idea of accepting intuitive grammaticality
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judgements as evidence, and those, such as Chomsky (apparently)
and Bresnan who object to allowing ONLY these as the means of
directly testing linguistic theories. In Chomsky's case, we
find the rather odd situation in which he states that other
sorts of evidence are relevant to testing but never in practice
uses, or recognises, such evidence. In comparison with Chomsky,
Bresnan (1978 and elsewhere) has the merit of allowing that
evidence from neighbouring disciplines (principally, psychology)
should enter the testing of hypotheses in theoretical
linguistics, and then in practice trying to develop linguistic
theories which, in her view, fit the psychological evidence.
However, it is interesting to observe that in attempting to
develop such a 'realistic' linguistic theory, Bresnan does
pretty well what one would predict she would do if the
methodological basis of my version of autonomism (not to mention
Itkonen's: cf chap 4) is right. Consider the basic contention
of her lexical functional grammar (LFG) and its relation to the
form and testing of the grammar. She wishes to say that
psychological evidence points to a (mental) lexicon which is
much more than a repository of linguistically arbitrary
information, and therefore constructs a grammar in which a
highly structured lexicon plays a major part. But the
motivation for a grammar with a more highly structured lexicon
need not be psychologically orientated, as is shown by the
existence of such work as Mohanan (1986). Furthermore, it is
not clear that Bresnan uses psychological evidence directly to
test her linguistic hypotheses; in Bresnan (1982), the purely
linguistic argumentation takes place separately from its
supporting psychological evidence. Nor is it clear that the
evidence does not equally support competing linguistic theories
which do not claim to be essentially psychologically orientated.
In fact, given the vast armament of theoretical devices being
used in LFG, it would be surprising if the psychological
evidence did not support some proportion of the framework*.
The point that I want to stress about Bresnan's
'psychologically real' grammar concerns the relationship between
one's metatheoretical orientation and the form of one's theory.
There is no doubt that the form of one's theory is informed by
one's metatheoretical assumptions (thus the importance of the
sorts of issue I am discussing), and this is as true for
Bresnan's grammatical theory as it is of any other. What needs
to be demonstrated by Bresnan is that ONLY her metatheoretical
position, to the exclusion of other competing positions (such as
mine, or Itkonen's, or Katz': cf chapters 4 and 5), gives rise
to the sort of grammatical theory she proposes. If this is not
the case, and I suspect that it is not, then there is no reason
to take linguistic evidence in support of her theory to count as
a vindication of her particular metatheoretical approach.
* Given the range of theoretical apparatus available within LFG,
one wonders whether there is any linguistic state of affairs
that it does not allow for. For criticism of this aspect of LFG
and a proposal that it generates non-possible human languages,
cf Berwick & Weinberg (1986: chaps 3 & 4).
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All of this suggests to me that, if one considers LFG (as
a grammatical framework) and its motivation independently,
Bresnan can be seen to be carrying out two distinct sorts of
activity. The first of these is standard autonomous linguistic
hypothesising and testing, carried out independently of
psychological evidence, and the second is psycholinguistic
investigation which, far from directly testing these hypotheses,
is meant to suggest that they fit with the available
psycholinguistic evidence. My interactionist methodology (cf
chapter 5 for details) suggests that this is precisely the sort
of relationship that would hold between autonomous linguistics
and psycholinguistics. Nor does this methodological position
suffer from unneccessary 'mystical' suggestions as to the
ontological status of the object of autonomous linguistic
inquiry: it is far from mystical to assume a linguistic reality
which is intersubjectively established as a result of social and
psychological processes, but which is distinct from these.
However, I pursue this matter in greater detail in part two.
The adoption of this sort of realism means that any given
theoretical construct in AL (autonomous linguistics) is a
potential candidate for reality, but it does not mean that we
assume the reality of a construct without applying the test of
heuristic fertility. One of the differences that emerges
between my version of realism and Chomsky's can be seen in the
way he denies the reality of certain theoretical notions.
Consider the construct 'system', for instance.
In phonology, Chomsky has long since argued that the idea
of a phonological system is nothing more than a set of
derivative correlations among members of a distinctive feature
matrix. This is closely tied in with his view of the status of
the phoneme, since he assumes that in using a representation
like /p/, one is not referring to either a unitary phonological
whole or a unit within a system of such wholes. Thus, such
representations are 'to be regarded as as nothing more than
convenient ad hoc abbreviations for feature bundles, introduced
for ease of printing and reading but lacking any systematic
import' (SPE: 64). Given an appropriate set of phonological
representations and rules which mediate between those and the
level of phonetic representation, one can apparently construct a
model of phonology which simply does not refer either to objects
corresponding to representations like /p/ or to Praguian-1ike
systems such as /p , t , k /.
The methodological issue here seems straightforward enough:
according to the sort of realism I have discussed, if there are
no generalisations capturable by using /p/-type representations,
then there is no justification for adopting a realistic
interpretation of such a construct. The same goes for the
Praguian (and Saussurean) notion of 'phonological system'. It
does seem rather difficult to account for certain phonological
phenomena, such as the Great Vowel Shift, without reference to
the notion of system, however. While it is true that many
generalisations about the vowel shift are capturable by means of
distinctive feature-based rules and representations, it is not
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clear that in constructing these alone we capture the relational
nature of phonological units and the idea of distance within the
vowel space. And yet it is arguable that this sort of idea is
central to an understanding of what this sort of phenomenon is
about (cf Lass 1984: 7.2 for arguments to this effect). Thus,
it seems that the notion 'system' is methodologically fruitful
and therefore to be interpreted realistically. To deny this,
Chomsky must either define the nature of his realism so as to
exclude the construct from consideration as a real object, or
show that the methodological evidence in its favour can be
argued against convincingly.
Of course, I allow that there are terms/constructs which
cannot be allowed 'real' status, and the question of whether a
given construct must be interpreted this way will depend on its
heuristic fertility. Furthermore, as I argued in 1.1, not only
can we not assume that real status is once and for all, as in
Harre's framework, but nor can we assume that falsification or
the decision not to grant a term real status are once-and-for-
all matters either.
An example, from physics, of this tentative epistemic
status of theoretical constructs* would be the construct
'phlogiston', which failed the heuristic test because the
* I ought to note that Harre (1972) does in fact allow that
scientific constructs never enjoy a permanent, fixed epistemic
status. It seems to me that this observation on his part is in
conflict with his claims about incontrovertible proof of
existence via ostension.
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phenomena it covered did not emerge as a unified whole in
succeeding theories, but was seen to cover disparate phenomena
which were accountable for under distinct sets of principles in
succeeding theories. Consider how one might argue such a case
in linguistics. If one takes the construct 'fortis' (in the
fortis/lenis dichotomy), one might argue that it explains
nothing not explained by other constructs, such as 'voiceless'.
Now, in accordance with the sort of realist methodology I
have discussed, expressions like 'force' are to be granted real
status despite their being said to be 'reducible to' a variety
of derivative phenomena. However, if they allow us to express
generalisations not otherwise expressed concerning these
phenomena, then real status is merited (Putnam's warranted
assertibility). If this were the case for phlogiston, or if it
were resurrected and shown to be so, then real status could be
re-assigned to the term. For 'fortis', if it adds nothing to
the range of phenomena already covered by 'voiceless', then it
looks heuristicaly weak and not available for a realist
interpretation. And I do not think there has ever been any
evidence that it does in fact allow us any heuristic gain over
'voiceless'*.
Similarly, in the case of 'tense' (and 'lax': the dichotomy
is similar to the fortis/lenis one in that it appeals to
* Note that at least one standard phonetics textbook,
Abercrombie (1967), covers the subject matter of articulatory
phonetics without reference to the distinction, which is rather
suggestive.
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putative differences in degree of muscular tension *), if it
were shown that there are generalisations extending over the
phenomena subsumable under 'high', 'back' and 'long', then
tenseness would be available for real status. Lass (1976, 1984)
has long since argued that the 'tense' construct does not
express anything over and above these, that statements
containing the expression can be 'reduced' to statements
containing (one or more of) the former three, with tenseness
being discarded as a theoretical tool (1984: 92). The point
that should be stressed, as I have argued, is not, as Lass
would have it, whether reduction of statements seems possible,
but whether we can get from the term heuristic mileage in the
form of generalisations not otherwise expressible. If this is
missing, then we are not warranted in granting real status to
the feature [1 tense].
Interestingly, Lass' methodology is an instrumentalist one
(cf 2.2), so that it ought only to be methodological
considerations, and not ontological ones, that come into play in
assessing the status of the construct (there is no question, in
an instrumentalist methodology, of whether the expression should
be taken to correspond to something real).
This would not be the case, of course, if Lass were
* Ja kobson & Halle (1964) in fact propose that the phenomena
which these two constructs cover are subsumable under one single
generalisation, ie that tense/lax and fortis/lenis are
manifestations of the same principle.
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prepared to admit of a realist interpretation of terms in
phonetics, and then interpret these phonological terms
phonetically. Alternatively, he could argue that these simply
are phonetic terms, and need not be regarded as phonological
terms reduced phonetically. However, there is no doubt
that this latter avenue is problematical: in discussing these
constructs, we are discussing distinctive features, which are
(to say the least) rather closely tied into matters
phonological, and it is not clear to me just how much of
phonology Lass is prepared to interpret phonetically (quite a
lot, I imagine, given the remarks in his 1984). Lass has a
very sophisticated and sensitive awareness of these
methodological problems, and it is perhaps unfair to use his
1984 to discuss his methodological position, given that it is a
textbook which of necessity makes little of matters
methodological. However, I do think that Lass' position on the
extent to which phonology is reducible to phonetics is much more
reductionistic than mine. I make it clear (5.2) that my
position on this is that to interpret phonological terms
phonetically amounts to an untenable reductionism which deprives
the subject of its very rationale.
One interesting comment which Lass makes is that 'there
seems to be no particular evidence either for the utility OR THE
REALITY of such a feature.' (1976:39, emphasis added). He then
goes on to ask the obvious question, namely 'what does it mean
to say that a feature is 'not real' ?'. He cites three
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different factors in this connection : the first of these is an
argument that tenseness can only be identified by means of its
EFFECTS (on vowels). This is, I think, not a good objection.
Many, if not most, of the things for which we might want to
claim real status are available to us only through their
effects. And the fact of evidence from effects is something
which Popper uses as his principal argument for the reality of a
postulated entity. Forces are a good example of this.
Lass' second point is that there is 'no empirical
(instrumental, perceptual) evidence given for the feature'.
Again, this is a weak objection, I think. There is no reason
why there should be instrumental evidence for the reality of
such a feature unless, of course, one wants to have phonological
realities interpreted in an entirely phonetic manner.
As Lass points out, these aren't actually arguments
against the feature per se. But nor are they good methodological
arguments either. His third point is, however, the sort of
argument which I think counts against the real status of this
construct, and it is the sort of argument which is important in
the version of realism I adopt. Here, Lass argues that there
is no methodological reason to adopt the feature 'tense', since
there are no generalisations available that are not otherwise
available without the construct. This is about right, I think.
The argumentation must be to do with the capturing of
generalisations, that is, it must be phonological, and Lass'
third argument is of this sort. He argues that reification of
tenseness 'reduces an arbitrarily chosen set of observables to
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a hidden 'generalisation1. The point is that there is in fact
no generalisation to be had that is not already available, and
this lack of heuristic fertility is the most condemning factor
against the possible reality of tenseness. Were there a
generalisation to be had, there would be no reason to object to
it on the grounds that it might be 'hidden': all generalisations
express something over and above the data, and if interpreted
realistically, must be said to be about a 'hidden' reality which
induces the phenomena.
As I have mentioned, there is a defence of the distinction
in Ja kobson & Halle (1964), but it has two major defects. The
first of these is that they accept a definition of the
distinction which is essentially the 'degree of deviation from
the neutral position' sort which Lass shows to be untenable.
The second is the fact that they use as evidence data from
languages with ATR harmony. The principle point of
methodological interest where ATR harmony is concerned is that
such phenomena are now taken by phoneticians (in the light of
subsequent development in general phonetic theory) to be
quite distinct from phenomena such as the English 'tense/lax'
vowel pairs*. Additionally, Ja kobson & Halle identify the
tense/lax distinction with the fortis/lenis one, and assume
that there is a generalisation to be captured here, namely the
identification of these as instances of the same general
* Regarding the purely phonetic distinction between tense and
lax, note that work as early as Jones (1950) casts considerable
doubt on its phonetic content.
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principle. Were such a generalisation* attainable, this would
indeed be an compelling reason for asigning real status to the
construct(s) in question. However, what we have here is a case
of a range of phenomena being apparently subsumable under a
single principle, and later turning out, in the light of
subsequent theory development, to belong to separate
categories. Note that there is nothing irreversible in this: the
tense/lax distinction has neither been shown to be
incontrovertibly real nor to be incontrovertibly non-existent.
Rather, there has been a change in the assessment of the
heuristic fertility of the construct. We see in this case an
example of the extent to which methodological considerations
determine our acceptance or otherwise of a construct.
It might be thought that this emphasis on methodological
considerations is a rather instrumentalist-orientated approcah
to take to the evaluation of constructs; this is therefore an
appropriate point at which to try to sustain the realist
position in the face of the instrumentalist case against
realism.
* Note that I have not said anything about what might count as a
significant linguistic generalisation, despite my relying rather
heavily on this notion in arguing for a realist interpretation
of linguistic constructs. The only work I am aware of that
seeks to explicate the notion is Hurford (1977). Hurford's
paper takes this sort of significance to be statistically
definable; he shows that under such a statistically interpreted
notion of significance, word order universals count as
significant generalisations. There is a problem here for my
methodological stance: if I accept Hurford's statistical
interpretation, and if he is right about word order universals,
then I must interpret them realistically, rather than
interpreting as derivative phenomena which are to be explained
be 'deeper' grammatical principles. I have not yet examined the
methodological status of word order universals, however.
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2.2 Instrumentalism in linguistics
Having examined (in 1.2) some of the main instrumentalist
arguments against realism, I now want to look at some of the
interpretations of an instrumentalist sort which have been made
of constructs in linguistic theory, i.e. aspects of what might
be called 'the instrumentalist tradition' in theoretical
linguistics. The first of these is in what might loosely be
called 'structuralist', i.e. pre-generative linguistics of the
sort carried out in the United States in the thirties and
forties (another term might be Bloomfieldian and post-
Bloomfieldian linguistics). Here the influence of Logical
Positivism is apparent; I examine some of its most central
claims and try to assess the extent of its influence on the
methodology of linguists working within this period. The second
is a more recent, and generally more sophisticated, set of
assertions about the way in which we should interpret our
theoretical constructs: those made by Lass (1976, 1980 and
elsewhere), as reflected in his view of our constructs as
'uninterpreted calculus'. Finally, I examine interesting
instrumentalist elements in the work of Itkonen, which I return
to in my discussion of his views in 4.1.
However, before I proceed to this, I must deal with an
objection which, if it is valid, undermines the entirety of what
I am trying to do here. It is this: the instrumentalism vs
realism distinction is one that has been made in the philosophy
of empirical sciences, and applies only to those sorts of
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science. If theoretical linguistics is not such a science, then
the distinction is irrelevant. This objection is incorporated
into a recent statement by Itkonen :
'It is tempting to view the dichotomy of AL (autonomous
linguistics: PC) vs psychologism as exemplifying the distinction
between the trends in the philosophy of empirical science known
as 1instrumentalism' and 'realism'. For this comparison to be
valid, however, it should first be proved that AL is an
empirical science. But this has not been proved. If on the
contrary, AL is a nonempirical science comparable to analytical
philosophy or formal logic, as I have argued all along, there is
no justification for relating it to the 'instrumentalism vs
realism' issue.'
(1983: 284-285)
Not surprisingly, I am inclined to disagree with this. I
must state firstly that I am NOT claiming that the autonomous
linguistics vs psychologistic linguistics distinction
exemplifies the instrumentalist vs realist distinction. In fact,
I want explicitly to deny that this is so. I will argue later
that the instrumentalist vs realist distinction is one that is
applicable even if one abandons psychologism and proposes what
Lass (1980:121) calls 'a radical autonomy thesis' for
theoretical linguistics. Both Lass and Itkonen, I will argue,
make the mistake of assuming that an autonomy thesis (whereby it
is held that theoretical linguistics has an object of inquiry
and a methodology of its own, qualitatively distinct from that
of, say, the physical sciences) is somehow intimately connected
with the adoption of an instrumentalist methodology; this is
quite mistaken, I believe. However, I postpone discussion of
this for the moment (see below on Lass and Itkonen in this
chapter and on Itkonen in chapter 4).
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Itkonen supposes that one can 'prove' that theoretical (or
'autonomous') linguistics is either an empirical or a
nonempirical science. I do not think that proof is a
particularly useful or relevant notion here; on the contrary, we
are dealing here with metascientific argumentation rather than
proof. Itkonen has argued that, in adopting his definition of
what counts as an empirical science, autonomous linguistics
emerges as nonempirical. I point out later (4.1) that it is not
very interesting to argue over what the term 'empirical' OUGHT
to mean, though one clearly ought to have an explicit definition
of the term if one is to use it. I also point out that the
observations about method in theoretical linguistics which
Itkonen makes seem to me accurately to describe what theoretical
linguists actually do (i.e. they do not collect sets of data
and then abstract away from them; rather, they have sets of in¬
formed or well-formed expressions as their data, where the
ill/well-formedness is determined by intuitive grammaticality
judgements). I am therefore quite willing to accept Itkonen's
point that AL is not an empirical science IF 'empirical' means
'testable by observation of spatiotemporal events'. If one wants
to define 'empirical' as 'falsifiable', however, then I am happy
to accept that AL is an empirical science. That is, I take it
that theoretical proposals in AL are falsifiable, but not on the
basis of the observation of spatiotemporal events.
This is distinct from Itkonen's position: he seems to think
(see discussion below for evidence of this), not only that
theories in AL are not falsifiable in this way, but that they
are not falsifiable at all. This means, within my (Popperian)
definition of what counts as a science, that AL is not a science
(this is Lass' conclusion, in fact). Itkonen is using as a
definition of 'science' one that is very different from
Popper's, as it includes analytical philosophy. Since he appears
to take science to be essentially 'axiomatic' in nature, he
characterises formal logic and analytical philosophy as well as
theoretical linguistics as sciences (Lass, on the other hand,
defines 'science' in much the same way as I do, but unlike me,
then decides that theoretical linguistics is not thus a
science).
This at least clears up the terminological problems, and
shows where Itkonen and I disagree on the subject of AL as an
empirical science. And this is directly related to the question
of whether the instrumentalism vs realism distinction is
relevant for a discussion of linguistic theory. My position on
this is as follows: the realism vs instrumentalism debate is
about the status of theoretical constructs, particularly the
question of whether they refer or not to extratheoretical
objects. Whether these sorts of notion are of any use in
investigating the status of theoretical constructs in AL is an
open question. We need to look into the question to find out.
This is precisely what I have been doing here. From my
consideration of the various aspects of the debate and of the
sorts of methodological proposals that have been made in
autonomous linguistics, I conclude that we can in fact gain a
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fair amount of insight into metatheoretical issues in AL by
considering the realism vs instrumentalism dichotomy. I intend
to demonstrate this further here by considering what I call the
instrumentalist tradition in linguistics; interestingly, this
sheds light on the work of Itkonen himself, and ties in with the
sorts of ontological problem that Itkonen is concerned with,
which I consider in subsequent chapters.
(i) Twaddell, Bloomfield and Harris
To take the first of my three areas of discussion, the
nature of logical positivism and its influence on structuralist
linguistics: the sort of importance attached to observability
which I mentioned in the introduction to this chapter is very
much evident in, and in fact constitutes much of the basis of,
the logical positivist philosophy of science. A central
component of their set of proposals was an attempt to
demonstrate that metaphysical propositions are not meaningful,
that the only meaningful propositions are those that are
elementary and correspond to simple facts of observation, or
those that are more complex than this, but which are
constructed out of series of elementary propositions via the
logical operations, such that their truth or falsehood is
entirely dependent on the truth or falsehood of the elementary
statements in question, the elementary statements being
expressed wholly in observation language. They also held that
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such elementary propositions are empirically verifiable, and
that we gain knowledge via this process of building up
meaningful propositions out of elementary empirically verifiable
statements. It follows from this that when we attempt to
communicate via metaphysical statements, which are not so
constructed, we literally fail to communicate at all: we have
not said anything meaningful (i.e. we have said nothing; note
the similarity between this and the Wittgensteinian private
language argument: whereas metaphysical assertions might
reflect some sort of inner state of the speaker, they cannot be
said to be meaningful, where meaning is intersubjective).
These fundamental doctrines of logical positivism, as
expressed by the members of the Vienna Circle (sucli as Schlick,
Carnap and Neurath), can be seen as constituting an alternative
to realism when one considers the proposition 'there is a
transcendent external world'. Since this is not reducible to a
set of elementary observational statements, it must be taken to
be a metaphysical assertion. As such, it is taken to be
meaningless within the logical positivist approach. Schlick
(1932) was at pains to point out that they were not DENYING the
existence of an external world, but were saying that such
assertions, and also their negations, were meaningless
metaphysics, that in asserting them we assert nothing. This is,
for instance, what Catnap's (1956) 'criterion of significance'
states: only statements in observation language are meaningful,
and that which cannot be reduced to observation language has no
meaning.
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I have already outlined the principal objections to this
sort of observation/theory distinction in chapter 1; note that
it can lead to a version of sensationalism such as Mach's very
easily, since the notion 'physical object' can be objected to by
saying that the proposition 'there are external physical
objects' is equally as metaphysical as 'there is an external
physical world'; all we have as a certain basis for our
knowledge are observation experiences, i.e. sense experiences.
Consider Mach's comment that our theoretical constructs are best
interpreted as devices for stating as economically as possible
sets of laws about our sense experiences:
'Properly speaking, the world is not composed of "things"
as its elements, but of colours, tones...in short, what we call
individual sensations.... the whole affair (of constructing a
physical theory: PC) is a mere affair of economy.'
(Mach 1893/1966: 579)
An interesting consequence of taking this line is that it
ends up in a philosophy which becomes increasingly solipsistic:
the only foundation for our knowledge is our subjective sense
experiences. There are a couple of ways of attempting to avoid
this conclusion and still retaining positivism, however. One is
Russell's (1912), in which a distinction is made between the
content of our sense experiences as individuals (these are
distinct even in those circumstances when two or more
individuals might be said to be perceiving the same object) and
what he calls their structure, by which lie means the
circumstances under which they occur; it is this which is
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remarkably similar from one individual to another. This is 110
real solution to the problem, though, since it is impossible to
tell that the circumstances under which our shared sense
experiences occur are similar unless one makes the metaphysical
leap of simply asserting that this is so in order to make sense
of our reports of sense experiences. A more workable solution
is Schlick's, which is to avoid saying that physical bodies are
'complexes of sensations', and to say instead that
'propositions concerning bodies are transformable into equivalent
propositions concerning the occurrence of sensations in
accordance with laws' (1959:107), so that the subject matter of
a physical theory is not sensations, but laws. As a way out of
Mach's solipsistic sensationalism, which is a fair way down
the road to idealism, this is certainly an improvement on
Russell.
Obviously, the problem will not arise if one adopts tlve
realist position of the sort that I stated in 2.1: we can
assume, with Quine, that both the notions 'physical world' and
'physical object' are myths which allow us a great amount of
progress in managing our experiences, and we can add the realist
argument that unless we assume that there really are physical
objects and a physical world, there would be no account of why
these notions should do so much work for us. As I've said, this
consequence of logical positivism, that one should end up so
close to such an idealistic philosophy of science, is
particularly interesting: one would have thought, given the
logical positivist conception of the meaninglessness of
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metaphysical assertions which merely express subjective states,
that the last thing one would want to reduce science to would be
the subjectivity of our individual sense experiences. As Poppet-
has repeatedly pointed out, a major factor in favour of realism
is that it allows us to maintain the objectivity of science,
while positivism sees it diminish into, at best, laws about our
sense experiences.
Regarding the claim that metaphysical propositions are
literally meaningless: this has been adequately countered by
Popper (1959, 1963 and elsewhere) whose version of realism
incorporates a demarcation criterion which distinguishes
falsifiable (scientific) from non-falsifiable (non-scientific)
theories, while not proposing this as a criterion of
meaningfulness. By thus allowing that metaphysical propositions
may be meaningful, and allowing that scientific frameworks may,
and frequently do, develop from metaphysical 'pictures of the
world' (metaphysical research programmes), Popper gives a very
convincing account of how scientific frameworks arise. Examples
are the heliocentric view of our world, the planets and our sun,
which did develop into a falsifiable framework from its roots in
mythology, and metaphysical research programmes such as
Darwinianism, whose central picture of the way in which living
systems evolve, is not, as Popper points out, itself
falsifiable, but which yields hypotheses which are. Some (eg
Hesse 1966) have taken this 'picture of the world' notion very
seriously and stressed that scientific theories are best viewed
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as models or metaphors, emphasising this rather than
falsifiability and convergence on the truth as a means of
characterising the scientific enterprise. This has tended to
lead to a non-realist interpretation of scientific theories,
with the emphasis on the fact that there may be many different
possible 'world pictures' of equal value. However, allowing
that there is this metaphorical aspect to scientific theories
need not diminish the realist's position; Popper has adequately
incorporated the notion into his convergent realism, and others
such as Boyd have taken an even more extreme realist stance,
claiming that our theories as metaphors 'cut the world at its
joints'(Boyd 1979:393).
What does seem to have emerged as a consensus, among
realists and non-realists alike, is the view that our theories
do have an irreducibly metaphysical ingredient, whether one
refers to this in terms of metaphysical research programmes
underlying theories, or theories themselves as metaphors. The
logical positivist attempt to divorce scientific theories from
metaphysical assumptions can be said to have failed. However,
my aim here is not to criticise logical positivism at length,
and one wants to avoid setting up a positivist straw man in
order to maintain realism; it is clear from 2.1 that some of the
core notions of this sort of 'consistent empiricism' (as it was
also known: cf Schlick 1932) can be developed into sophisticated
instrumentalist arguments which do seriously weaken realism.
What I do want to do is to examine the effects of logical
positivism on the methodology of linguistic analysis in the
United States in the thirties and forties, much of which is
important because it forms the methodological background against
which generative principles were formulated.
In talking about the influence of positivist thought upon
linguistics, I am not concerned with establishing that, say,
Bloomfield, or Harris, read and was consciously guided by the
works of the Vienna Circle. Rather, I want to suggest that many
of the central ideas of positivism came to constitute a general
intellectual climate of opinion concerning the nature of
science, (Miller 1973 makes this point very clearly) and that
this had important repercussions for the way in which linguistic
analysis was carried out (and of course, this in turn had
consequences for the way in which post-generative work was
done). An interesting statement of an instrumentalist
methodology for linguistic analysis comes from Twaddell's (1935)
paper on possible interpretations of the 'phoneme' construct.
Having starting with an argument from idealisation (that we
arrive at the phoneme via abstraction from a corpus of data), he
asserts that :
'The macro-phoneme is a fiction, defined for the purpose of
describing conveniently the phonological relations among the
elements of a language, its forms. The sum of such relations
among the elements is the phonological system of the language.
This phonological system is of course nothing objectively
existent: it is not definable as a mental pattern in the minds
of the speakers of the language; it is not even a 'platonic
idea' which the language actualises The phonological system
is the phonetician's and phonologist's summarised formulation of
the relations; it is not a phenomenon, nor an intuition.'
(1935: 76)
This paper is interesting because of its rejection of even
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a physical definition of the phoneme, which represents the
consensus view among structuralists of the period and is itself
largely influenced by positivist physicalism. The rejection of a
psychological interpretation is typical of the positivist
influenced work of the time: the idea that science is concerned
with observables is here interpreted such that mental phenomena
are taken to be unobservable and therefore not the proper
concern of the scientist. Of course, logical positivists
themselves did not assume that mental phenomena were not a
proper object of scientific inquiry; rather, they assumed that
notions such as 'mental' were reducible to statements concerning
observable behavioural phenomena: here we see how the legacy of
positivism helped mould methodological trends, rather than
functioning as the explicitly adopted scientific method for
linguistic inquiry.
Many of the instrumentalist arguments against reaiism can
be seen in Twaddell's methodological position: pragmatism
(stressing the purpose of the investigator), the denial that
theoretical constructs have theory-external referents, the
emphasis on patterns and relations among the phenomena. But
note the extent to which Twaddell cannot help but incorporate a
realist ingredient into his instrumentalism: he allows himself
to talk of relations and (phonological) forms in a realist
manner. If the phonological system is nothing which actually
exists, and if it is the sum of the relations among the forms,
are we to conclude that the relations and forms themselves are
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not objectiovely existent? Or do we assume that we can
legitimately speak of the existence of forms and the relations
between them, assuming that any theoretical statement is
reducible to a statement about forms and their relations, and
not anything over and above these? This would seem to accord
with Schlick's reductionist position. It is open to the usual
objections to reductionism: one cannot help smuggling
theoretical concepts into the picture (recall Putnam's point
that even in the most 'observational' of statements, terms like
'physical object' appear), and these themselves are used in a
realist way: Twaddell speaks of relations as if they were
observable, but they are in fact abstractions of the very sort
that he wishes to assume no ontological commitment to. Thus he
would be forced, in order to maintain a consistent
instrumentalism, to allow that even his 'observables' are
abstractions, and would have to retreat to the kind of
solipsistic position I described in relation to logical
positivism, where the only realities are sense experiences.
I have concentrated here on what I think are the weakest
points in Twaddell's methodological position; it should be
pointed out that his arguments against physical ism and
psychologism are impressive (it is interesting, given subsequent
historical developments in the philosophy of linguistics, that
he considers a Platonistic interpretation of the phoneme
construct). My main point is that, in abandoning these, and in
appreciating the fact that our constructs do not correspond in
any simple way to extra-theoretical entities, one need not
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embrace instrumentalism as the only remaining alternative. This
is, in fact, precisely the point I want to make about the work
of Lass and Itkonen on the subject.
In fact, it is this combination of a non-instrumentalist
methodology coupled with an autonomy thesis of the sort proposed
by Lass (1980) that constitutes the main thrust of my proposals;
it is a combination which has been overlooked. As evidence that
it has been overlooked, consider Twaddell's conclusion that the
construct 'phoneme' cannot be said to correspond to a physical,
to a psychological, or to a Platonic reality, and his assumption
that we must must therefore adopt an instrumentalist position.
My proposals suggest that these do not exhaust the available
options. The same can be said in relation to Katz'(1980)
proposals (cf 5.1): he assumes that if we abandon
instrumentalism and psychologisin, Platonism is the only option
left open. Similarly, Lass and Itkonen assume that
instrumentalism is the only avenue left open when one adopts an
autonomy thesis. I hope to show that this combination of realism
and an autonomy thesis of a particular sort (not the Platonic
sort) constitutes a fruitful methodological basis for
interpreting grammatical theories.
To return to structuralist linguistics: it may be argued
that Twaddell is not wholly representative of the
instrumentalist position in structuralist methodology; since, as
Joos (1957:80 ) points out, his position on the interpretation
of the phoneme was not widely adopted, it is perhaps best to
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examine the views of Bloomfield, and later those of Harris,
as being more representative of the period.
Bloomfield's methodological views generally represent a
much more thoroughly positivist position than those of Twaddell,
incorporating a version of physicalism very similar to that of
the logical positivists. However, as Itkonen (1978:70) has
pointed out, Bloomfield did not subscribe to the view, held by
Twaddell and Harris, that a corpus of utterances constitutes the
database for linguistic analyses, and in this respect, his
philosophy of linguistics is less positivist than it might have
been.
The following indicates the influence positivism did have
on Bloomfield's methodology:
'The only useful generalisations about language are
inductive generalisations.... when we have adequate data about
many languages, we shall have to return to the problem of
general grammar... but this study, when it comes, will not be
speculative but inductive.'
(Bloomfield 1935: 20)
This is in stark contrast to Chomsky's views on the matter,
and is linked to Bloomfield's reductivist insistence that every
structural unit postulated by the linguist must be reducible to
some physical phenomenon; take, for example, his definition of
the phoneme: 'A minimum same of vocal feature is a phoneme or
distinctive sound' (1926:27). Thus inductivism and reductivist
physicalism constitute the core of Bloomfield's methodology. I
argue that physicalism is not a viable basis for interpreting
linguistic constructs. And while it may not seem especially
novel to criticise the physical definition of the phoneme, I
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want to argue that it is still with us, and that reductionisiu of
this sort in phonology has never really gone away: cf 5.3 on
'phoneticism' in phonology. I will not concentrate on
Bloomfield's statements as to linguistic meaning in relation to
stimulus-response behaviourism, which has been adequately
criticised elsewhere (cf Itkonen 1978: 68-71 for some
interesting criticism, though Itkonen assumes, mistakenly I
believe, that Bloomfield's physicalist definition of the phoneme
has been adequately dismissed). However, I do want to point out
that there is some considerable similarity between the
(untenable) physical definition of the phoneme and the
interpretation placed upon the notion within generative
linguistics, which one would normally take to be non-physicalist
and non-instrumentalist ( in this respect, cf 3.2 for my account
of Chomsky as a reductionist).
Consider the comments by Jacjjkobson and Halle (hereafter
J&H) on the physical definition of the phoneme in their early
defence of distinctive features:
'This so-to-speak 'inner', immanent approach, which locates
the distinctive features and their bundles within speech sounds,
be it on their motor, acoustical or auditory level, is the most
appropriate premise for phonemic operations, although it has
been repeatedly contested by 'outer' approaches which in
different ways divorce phonemes from concrete sounds.'
(1968: 415; revised version of J&H 1956)
J&H then go on to criticise Twaddell's fictionalist
treatment of the phoneme on the grounds that it divorces
phonological analysis from its 'correlate(s) in concrete
experience' (418) and demand that 'any distinctive feature and,
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consequently, any phoneme treated by the linguist, have its
constant correlate at each stage of the speech event and thus
be identifiable at any level accessible to observation.'(loc
cit). This position is identical to Bloomfield's and is open to
all of the criticisms that have been made of it since (at the
very least) Twaddell's in 1935 including the point that there is
no evidence that there are any such constant physical features
which can be picked out in any given instantiation of a phoneme.
Were it not for the fact that this early paper was revised
before its 1968 publication, this might seem a kind of pre-
generative statement from Halle. Yet the same point of view is
repeated in several papers by Halle in the early sixties.
Consider his comments in the (1962) paper 'Phonology in a
generative grammar' (reprinted in Fodor & Katz 1964)':
'..all references to segments as "/s/" or a "labial stops"
are to be understood as unofficial circumlocutions introduced
only to facilitate exposition, but lacking any systematic
import'
(footnote 2, p.336)
That is, in this strikingly instrumentalist proposal,
phonemes are reducible to distinctive feature clusters, and if
these are entirely definable physically, then we have, within
generative grammar, exactly the same methodological basis for
interpreting phonological constructs as Bloomfield had.
I find this fascinating since it shows how persistently
reductivism, physicalism, and instrumentalist interpretations of
theoretical notions recur. And, as I point out below,
instrumentalism need not appear in conjunction with reductivism
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and physicalism, as Lass' and Itkonen's suggestions demonstrate.
If Bloomfield's views are unnecessarily burdened with
positivist assumptions, and generative work has not entirely
dispensed with them, it is interesting to consider the views of
Harris, whose work is commonly taken to constitute the
historical link between structuralist and generative
linguistics. Unlike Bloomfield, and like Twaddell, Harris takes
the data of linguistic theory to be observable events, or
regularities among those events, selected from a corpus. The
data, for him, are behavioural:
' Investigation in descriptive linguistics consists of
recording utterances in a single dialect and analysing the
recorded material. The stock of recorded utterances constitutes
the corpus of data, and the analysis which is made of it is a
compact description of the distribution of elements within it.'
(Harris 1963: 12)
'In investigations in descriptive linguistics, linguistic
elements are associated with particular features of the speech
behaviour in question, and the relations among these elements
are studied.'
(op. cit.: 17)
I argue below (4.1) that the proposals as to the corpus-
based nature of theoretical linguistic inquiry are neither
viable as a description of how work ought to proceed in
theoretical linguistics, nor of how it actually does proceed.
For the moment, I will concentrate on the relationship which
Harris takes to hold between what he takes to be the
'observable data' and the theoretical constructs we devise to
account for them. For Harris, these are merely 'symbols' upon
which operations can be performed:
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'However, in the course of reducing our elements to simpler
combinations of more fundamental elements, we set up entities
such as junctures and long components which can only witli
difficulty be considered as variables directly representing any
member of a class of portions of the flow of speech. It is
therefore more convenient to consider the elements as purely
logical symbols, upon which various operations of mathematical
logic can be performed.'
(op cit: 18)
This reflects most of the instrumentalist preoccupations of
the logical positivists, and all of their shortcomings. It is an
attempt to separate theoretical from observational terms and to
avoid ontological commitment to the former. Against it, not
only does the realist argue that this separation is impossible;
he also points out that if constructs like 'long' and 'juncture'
are heuristically fertile, this is sufficient warrant for
granting them 'real' status. We can claim that linguistic
systems do actually have length as a function, and that the
temporal length we perceive is a manifestation of this (Arnason
1980 uses the terms 'quantity' and 'length', respectively, to
distinguish these). If we find that constructs such as
'juncture phoneme' do not have the heuristic fertility of other
constructs, then we are justified in abandoning them in favour of
others, which in turn we are warranted in claiming 'real' status
for. What sort of reality we are dealing with here is the
subject matter of my discussion in the chapters that follow, but
it seems perfectly acceptable (to me at any rate) to say that
realities such as 'quantity' are neither physical properties of
speech events nor mental realities, but linguistic properties of
linguistic systems per se. But more of this later.
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One aspect of Harris' methodological position which is
found not only in Twaddell's work, but also in the writings of
generativists, is the claim that theoretical linguistics is
corpus-based, and that analyses are abstractions from corpora.
It is interesting that this should have persisted from pre-
generative through to generative methodology. For a defence of
this view (by Pulman) from within a version of Chomskyan
rationalism, and my objections to it, cf 5.1. Itkonen (1978:75)
provides an excellent critique of this notion and also points
out the continuity here between pre-generative and generative
work. Interestingly, though, Itkonen himself proposes a
strongly instrumentalist interpretation of theoretical
constructs in grammatical inquiry (see below for discussion).
(ii) Lass and uninterpreted calculus
One can trace the instrumentalism in Lass' work as far back
as Lass and Anderson (1975) and then down through his 1976 to
Lass 1980, where it finds its fullest expression; traces of it
are even apparent in his 1984 textbook on phonology, which does
not dwell unduly on matters methodological.
In the epilogue to his 1976 work, Lass adopts Popper's
demarcation criterion and argues that linguistics lies on the
metaphysical rather than the scientific side of the demarcation
(but is nonetheless a rational activity); that is, he takes
linguistic theories not to be falsifiable. For him this means
that they are not susceptible to disconfirmation in the face of
'experience', thus:
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'I think that most theories in linguistics are not in fact
scientific in the strict sense, but belong to category (c)
(theories which are not refutable: PC): linguistics is at this
point largely - if not nearly exclusively- a form of philosophy
or metaphysics.'
(Lass 1976: 216)
He then proceeds to argue for the validity of non-refutable
theories (which for him means 'non-empirical') as a valuable
kind of rational activity. He suggests that we recognise that
this is so, and carry on with theoretical linguistics without
pretending that it is an empirical science, or genuinely attempt
to convert it into such a science by turning it into a properly
experimental discipline, along the lines suggested by Derwing
(1973) and Ohala, a move which Lass thinks would be counter¬
productive* .
Lass' views are very close to Itkonen's on this score (see
section (iii) below); my principal objection to them is that
we have a third choice intermediate between empirically testable
theories and non-empirical, non-testable theories, namely
theories which are testable, but not empirically. Thus, one can
test linguistic hypotheses, but not via 'experience' or the
observation of spatiotemporal events. Rather, they are testable
against the data of theoretical linguistics, in the form of sets
of well- formed or ill-formed expressions. In addition to the
data, we have the usual methodological factors which come into
play when theories are to be tested, namely evaluations as to
* I agree with him. I do not have access to the unpublished
manuscript, which Lass refers to; however, I discuss Ohala's
metatheoretical position in detail in 5.3.
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heuristic fertility. If we maintain this sort of realist
position, we can still reasonably talk of there being referents
for theoretical constructs in grammatical inquiry. What the
ontological status of these referents might be is an interesting
question which I deal with at length in part 2; it is clear that
the two questions, one largely methodological, namely 'do our
constructs have referents?' and the other ontological, namely
'what sorts of thing are these referents?' are closely inter¬
related. I attempt to provide a positive answer to the first of
these and to try to answer the second by suggesting (in 5.2)
that the object of inquiry is neither psychological nor social
(assuming we define satisfactorily what 'social' means: cf
chapter 4), nor Platonic, but something other than these, a
largely autonomous object which belongs to a category akin to
what Popper refers to as 'world three'; this suggestion I owe
to Lass himself, but I have a rather different approach to the
inter-relationship between the methodological and the
ontological questions.
On the subject of this interconnection between the two
questions, consider Lass' comments in his 1980. He proposes, in
relation to the second of these, that it is useful to talk of '
a linguistic world three'(op cit: 122), whereby we can recognise
the possibility of 'language without a knowing/using speaker',
parallel to Popper's epistemology without a knowing agent. This
strikes me as an excellent idea and it is one I try to defend
(chapter 5). However, on the methodological question, Lass
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takes quite a different tack from the one I take, and it is one
which I find worrying; I also think it is rather in conflict
with his response to the ontological question. He says that the
consequences of adopting a view like this are something like
those discussed by Eddington (1938), in which 'the study of a
(putatively) 'empirical' domain is not to be viewed as a
'direct' study of the domain itself, but rather a study of our
knowledge of it.' (123). Eddington's view of physics sees it not
as an investigation of an entity, the external world, which our
knowledge is said to describe, but an investigation of knowledge
itself. This leads to an ontology of 'pure structure', where
our constructs are said by Lass to be 'uninterpreted calculus'.
This strikes me as being excessively instrumentalist; it
reflects the fact that Eddington was something of an idealist,
who was at pains to stress that the world consists primarily of
contents of consciousness. There are striking similarities
between this idealism and the logical positivist philosophy of
science: both assert, against the realist, that it is only the
contents of our sense experiences which we are warranted in
claiming to exist. Take the passage quoted by Lass (p.125):
'To the question: what is X when it is not a sensation in
any consciousness..? the right answer is probably that the
question is a meaningless one - that structure does not
necessarily imply an X of which it is the structure.'
(Eddington 1938:151)
Lass goes on to say that, with the addition of an
instrumentalist metaphysics, this reflects the metatheoretical
view of Harris. But this is an instrumentalist metaphysics.
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Eddington is clearly an instrumentalist, as is Lass in following
him. Both believe that our theoretical frameworks are not about
extratheoretical entities. Lass (p.124) argues that Eddington is
not an idealist in the strict sense, but is simply displaying
'an acute consciousness of the power of an epistemological
framework to dictate the shape of its own contents - as well as
the fact that it always stands as an insuperable barrier to
'direct experience' of anything (there are no theory-free
observation languages' (loc cit). But Eddington's philosophy is
clearly idealistic, thus:
'To put the conclusion crudely, the stuff of the world is
mind-stuff'
'The mind-stuff of the world is, of course, something more
general than our individual conscious minds'
'The mind-stuff is the aggregation of relations and relata
which form the building material for the physical world'
'It is difficult for the matter-of-fact physicist to accept
the view that the substratum of everything is of MENTAL
character. But no-one can deny that mind is the first and most
direct thing in our experience, and all else is remote
inference.'
(Eddington 1927: 281, emphasis added)
And one can stress the fact that epistemological frameworks
have the power to dictate their own contents without abandoning
realism. One needn't see theories as barriers to the
experiencing of reality, but as enabling devices which allow us
to get at the structure of reality. Lass is right, of course,
in stating that there can be no 'direct' experience of reality
without intervening theoretical constructs, but that is partly
what realism is about: the logical positivist notion of direct
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sensory experience and of statements reporting it was not viable
as a picture of how our perceptual system works, and of how we
gain knowledge of the world. By adopting the realist's argument
that our theories get at a reality which induces our sense
experiences (cf Maxwell 1962 for a statement of this sort of
'causal theory of perception'), while still allowing that the
theories shape our perceptions, we avoid the subjectivist trap
of saying that our theories can only be about the contents of
our own consciousness (Eddington) or sense experiences (Mach,
logical positivism).
It might be argued that Eddington is not committed to
idealism in stressing the power of our theories to shape our
perceptions ( I am grateful to Jim Hurford for pointing this
out). I accept this, and I have said that an awareness of this
feature of theories and their epistemological function is
compatible with realism. Nor do I agree with Hempel (1966: 77),
who claims that Eddington 'denies the existence of everyday
objects'. However, it is the notion that the theory-external
world in some sense possesses a mental character that
constitutes Eddington's idealism.
If one is to allow that any philosophy is idealistic (say,
Berkeley's), ie that there are idealistic philosophies, then one
must allow that certain claims about the nature of reality are
idealistic. The most common one I know of (discussed in, for
example, Popper 1963 and Russell 1912) is this: that the
physical world is partly (even primarily) mental and that
we can only speak of the existence of something if we can speak
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of perceiving it (esse = percipi). This is, I think, precisley
what Eddington is saying. It is a position that seems to me
clearly in contrast to the realist one, and has historically
been taken to be so (cf Popper 1963 for discussion of the
historical roots of instrumentalism in idealism, particularly
Berkeley's, and Putnam 1975 for the view that idealism has
historically been in opposition to various versions of realism).
I also think that Lass is mistaken in assuming that the
adoption of an autonomy thesis for linguistic structure (e.g.
whereby we take it to be of the 'world three' sort) means that
we should follow such an instrumentalist interpretation of our
theories. In fact, if world three objects, as Popper (1972)
describes them, are objectively existing objects, independent of
our knowledge of them (epistemology without a knowing
subject), then we are in conflict with this interpretation in
adopting instrumentalism: we cannot both claim that the object
of inquiry exists as an autonomous reality and then DENY that
our theories about it are theories about such an objective
reality. It is only by adopting a realist methodology that we
can square our methodological assumptions with these sorts of
ontological assumption.
Lass' theories-as-uninterpreted-calculus would function as
a thoroughgoing instrumentalism if it were not tied to an
autonomy thesis of the sort he wishes to adopt. And the
ontological assumptions can be pursued if one abandons the
instrumentalism. What I want to do is to adopt Lass' autonomy
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thesis and abandon his instrumentalism, replacing it with a
version of realism. And, having argued for a realist philosophy
of linguistics, I proceed, in part 2, to show why I think that
an autonomy thesis of this sort is superior to the other
currently available ontological positions. Before doing that,
however, I want to look at another instrumentalist philosophy of
linguistics which also brings out the interesting sorts of
relationship which develop between methodological and
ontological assumptions.
(iii) Itkonen's pragmatism
One of the most recent philosophies of linguistics, that
developed by Itkonen (1979, 1983), whose ontological assumptions
are discussed at length in 4.1, contains a great many of the
strands of instrumentalism I discussed in 2.1. I hope to show
here that it is precisely these strands which make it such an
inappropriate basis for describing the methodology of
theoretical linguistics. I will also point out what I think are
interesting links between these issues in the
realist/instrumentalist debate and the question of the
ontological status of the object of inquiry (the subject matter
of part two).
Without going into detail on the bases of Itkonen's
philosophy of linguistics at this point, it can be said that
it centres on the notion that theoretical linguistics has a
qualitatively distinct status from disciplines such as physics,
that its object of inquiry consists, not of observable events
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and regularities, but of social norms which we know intuitively,
and which form the basis for our (speech) actions. These norms,
also referred to as (atheoretical) rules, are describable by
means of rule-sentences. Thus, the rule-sentence 'Complements
follow their governors in English' would describe a norm
(atheoretical rule) which governs our speech acts (where 'speech
act' is used in a very wide sense to refer to any act of
speaking). Thus a speech act corresponding to 'William ate the
pie' or 'John is happy that you've come' would be judged
intuitively to be 'correct' whereas 'William the pie ate' or
'John is that you've come happy' would not. There is no doubt
that these sorts of rule-sentence are things that we would want
to say about English, but there is equally no doubt that in
theoretical linguistics we want to achieve more than simply a
list of such statements. Indeed, a set of 'observations' of
this sort (I use the terms 'observation' here NOT to mean
'spatiotemporal event observed' but something like 'non-
spatiotemporal phenomenon noted': more on what I'm getting at
here later).
Assuming that we want to achieve more than such a set of
(rather uninteresting) observations, and that we want to
establish some sort of account of how our set of observations
comes to be so, we can say that we want the observations to
follow in some way from some sytematic, principled account of
the structure and functioning of the language in question. For
this, we adopt a range of theoretical constructs, such that
sentences containing them express propositions about this
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systematic whole. I have argued that if such constructs possess
a certain amount of heuristic fertility, then we are as
warranted as we can be in asserting that they are candidates for
'real' status. Under this realist approach to the
interpretation of theoretical constructs, then, we are
warranted, for the time being, and until we come up with a
heuristically more fruitful account, in saying things like
'There are such things as governors and complements', 'There are
verbs of aspectual meaning', 'Progressive BE cannot occur in its
own complementation because it is a verb of aspectual meaning
and such verbs cannot constitute part of the complementation of
progressive BE', and so on.
How are we to interpret such statements, if not in a
(suitably sophisticated) realist manner? According to Itkonen,
our theoretical statements, which include our hypotheses about
why the data should be as they are, are not falsifiable, but are
merely 'pictures' or systematisations of sets of rule-sentences,
which in turn are about norms (normative rules). Furthermore,
rule-sentences and hypothetical statements are about the same
thing. Thus:
'...non-trivial grammatical theories, whose truth or
falsity is NOT known, are not empirical theories, but
hypothetical conceptual descriptions, given that both
(atheoretical) rule-sentences and (theoretical) grammars speak
-in different ways- about the SAME normative reality.'
(Itkonen 1978:166, emphasis in original)
Allowing for the fact that I accept his point that
grammatical theories are not empirical, if empirical means not
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testable by means of spatiotemporal observation, it is clear
that Itkonen in NOT allowing that grammatical theories are
nonetheless testable in some other way. This is mistaken, I
believe, for the following reasons. If we distinguish the data
which is to be accounted for from our theories on the one hand
and the some underlying principles, structures or systems of
which the data are manifestations, and which we attempt to guess
at via our theoretical constructs, then it is clear that our
theories are about the underlying principles, and only
indirectly about the data. Rather, the data are what we hope
will fall out from our theories, such that a statement of the
rule-sentence sort will follow in some systematic way from the
set of underlying principles which we postulate. Itkonen adopts
a typically instrumentalist view when he claims that the
systematisation of a set of rule-sentences is nothing more than
a systematisation, i.e. the theoretical terms we use are not
actually ABOUT anything other than the data: they do not refer
to anything, have no referents. Thus the propositions expressed
by statements containing them lack truth value.
My objections to this sort of instrumentalism are precisely
those expressed in 2.1. If we allow, and we must, that not just
ANY systematisation will do, we allow that some are more
heuristically fertile than others, and Itkonen would allow this.
But we are left with no explanation as to WHY some theoretical
frameworks are more fertile in this way. It is only by making
the realist assumption that some frameworks get closer to the
nature of some theory-external reality that we can offer some
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explanation for theory success. Like Duhem, Itkonen simply
accepts that some theories are more fruitful than others and
leaves it at that*. And this induces just the sort of
complacency that we want to avoid: if one framework gives us a
fair amount of insight into the phenomena, why should we attempt
to improve upon it:
If this very relativistic approach to rival theories is
heuristically unsatisfactory, Itkonen's pragmatism is even more
so: he denies (in his 1983:129) that it is even possible to talk
in a non-circular way of one theory being more fertile or
successful than another (as I pointed out in 2.1, footnote 4 ).
Incidentally, this rather contradicts his comments about the
growth of science in his 1978 (p.171) where he seems to think
that believing the earth to be flat is less desirable than
believing it to be round; surely this sort of comment
presupposes precisely the sort of conception of success that
Itkonen says we can only define circularly, i.e. in relation to
arbitrarily changing purposes. From the realist point of view,
the heuristic fertility of supposing the earth to be spherical
* Itkonen accepts (CLT: 134-135) that we CAN choose, on non-
arbitrary grounds, between competing linguistic theories. The
choice between them, however, is not determined by
correspondence between theoretical terms and unobservable
entities, as in the empirical sciences, but by whether a given
theory provides us with a 'good overview of the subject'. This
simply begs all of the questions we have been trying to answer,
and since lie insists on saying that the criteria of goodness
vary from one linguistic school to another, he robs his
discussion of any nonarbitrary grounds for choosing between
competing theories.
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is sufficient warrant for saying that it really is so, unless we
come up with an even more fruitful proposal.
In theoretical linguistics, we end up, in adopting
Itkonen's instrumentalism, by accepting all proposed theoretical
frameworks and assuming that there is nothing at issue when it
comes to deciding between them. This is a warrant for heuristic
complacency, and is interestingly not in accord with what
practitioners actually do (even if one seeks an eclectic
synthesis of current theoretical proposals, one is still
attempting to produce a theoretical proposal distinct from any
single contributing theory, and attempting to select from the
contents of individual theories what one takes to be their most
fertile parts).
It is clear from this that many of the sorts of
methodological assumption discussed in 2.1 have been explicitly
adopted by Itkonen; they appear to have precisely the defects in
investigating method in theoretical linguistics that they have
in investigating the methodological basis of natural sciences.
In discussing instrumentalism in theoretical linguistics, I
have tried to show that the core components of the
instrumentalist challenge to realism have continued to be
proposed, despite the overt switch, since the advent of
generative linguistics, from an explictly non-realist to an
explicitly realist programme. I think I have shown that there
are interesting similarities in methodology between such diverse
writers as Bloomfield, Twaddell, Harris, Lass and Itkonen. I
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think this reflects the strength of many of the core
instrumentalist arguments, with their emphasis on the power of
theoretical frameworks to shape what we perceive and what we
count as success in linguistic analysis. However, I've argued
here and in 2.1 that realism can accommodate these arguments,
and that they can even be turned to the realist's advantage. By
thus accommodating instrumentalist considerations into a realist
methodology, we arrive at a version of realism sufficiently
sophisticated as to allow us to make claims about the 'real'
status of theoretical constructs without falling into the
pitfalls of the sort of naive realism which has been evident in
some work in generative linguistics.
I conclude that the fundamental assumptions underlying the
realist position are more appropriate for theoretical
linguistics than their instrumentalist rivals. In what follows,
I will assume a suitably sophisticated version of realism and
try to tackle the ontological questions which arise from it.
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PART TWO
THE ONTOLOGICAL STATUS OF THE OBJECT OF If/QUIRY
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Introduction
Given a realist philosophy of theoretical linguistics, one
is faced with the ontological question, i.e. the problem of
specifying the nature and status of the reality under
investigation. What I intend to do in what follows is to
describe the range of possible positions which could be taken on
this issue, to identify particular linguists with these
positions, and to argue for a version of autonomism based on
Popper's notion of an autonomous category of objects consisting
of man's mental products. I will therefore attempt to
characterise the positions taken by Botha, Chomsky, Fodor,
Itkonen and Katz and to argue for my position on the basis oj"
what I take to be the weaknesses of theirs.
I appreciate that the methodological and ontological
questions are not sharply distinguished, and that we are not
dealing here simply with a logical progression from the adoption
of a version of realism to the examination of ontological
questions. Rather, the two sets of questions are intertwined in
complex ways. However, it is easier from an expository point of
view to proceed this way, and there are clearly different
versions of realism in theoretical linguistics which depend for
their differences, more or less, on matters ontological.
I will identify three general categories within which a
variety of positions can be located. These are: linguistic
objects as psychological realities, as social realities, and as
realities which are neither social nor psychological. I will
argue throughout for (a version of) the third of these.
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CHAPTER 3
LINGUISTIC OBJECTS AS PSYCHOLOGICAL REALITY
3.1 Materialism and reductionism
(i) Reductionism in psychology
Consider the case for materialism put by Smart (1963). He
argues for a realist interpretation of (macroscopic, microscopic
and sub-microscopic) terms in physics, and rejects an
instrumentalist account of these in terms of sense data
statements. That is, he takes it to be untenable to devise a
realist interpretation of macroscopic objects and at the same
time an instrumentalist or phenomenalist interpretation of sub-
microscopic objects (16-49). He then argues (50-63) that we must
interpret terms and statements in biology and psychology (and
any other 'emergent' domain of inquiry) in an entirely
instrumentalist way. Thus, he proposes that we reduce all
statements in biology and psychology to 'genuine' law-like
statements in physics. Thus there are no 'emergent laws and
properties' (52) but only 'empirical generalisations' (52) in
these two disciplines. This follows from his physicalism: since
there are only physical realities, and since physics constitutes
the study of such realities, then any laws there are will be
physical laws, stateable solely in the terms of physics; any
generalisations which can be made outside of physics are
reducible to genuinely explanatory laws of physics.
It follows from this that our linguistic reality-as-
psychological reality must be describable in terms of 'genuinely
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explanatory' physical laws. This is a very strong version of
reductionism, then: generalisations in theoretical linguistics,
taken to be about psychological states-of-affairs, must be
reducible to physical laws. Indeed, this very position has been
adopted by Botha (1979), which I discuss below (95 - 101).
Before considering the implications of such a reductionism for
theoretical linguistics, however, consider the problems of such
a version of reductionism for psychology alone.
What Smart is saying is that there are no genuine laws of
an explanatory sort in psychology. I have a methodological
objection to his position, however. If he is to reject
phenomenalism, this means rejecting the reductionism it involves
(cf 2.1 on reductionism in phenomenalist philosophies of
science). Consider the phenomenalist1s reductionist position:
it incoroprates an assertion that we give epistemological
priority to sense experiences, i.e. it takes these to be the
only solid realities of which we can be absolutely certain.
Since our knowledge of these is the only certain knowledge we
may have, it follows for the phenomenalist that talk of anything
over and above these involves a metaphysical leap not warranted
by the phenomena. Generalisations concerning so-called
'realities' over and above the phenomena are taken to be
reducible to statements about sense experinces. Thus there are
not generalisations about 'physical realities', only
generalisations, of a truly explanatory sort about sense
experiences.
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Considering that Smart rejects this position, it is rather
odd that he proposes a remarkably similar approach to
generalisations in biology and psychology. In Smart's case, we
see a kind of epistemological priority being given to
macroscopic physical realities (16), which is extended to
microscopic and sub-microscopic realities. But the possibility
that there may be realities over and above these, e.g. those of
a biological and psychological sort, is ruled out , in much the
same way that the phenomenalist rules out the possibility of
physical realities over and above the phenomena. if the
phenomenalist approach to sub-microscopic realities is
impoverislied because it 'gives an ontological priority to
everyday concepts (i.e. concepts relating to the macrophysical,
such as 'table', 'door' , etc) (48), then surely Smart's own
reductionism regarding biological and psychological phenomena is
equally impoverished in giving ontological priority to everyday
concepts of a physical sort. Interestingly, the 'metaphysical
leap' that is required of the realist in assuming that there are
physical realities (such as forces, etc) over and above the
phenomena is very similar to the 'leap' required of the non-
reductionist in assuming that there may be biological and
psychological realities.
It seems to me that the appropriate response to this
question of whether we ought to assume the existence of
psychological realities relates to the sorts of methodological
consideration I discussed in 2.1: just as our realist
assumptions about physical objects (and forces, etc) afford us a
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certain amount of heuristic gain, so assumptions about the
existence of biological and psychological realities may
similarly be heuristically fertile. If the objects, processes
and structures of a biological and psychological sort which we
postulate do possess such heuristic fertility, then we are
warranted in asserting of them that they are potential
candidates for reality.
This would mean that we would allow that it makes as much
sense to speak of there being states of mind, intentions, and
memories in existence as it does to speak of there being stones,
stars and trees. Nor would we have to insist that propositions
con cerning states of mind be reducible to those concerning more
primitive categories, anymore than we would have to speak of
propositions concerning stones being reducible to those
concerning sense phenomena.
In short, I am arguing that the objection to Smart's
reductionism is of the same sort as the objection to
phenomenalist reductionism, which Smart himself is opposed to.
(ii) Physicalist psychologism in linguistics
To see what physical reductionism in linguistics amounts
to, consider the position adopted by Botha (1979) in his
'progressive mentalism'. He rightly points out that Chomsky
fails to 'specify in clear and precise terms the content of his
expressions "to impute existence to theoretical constructs" and
"to attribute psychological reality to theoretical constructs"'
(1979: \] ), claiming that Chomskyan mentalistic claims are
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ontologically indeterminate. In this I agree entirely with
Botha (cf 3.2). However, that is as far as Botha's and my
ontological assumptions coincide. Having thus criticised
Chomsky, he outlines the basis for a physical mentalism,
incorporating a set of conditions on the ontological status of
linguistic entities, an essential one of which is his Physical
Basis Condition, stated thus:
'A theoretically postulated mental entity cannot be granted
existence unless it is somehow realised in the (physical)
mechanisms of the brain.'
(1979: 64)
He takes this even further by proposing another ontological
condition, namely the Neurological Condition:
'A mental entity postulated by a general linguistic theory
cannot be granted existence unless ceratin neurons exhibit
particular properties before they have been exposed to
linguistic experience.'
(66)
I think this reflects a physicalism rather similar to that
of Smart. As such it reflects a lack of understanding of non-
physicalist realism, such as Platonic realism. Thus, Botha
assumes that Platonism is not a version of realism at all, but a
kind of instrumentalism:
'a progressive mentalism (is distinct from) a nonmentalism
such as Platonism whose claims are about fictitious, nonreal
objects 1
(61)
This claim is simply false if Botha is claiming that Platonists
do not claim real status for their ideal entities. Katz, for
instance, makes the following statement:
'I now realise there was all along an alternative to both
the American structuralists' and the Chomskian conception of
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what grammars are theories of, namely the Platonic realist view
that grammars are theories of abstract objects..'
(Katz 1981: 3)
It is clear that 'ideal' in the Platonist sense is not the
same as 'idealised'. An idealised theory is abstracted away
from some set of phenomena. Thus an idealised physical theory
would utilise constructs whose properties are arrived at by
abstracting away from actually encountered singular entities.
An example of this would be frictionless planes, where we
abstract, or factor out, certain properties of actually
occurring planes and ignore others. With mental theories, we
would single out certain relevant properties of mental phenomena
and ignore others (we would have to do this in fact: cf 1.1),
the relevance being decided by the theoretical assumptions we
made. However, such idealised constructs still relate to
actually existing entities (theories referring to frictionless
planes are still about actual spatiotemporal planes). Ideal ( or
'abstract') entities of the Platonic sort, on the other hand,
are not of this sort. Rather, they are taken to be real, but
non-spatiotemporal, entities. In the Platonist's view, they are
not fictions at all. Maintaining this distinction between ideal
and idealised', we see that 'abstract' in the Platonic sense is
parallel to 'ideal' and 'abstracted away from ' parallel to
'idealised'. Botha notes this important distinction but makes
the mistake of assuming that 'ideal' in the Platonistic sense
means fictitious. It does not.
This point is important, as it undermines Botha's claims
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about the ontological status of the object of inquiry in
theoretical linguistics. He states that 'No form of
nonmentalism makes any claim about an underlying reality', and
this forms the basis of his attempt to formulate an ontological
'import' for his progressive mentalism. The first condition he
imposes on his progressive mentalism, the Reality Condition (61)
does not, as he supposes, demarcate Platonism from his version
of mentalism. It is stated thus:
'In order for any form of mentalism to be progressive, its
ontological claims must refer, ultimately, to entities which are
both real and uniquely identifiable.'
Botha mistakenly thinks that this condition draws a
distinction between his progressive mentalism and Platonism.
This is not the case, as we have seen, since Platonism is a
version of realism which does in fact make ontological claims
which refer to entities which are both real and uniquely
identifiable.
Of course, Botha could argue that there is no basis for
assuming the existence of ideal, Platonic objects, but this is
not what he has argued.
There are other methodological problems with the
foundations of Botha's ontological proposals. One of these is
the 'general metascientific perspective' (66) from which he
views these proposals. He states that 'The general tenet of
such conditions (ie his ontological conditions as described
above: PC) is the following: the existence or non-existence of a
mental entity is reflected by the manner in which it does or
does not interact with other kids of entity or process which may
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be assumed to exist.'. Botha quotes Dudley Shapere (1969) to
state the philosophical basis of his ontological conditions: 'To
say that A exists implies ...that A can interact with other
things that exist*. Botha then goes on to state that fictitious
entities (which is what he takes Platonic objects to be) cannot
interact with other existing entities.
This is quite mistaken, and in an interesting way, though
Botha could have turned this comment into something worth saying
about a particular version of Platonism (Katz'). The
interesting mistake that Botha makes is to cite as his
methodological rationale the very rationale that Popper uses to
support a position diametrically opposed to his. Popper cites
the following argument to support his anti-reductionist
proposals for a 'world three' which is ontologically distinct
from the physical world:
'One of my main theses is that World Three objects can be
real...not only in their World One (physical:PC)
materialisations or embodiments, but also in their World Three
aspects. As World Three objects, they may induce men to produce
other World Three objects and, thereby, to act on World One; and
interaction with World One -even indirect interaction- I regard
as a decisive argument for calling a thing real.'
(Popper & Eccles 1977:39)
We see here that the metascientific perspective that Botha
thinks differentiates his physical reductionism from
nonreductionist programmes is EXACTLY the perspective that
Popper uses to argue for a nonphysicalist ontology. Thus, I am
happy to adopt this metascientific perspective as a means of
assessing whether an entity can be judged to be real, but like
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Popper, I see this as a tool for arguing AGAINST physical
reductionism.
The upshot of all this is that neither Botha's
metascientific perspective nor the specific ontological
conditions he proposes are sufficient to rule out
nonreductionist ontologies.
I did mention, however, that there is a point that can be
made about Katz' Platonism which DOES relate to the argument
from interaction. That is that Katz' Platonic objects are said
not to enter into causal relations with mental or physical
realities, and this means, of course, that it is a principle of
Katz' Platonism that interaction cannot occur. The obvious
response to this is that we cannot surely then have any way of
coming to know such Platonic objects. Here, Botha really could
attack Platonism by means of an argument from interaction (as we
have seen, it is not an argument that holds against Popper's
interactionism). Naturally, Katz has a reply to this, which I
take to be unsatisfactory, but that is one of the subjects of
discussion in 5.1.
I have one more methodological comment to make about
Botha's reductionism, and it is this: that his proposals do not
accord well with the actual practice of theoretical linguistics.
The discipline proceeds by means of linguists thinking up
hypotheses and testing these against the data, which are arrived
at by means of grammaticality judgements. This method has
yielded interesting results and has not used neurological
investigation either as its starting point or as a point of
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reference for that matter. This suggests that it is a viable
activity in itself, and that we need not refuse to assign real
status to its constructs because of the absence of neurological
correlates. I do not doubt that the object investigated by
theoretical linguists interacts with, and is constrained by,
neurological factors, in ways which we do not yet know, but this
fact would be recognised, and investigated, in the sort of
interactionist programme I assume (5.2). By thus adopting
interactionism, which allows for a strong autonomy thesis, we
can successfully characterise the way that theoretical
linguistics actually proceeds while allowing for interesting
discoveries about the way in which neurological factors do come
into play. All of this makes for a considerably more
sophisticated, and heuristically more fruitful, research
programme than the sort of physicalist reductionism which Botha
proposes.
Having said that, one must not assume that the sort of
reductionism I have just discussed constitutes the only version
of a psychologically interpreted theoretical linguistics;




One of the most salient debates in the philosophy of mind is
the question of whether mental processes are reducible to physical
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states of affairs, and the debate in which most of the arguments
on this topic have been proposed is the debate between
physicalists of varying sorts, and dualists. This debate can be
referred to as the mind/brain, or mind/body, debate, concerning
as it does the question of whether properties that are
attributed to mind are reducible to brain states. This is a
long-standing and complex philosophical problem, and I make no
attempt to contribute to it. It is relevant for my concerns,
though, as I am attempting to consider various differing
versions of the view that the object of linguistic investigation
is psychological in nature, and one has to give a coherent
account of what is meant by 'psychological' if one is to adopt
this view.
If one is to consider non-physicalist accounts of
psychological phenomena, the work of Descartes is as good a
place to start as any, particularly since (a) the issues he
tackled are relevant to what I am discussing and (b) his claims
regarding innate ideas have played a central role in the
philosophy of linguistics since Chomsky (1966). I will try to
bring out what I see as a crucial link between Descartes'
dualist, non-physicalist position and his proposals concerning
innateness. My concern is not with innateness per se, however,
but with alternatives to physicalism.
(ii) Dualism and psychologism
There are two principal aspects of Descartes' philosophy
which are important for this discussion: dualism and the
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doctrine of 'innate ideas'. Regarding the first of these,
Descartes states, in the sixth meditation:
'In this inquiry, what I first note is the great difference
between mind and body, in that the body, from its very nature,
is always divisible, and mind altogether indivisible. For
truly, when I consider the mind, that is to say, myself in so
far as I am a thinking thing, I can distinguish in myself no
parts; I apprehend myself to be a thing single and entire...The
opposite holds in respect of a corporeal, i.e. extended, thing.'
(trans.Smith 1952: 261)
'In the next place, I take note that the mind is
immediately affected, not by all parts of the body, but only by
the brain, or rather perhaps only by one small part of it, viz
by that part in which the sensus communis is said to be.'
'Finally, I note that each of the motions that occur in the
part of the brain by which the mind is immediately affected
gives rise always to the one and the same sensation, and
likewise note that we cannot wish for or imagine any better
arrangement.'
(op cit: 262)
This partly states the basis of Descartes' dualism: mind is
unextended whereas brain is extended; the two are qualitatively
different and they interact in the sense that brain stimuli are
registered as perceptions in the conscious mind, and conscious
activities of the mind somehow get transmitted via the brain to
the physical world. Of course, few now are willing to accept
such a non-physicalist view of the mind, and perhaps the
principal reason for this is that Descartes' philosophy was
unable to explain how two such distinct entities are able to
interact at all.
However, I want to bear in mind the details of just how
much of a nonphysicalist interpretation of the mind Descartes
had in discussing his proposals concerning innate ideas. On
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innatenes, he states in the third meditation:
'To consider now the ideas, some appear to me to be innate,
others adventitious, that is to say foreign to me and coming
from without, and others to be made or invented by me.'
(216)
In a reply to Regius concerning innate ideas, he writes:
'I have never written, nor been of the opinion, that the
mind needs innate ideas in the sense of something different from
its faculty of thinking. I observed, however, that there were
in myself certain thoughts that did not proceed from external
objects, nor from a determination of my will, but only from the
thinking faculty that is in me; and therefore, in order to
distinguish the ideas or notions that are the content of these
thoughts from other ideas which are adventitious or
manufactured, I called them innate.'
(trans Anscombe & Geacli 1954: 302)
However we regard Descartes' typology of ideas set out
here, and regardless of whether his notion 'idea' was consistent
(cf Kenny 1967 for a critique of the notion 'idea' in Descartes'
work), it is clear that innateness for Descartes is MENTAL
innateness, where 'mental' is interpreted as above, ie relating
to 'thinking substance', unextended and distinct from brain
process. This is important, since we cannot interpret what sort
of innateness Descartes is proposing unless we first understand
his dualist philosophy of mind. It is clear that it would be
possible to posit an innate capacity of a purly physical,
corporeal, extended sort; if we did, we would not be proposing
the sort of innateness that Descartes was proposing.
What is equally as clear is that, with regard to a
specifically linguistic innate capacity, we must specify whether
we are positing as physically or nonphysically (as in Descartes)
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innate faculty. Any proponent of an innatness hypothesis must
make it clear what FORM of the hypothesis he is proposing, ie
whether it is of the strictly Cartesian dualist sort, of a non-
dualist sort, or of a kind neutral with regard to the
dualist/physicalist debate.
The question which naturally arises here is whether
Chomsky adopts a fully Cartesian innateness or not. Having done
this, we can then begin to establish what sort of psychologism
Chomsky is proposing. It is as well, in trying to establish
exactly what Chomsky is claiming, to trace Chomsky's thoughts on
the matter chronologically, beginning with Cartesian
Linguistics. It should be emphasised that my concern here is
not with the rationalist/empiricist debate (cf Cooper 1972,
Sampson 1975 for criticism of Chomsky on this) but with the
question of the nature of Chomsky's psychologism.
It is clear from his comments in Cartesian Linguistics that
Chomsky appreciates Descartes' dualism. Early on in the work he
states:
'Arguing from the presumed impossibility of a mechanistic
explanation for the creative aspect of normal use of language,
Descartes concludes that in addition to body it is necessary to
attribute mind - a substance whose essence is thought - to other
humans.
(1966: 5)
He sums up Descartes' arguments concerning evidence from
language in favour of mind as follows:
'In summary, it is the diversity of human behaviour, its
appropriateness to new situations, and man's capacity to
innovate - the creative aspect of language use providing the
principal indication of this - that leads Descartes to attribute
possession of mind to other humans, since he regards this
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capacity as beyond the limitations of any imaginable mechanism.'
(op cit: 6)
We can conclude thus far that Chomsky is at least aware of,
and appears to accept, Descartes' conception of mind as non-
corporeal. Later in the same work, he adopts the Cartesian
notion of innateness as part of a universal grammar approach to
language:
'By attributing such principles (the organising principles
that make language learning possible: PC) to the mind, as an
innate property, it becomes possible to account for the quite
obvious fact that the speaker of a language knows a great deal
that he has not learned.'
(60)
In Language and Mind (1968), Chomsky expounds the Cartesian
idea of a res cogitans, a non-corporeal mind alongside body, and
states that 'with all its gaps and deficiencies, it is an
argument that must be taken seriously (1968: 7). However,
having later argued against a purely behavioural approach to
mental phenomena, he states:
'On the other hand, the proposals of the Cartesians
themselves were of no real substance; the phenomena in question
are not explained satisfactorily by attributing them to an
"active principle" called "mind", the properties of which are
not developed in any coherent or comprehensive way.'
'It seems to me that the most hopeful approach today is to
describe the phenomena of language and of mental activity as
accurately as possible, to try to develop an abstract
theoretical apparatus that will as far as possible account for
these phenomena and reveal the principles of their organisation
and functioning, without attempting, for the present, to relate
the postulated mental structures and processes to any
phsyiological mechanisms or to interpret mental function in
terms of "physical cuases".'
J
(1968: 14)
I quote at length because it is clear from this that
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Chomsky appears to be adopting, not a Cartesian dualist account
of innateness, but a 'neutral' account of the sort I discuss in
3.3, whereby the physicalist/non-physicalist issue is left
undecided or simply not addressed. I have suggested that this
be called the 'ontology-neutral' approach, but the term is,
interestingly, not too appropriate for Chomsky, since his
position is not entirely neutral. He does go as far as to claim
that the reality under investigation is mental, and this
constitutes the beginnings of an ontological interpretation of
the object of inquiry. The problem is that he does not go on to
specify exactly what we are to take 'mental' to mean. It is
this fact which has given rise to much of the discussion
concerning the content of Chomsky's claimed psychological status
for grammars, and it is this which Botha rightly describes as
the ontological indeterminacy of Chomsky's psychological
reality.
The question of Chomsky's ontological assumptions becomes
more complex if we consider the remarks in his later work. In
Reflections on Language (1970), we find firstly the following
statement, which corresponds to his position in Language and
Mind:
'With the progress of science, we may come to know
something of the physical representation of the grammar and the
language facuity...For the moment, we can only characterise the
properties of grammars and of the language faculty in abstract
terms.'
(36)
However, a later comment seems to suggest a non-neutral
ontological position:
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'Learning is primarily a matter of filling in detail within
a structure that is innate. We depart from the tradition in
several respects, specifically, in taking the "a priori system"
to be biologically determined.'
(39)
For the present discussion, this departure from the
Cartesian framework of assumptions is important; it is a
definite indication that we are dealing with the 'biological'
rather than with Descartes' res cogitans, the non-corporeal
mind alongside body. And Chomsky explicitly recognises this
departure from the Cartesian tradition.
So far, then, there are three different positions which
Chomsky has to choose from: a strict Cartesian 'non-corporeal'
innateness, a biologically interpreted one, or a neutral one.
While he appears to have appreciated the nature of Descartes'
innateness, he never explicitly adopts it. He does consistently
state that our knowledge of physical instantiation is too
underdeveloped to make any exact physical claims and that we
must make do with abstract characterisations of cognitive
structures. This position looks like a neutral one, but it is
arguable (and Chomsky himself argues this, as we shall see) that
the biological view is not neutral with respect to the
dualist/physicalist debate. The trouble for the dualist here is
that 'physical representation' is ambiguous, given dualist
assumptions. It may mean either (i) that our innate structure
is entirely physical, but we are not at present in a position to
say exactly what those physical structures are, or (ii) that the
innate structure is nonphysical, but has physical correlates,
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which again we are not in a position to specify.
As evidence that Chomsky's position is not a dualist one,
consider the following statement in Rules and Representations
(1980):
'For Descartes, mind is not a part of the biological
world...One might then argue that we are not studying Descartes'
problem when we consider the human mind as a specific biological
system, one with components and elements of varied kinds, to be
explored as we would any other aspect of the physical world.'
(30)
This does suggest that the innate structures Chomsky is
interested in are decidedly within the physical side of the
dualist's dichotomy. Thus, I am inclined to agree with Chomsky
that he is not working within a Cartesian dualist framework.
However, consider the following remark of Chomsky's on the
matter:
'This conclusion holds, however, only if we regard
Descartes as an irrational dogmatist, that is, as putting forth
doctrines that define the domain of inquiry, rather than as
arguing for principles that he believed he had established
within an inquiry more broadly construed. That seems to be a
questionable move.'
(op cit: 30-31)
I think we have to take this with rather a large pinch of
scepticism; it is tempting (personally, I find the temptation
irresistable) to see him as confusing Descartes with Chomsky.
We cannot begin to revise what Descartes said in the light of
how dogmatic we think he might have been about it, otherwise we
end up with any number of interpretations of his philosophy.
Consider whether we ought to avoid Descartes' innateness
proposals altogether, along with the other basic principles of
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his philosophy, on the grounds that Descartes intended them in a
non-dogmatic spirit. I assume that Chomsky would rather object
to that, and for much the same reasons that I think we should
object to Chomsky's reinterpretation of Cartesian dualism. We
have little alternative but to recognise that Descartes was a
dualist (in fact, he is always taken to be the classic dualist)
and to see Chomsky's proposals as a departure from Descartes. In
doing so, we are hardly committed to seeing Descartes as an
'irrational dogmatist'.
That Chomsky is proposing a non-dualist ontology, and is
thus departing from the Cartesian tradition is made evident in
the following statement in Rules and Representations:
'When I use terms such as 'mind', 'mental representation',
'mental computation', and the like, I am keeping to the level of
abstract characterisation of the properties of certain physical
mechanisms, as yet almost entirely unknown. There is no further
ontological import to such references to mind or mental
representations and acts...the inquiry belongs to the study of
mind, in the terminology that I will adopt, though it need in no
sense imply the existence of entities removed from the physical
world.'
(1980: 5)
Since Descartes WAS asserting (and not merely implying) the
existence of entities removed from the physical world, it is
clear that this is a non-dualist position. Note, however, the
cleverness of Chomsky's argumentative strategy in the
succeeding paragraphs:
'It is perhaps worth stressing, in this connection, that
the notion of 'physical world' is open and evolving... 11 may be
that contemporary natural science already provides adequate
principles for the understanding of mind. Or perhaps principles
now unknown enter into the functioning of the human or animal
minds, in which case the notion of 'physical body' must be
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extended, as lias often happened in the past, to incorporate
entities and principles of hitherto unrecognised character.
Then so much of the so-called "mind-body" problem will he
solved, ...by invoking principles that seemed incomprehensible
or even abhorrent to the scientific imagination of an earlier
generation.'
(op cit: 6)
This does constitute a marked departure from the Cartesian
tradition in that Chomsky is conceiving of shifting the very
terms of reference in which Descartes framed the problem and his
response to it. That is, if Descartes represents the classical
dualist perspective on the mind-body problem, Chomsky is
tackling it by assuming that the dichotomy itself be obviated,
and thus the problem. This is a perfectly legitimate, not to
mention interesting, approach to take to the
physicalist/nonphysicalist philosophies of mind, but it cannot
be construed as a continuation of Cartesian dualism: in fact, it
contradicts it. There is also something of a problem for this
approach, namely its terribly provisional nature. While
speculative approaches to traditional philosophical problems are
perfectly valid, we are left with much that is merely promissory
in Chomsky's suggestion that we may come to understand,
somehow, the nature of physical insta ntiation, to the point
where we redefine the very notion 'physical'. One recalls
Bloomfield's hope that the progress of physical science would
somehow solve the problems of semantic analysis. Botha, too,
hopes that neural discoveries will constitute the real referents
for our theoretical terms, although his position is much more
reductionistic than Chomsky's since Botha thinks that our
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current conceptions of 'the physical' will suffice, whereas
Chomsky does not.
Botha, then, is a naive physical reductionist whereas
Chomsky appears to opt (finally!) for an 'ontology-neutral'
position. However, I think I have shown that there are at least
undertones of some sort of physical reductionism in Chomsky's
proposals; I say 'some sort of' since, with the sort of
indeterminacy that Botha mentions in Chomsky's ontology, it is
hard to pin him down. In this connection, I want to suggest that
the hint of physical reductionism in Chomsky's work is at odds
with his long-standing position on behaviour is tic reductionism.
It is striking that Chomsky has long since championed the
case against behaviouristic reductionism, and one might then
expect him to take an anti-reductionistic position on the
possibility of a physicalist reductionism in a psychologically
interpreted theoretical linguistics. To the extent that
Chomsky's position is (physically) reductionistic, it reflects a
potential conflict, within his philosophy, on the question of
reductionism in general. Of course, there is nothing like the
naive reductionism of Skinner (195"?), with its impoverished
ontology, in Chomsky's work, but so long as there is this
ontological indeterminacy, we can accuse Chomsky of not having
fully renounced reductionism.
Note that at least one interpretation (Steinberg 1982) of
Chomsky's philosophy takes it to be anti-physicalistic, which
confirms my comments (and Botha's) about the indeterminacy of
his position and the subsequent scope for widely differing
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interpretations of it:
'Mentalists, such as Locke, Descartes, Putnam, Chomsky, and
the Gestalt psychologists would answer each of these questions
(Do humans have non-physical minds, do these minds influence
their behaviour, should the contents of these minds be studied
in psychology and linguistics: PC) in the affirmative.1
(Steinberg 1982: 89)
I have no intention of engaging in a critique of
Steinberg's typology of philosophies of mind here (to my mind,
it is too narrowly constricted and thus obscures some of the
problems involved), but I think that my assessment of Chomsky's
philosophy of mind is rather more insightful than his. I have
already shown that Chomsky cannot be said to have answered in
the affirmative to the question 'Do humans have non-physical
minds?' (nor can Putnam, for that matter: cf his 19&2 for a
statement to this effect), even though he can be said to have
answered the other two of Steinberg's questions thus. The most
interesting thing about this misinterpretation of Chomsky is
that one might well expect an anti-behaviourist like Chomsky to
oppose physical reductionism, which is presumably why Steinberg
takes him to be a dualist.
In conclusion, I think it is clear that Chomsky wants to
avoid BOTH dualism of the Cartesian sort AND any naive
physicalism of the Botha sort. Unfortunately, he has not
actually come up with anything in the way of coherent proposals
for dealing with the dualist-physicalist problem, nor has he
adopted aq explicitly neutral view. I now want to look at the
work of someone (Fodor 1975) who has tried to do both of these.
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3.3 Neutral psychologism
(i) Fodor's alternative to naive reductionism
Fodor's approach to a psychological interpretation of
linguistic realities is less radical in its rejection of
reductionism than I would prefer it to be, but it is more
clearly articulated than Chomsky's and results in the
development of a useable research programme, which, I have
argued, Botha's does not. This fact is of particular sigificance
in my view, since I stress the importance of methodological,
especially heuristic, factors in assessing the merits of
philosophies of linguistics.
In his 1968, he argues that one must distinguish between
mentalist views in general and the strictly Cartesian view, of
the sort I have been discussing, in particular. That is, he
points out that a mentalism need not be of the Cartesian dualist
sort, and that one could adopt a non-dualist mentalism without
going to the behaviourist extreme of rejecting any and all
mental phenomena as primary data for a theory of psychology.
This is what I have been stressing, and it represents a much
more insightful view of the varieties of mentalism (what I call
psychologism) than given by Steinberg (1982) mentioned in 3.2.
This general approach is, I think, much more interesting, and
more likely to be fruitful, than the Smart/Botha reductionist
one (recall that Smart explictly rejects the idea that mental
phenomena can count as primary data for a theory of psychology).
Fodor is therefore attempting to propose an alternative to
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the two positions, physicalist reductionism and dualism, that I
have been discussing. In this sense, his is an attempt at an
'ontology-neutral' psychologism (bearing in mind my comments on
the slight inappropriateness of this term in this context: there
is an ontological position here, but the neutrality is with
respect to the physicalist/dualist dichotomy).
In The Language of Thought (1975), Fodor outlines an
alternative to both behavioural and physical reductionism. I
will try to asses whether he has succeeded. He points out that
we can reject both the view that psychology should deal only
with behaviour as its primary data and the view that we can only
legitimately take 'inner' processes as primary data if they are
assumed to be wholly physical. His approach relies heavily on a
distinction between type (or kind) and token. Arguing against
physiological reductionism, he claims that it is unlikely that
every kind will turn out to be a physical kind, thus:
'The reason it is unlikely that every kind corresponds to a
physical kind is just that (a) interesting generalisations can
often be made about events whose physical descriptions have
nothing in common; (b) it is often the case that whether the
physical descriptions of the events subsumed by such
generalisations have anything in common is, in an obvious sense,
entirely irrelevant to the truth of the generalisations, or to
their interestingness, or to their degree of confirmation, or,
indeed, any of their epistemologically important properties; and
(c) the special sciences are very much in the business of
formulating generalisations of this kind.'
(Fodor 1975: 15)
This set of observations is very important for linguistics
as a special science. Observation (b) in particular is relevant
to what I have said about Botha's set of ontological conditions
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and Smart's comments about the status of generalisations in
psychology. However, his ontological position differs from the
interactionist one (with its strong autonomy thesis) which I
propose, as follows: Fodor argues against physical reductionism
in psychology by arguing that 'the kind predicates of the
special sciences cross-classify the physical natural kinds.' (op
cit: 25). This is a clever move which, incidentally, is much
more sophisticated and insightful than Pateman's (1983) argument
that the objects of linguistic theory are natural kinds (cf
4.2). In adopting this argument, Fodor can oppose naive
physiological reductionism by insisting that there may well be
no one-to-one correspondence between psychological and neural
structure, but rather a state of affairs whereby psychological
representations are correlated with neurological function, which
is taken to cross-cut neural organisation. This rules out the
sort of naive requirement made by Botha, where specific neurons
must be correlated with psychological (specifically, linguistic)
entities. I have no doubt that this is an improvement on
Botha's set of proposals, but I still think that it is not
sufficiently removed from physicalism, if we assume that within
Fodor's framework, we are still dealing only with realities of a
physical sort. That this assumption is justified is made clear
by the following:
'Still, if mental events aren't to be reduced to
behavioural events, what are we to say about their ontological
status? I think it very likely that all of the organismic
causes of behaviour are physiological, hence that mental events




Fodor argues that this comment does not commit him to
reductionism, because of the fact that he opposes type
physicalism and proposes what he calls token physicalism. That
is, psychological kinds or types cannot be expected to
correspond to physical types or kinds, but psychological tokens
may well be found to correspond to physical tokens. My reaction
to this is to argue that physicalism, even of the token variety,
is still physicalism, and that it is mistaken to confuse objects
of one ontological category (the physical) with those of another
(e.g the psychological). Such a confusion constitutes
reductionism, in my view. However, Fodor's proposals do result
in a research programme which is freed from any over-restrictive
phsyiological constraints of the Botha sort, and is therefore de
facto non-reductionistic. It may be argued that it is not
therefore possible to distinguish in practice between a research
programme based on Fodor's de facto anti-reductionism and a
programme based on a radically anti-reductionist psychologism
(which isn't what I propose, since I do not adopt any version of
psychologism). Both would amount to a licence for an autonomous
psychologically based linguistics (autonomous in relation to
physiology or neurology).
Consider what Fodor makes of these fundamental assumptions.
He wants to use them to establish the basis for a research
programme which is freed from physiological restrictions and
which rests upon the notion of computation as «. model for
psychological processes, and representation as a fundamental
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part of the computation process. That is, he takes mental
phenomena (decisions, surveying of options, etc) as primary data
for a theory of psychology raher than restricting the primary
data to observable behaviour or physiological structure. I
take this to be perfectly justifiable: mental phenomena simply
are the legitimate object of inquiry for the psychologist;
cutting out one's own object of inquiry on the grounds that it
is not 'strictly observable' would be an odd suicidal manouevre
on the part of the psychologist, inherited from positivist
confusions regarding the status of observation and the nature of
scientific inquiry. It would be equally justifiable, I argue,
to insist that the object of linguistic inquiry is simply
linguistic structure per se, rather than associated neural (or
even psychological) phenomena. However, that is to anticipate
the discussion in 5.2.
It might appear that there is a contradicition in Fodor's
position on reductionism, since he claims (9) on the one hand
that the vocabulary of psychology is quite different from that
of physics, but, on the other hand, that mental events have
true descriptions in an 'ideally completed' physiology (205). To
establish whether there is a contradiction here, consider his
rejection of reductionism in detail. Attacking what he takes to
be a strong version of reductionism, of the Smart variety, lie
cites (10) the following representation of reductionist claims:
(1) S, x > S^y
(2a) S, x -—* P, x
(2b) S v —^ Py
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(3) P, x > P^y
Here, (1) is to be interpreted as a law in a 'special
science' (eg some non-natural science such as psychology,
economics, linguistics) which states, roughly, that 'all events
which consist of X's being S, bring about events which consist
of y's being .'. The formulae in (2) are taken to be bridge
laws which contain predicates from both the special science to
be reduced and the physical science ( or lower level science) to
which the reduction is to be made. The formula in (3) is then
the law in the reducing science to which law (1) is taken to
have been reduced. It is then assumed that all the laws of the
special science in question can be reduced in the same way to
laws in the reducing science.
What Fodor wants to do is distinguish between reductionism
of the classical sort and what he calls token physicalism, which
he takes to be entailed by reductionism. The distinction is as
follows: reductionism claims that there are natural kind
predicates in an ideally completed physics and that these
correspond to each and every natural kind predicate in any of
the (ideally completed) special sciences. From this it follows
that all events that are described by the laws of the special
sciences are physical events. Fodor claims that one can accept
the second of these components (all events are physical events)
without accepting the first (correspondence of natural kind
predicates between special and physical sciences). It is the
conjunction of both components (or, just as easily put, the
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assertion of the first one) that counts as reductionism for
Fodor, and the acceptance of the second one only that counts as
token physicalism.
Fodor achieves this separation of the two components by
observing that a law in a special science could easily contain
natural kind predicates for that science which do not correspond
to natural kind predicates in a physical science, even if the
statements in the special sciences can all be reduced to
statements in the physical science. The example he gives is
that of Gresham's Law in economics. If we assume that this law
is valid, it tells us something about what happens in monetary
exchanges under certain conditions. It may well be the case,
Fodor admits, that every such event described by this law can
also be described wholly within the vocabulary of a physical
science: this is what constitutes his token physicalism (it is
not a position I am willing to accept). The rejection of type
physicalism which he prop<>res in this example is as follows:
while we may be able to formulate descriptions within a physical
science of each and every event subsumed under Gresham's Law,
the events so described are not likely to form a natural
physical class. That is, the corresponding physical statements
describing instantiations of Gresham's Law are not going to turn
out to contain natural kind predicates.
That the latter observation is perfectly sensible is made
clear if one considers the following example. Let's say that
one monetary exchange is the exchanging of sheep, and another is
the deletion of characters on a visual display unit linked to a
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computer. It is rather obvious that it is not likely to turn
out to be the case that these two physical events are included
in some naturally occurring class stateable under some physical
law. Economic kinds, in short, are not likely to turn out to be
physical kinds.
All of this seems transparently obvious and unsurprising
from a non-physicalist point of view ; from a Popperian point of
view, it is unsurprising since economic systems are world three,
not world one, objects, and from an anti-physicalist position
such as Itkonen's (4.1), acts of economic exchange are
intentional actions (not spatiotemporal events), carried out on
the basis of rules which are of a mutual knowledge sort, by
conscious agents, and thus qualitatively distinct from the sorts
of spatiotemporal events describable under the laws of physics.
But this state of affairs is very damaging for the reductionist.
Worse still for the reductionist, as Fodor points out (15), is
the fact that he must also postulate, in addition to nonexistent
physical kinds, natural laws (of the bridge law sort) which will
reduce the economic law to the supposed physical law. In my
example, this means devising a law which will place sheep
exchange and VDU operations within the same natural class (a
rather amusing state of affairs, I think).
It is in opposition to this untenable reductionism that
Fodor introduces the idea of cross-classification of physical
structures and entities by higher levels of organisation. What
one winds up with at the level of the reducing science is a
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disjunction of predicates rather than a set of natural kind
predicates. His diagrammatic exposition of this is as follows:
Law of
This demonstrates the cross-cutting relationship between,
say, economic processes and their physical instantiations, or
equally between linguistic-as-psychological processes and their
physical instantiations.
(ii) Problems with token physicalism
Fodor is committed to saying that psychological and economic
processes can in fact be correlated with purely physical events,
if in the cross-classifying way indicated. I think this is to
get matters round the wrong way. It has long been argued (this
is Itkonen's point, for example, and Saussure's) that it is only
by virtue of being linked to some economic, psychological
(including linguistic) system that a physical event qualifies
as being economic, or psychological or linguistic. Clearly, the
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significance (linguistic, economic, whatever) of a particular
event is instantiated in the physical event, and thus there is
an embodying of linguistic or economic form in substance, but
one cannot possibly pick out physical properties of events which
constitute the linguistic or economic significance in question.
Why not , one might argue. Surely , for instance, one can
pick out specific phonetic properties of acoustic or
articulatory events which do bear formal (linguistic)
significance, e.g voicelessness or aspiration. But
voicelessnes, aspiration, etc, have no meaning in themselves;
they only have meaning in virtue of the linguistic system: that
is a long accepted Saussurean observation. And the system is not
constituted by its substantive realisations, even if the system
is instantiated in the substance. Thus the system is not
describable in terms of the properties of the physical mode of
instantiation. It seems to me that the linguistic (or economic,
or whatever) function of physical substance is not describable
in physical terms. To check whether it is, we can ask 'In what
physical terms would the function of voicelessness in English
obstruents be describable?' I find it rather difficult to
interpret this as a coherent question, since voicelessness
itself, but not its linguistic function in that particular
system, is describable in physical terms. This rather suggests
that Fodor's schema will not work for linguistics. Thus, the
token physicalist's attempt to classify linguistic (economic,
etc) systems and conventions as purely physical objects is a
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difficult, and in my view impossible, task.
Fodor does not tackle the following point either: if we are
to allow for cross-cutting as he does, we must inquire what the
ontological status of the cross-cutting is. For Fodor, it would
have to be physical. But in what possible way could the cross-
cutting of sheep exchanges and VDU operations be physical?
There would appear to be no way of stating this particular
example of cross-cutting, or of cross-cutting in general, in
purely physical terms. Token physicalism, then, turns out on
close inspection to be no more viable than type physicalism; it
seems that, not only are physical types not equatable with
linguistic types, but nor are physical tokens equatable with
linguistic tokens. Physicalism, of any sort, is untenable as a
basis for a psychologically interpreted theoretical linguistics.
Whether some other psychologically interpreted theoretical
linguistics, which is radically non-physicalist, can replace the
sorts of psychologism I have discussed is an interesting
question. It is interesting to note in this connection that it
does seem possible to obviate the dualist/physicalist debate in
the philosophy of mind if one avoids the psychological
interpretation altogether. Thus, Katz' Platonism steers clear
of the issue, and can afford to since the object of inquiry, for
them, is not psychological, and the problem of specifying what
one means by 'psychological' does not therefore arise (.note the
way in which Katz, throughout his 1981, uses the expression 'the
human mind/brain': this reflects an awareness of the mind/body
debate and an avoidance of any committment 011 the subject). Of
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course, the Platonist is faced with a multitude of ontological
problems anyway, most of which are as difficult as the one I
have been looking at (cf 5.1).
The question does arise whether we ought to characterise
the object of inquiry as psychological at all, and Platonism
constitutes a firm negative response to this question, as do
ILkonen's and my positions. Following my anti-reductionist line
of argument, I will argue that just as it is mistaken to assume
that linguistic reality is physical, so is it mistaken to assume
that linguistic reality is psychological in nature.
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CHAPTER 4
LINGUISTIC OBJECTS AS SOCIAL REALITY
Introduction
In this chapter, I will consider two quite distinct views
of linguistic structure as a social*, rather than a
psychological, reality. These are Itkonen's hermeneutic
account of linguistic rules as social conventions and Pateman's
view of languages as both natural objects and objects of social
theory.
I will argue that, just as the psychological reality
approach is ontologically impoverished, so is the social reality
account.
* There is a sense in which my ontological assumptions about
linguistic objects, whereby I take them to be intersubjective,
non-Platonic, non-normative in nature (cf chapter 5 below), may
be said to be social (Itkonen, personal communication, wants to
say this, for example). However, they cannot be said to be
social in either Itkonen's or Pateman's senses: I regard them
(pace Itkonen) as existing largely independently of either
social needs and functions, and I do not take them to be objects
of social theory, as Pateman does. More on this below.
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4.1 Hermeneutics
(i) Spatiotemporality and normativity
The most highly developed conception of linguistic
structure as a social reality that I am aware of is Itkonen's
hermeneutic view, as established in his (1978) Grammatical
Theory and Metascience* (henceforth GTM). In this and in
Causality in Linguistic Theory (1983), Itkonen presents a fully
developed philosophy of linguistics, of which I want to outline
the principal arguments and assumptions. I accept some of them,
but I have some rather major misgivings about others. I have
already discussed some of Itkonen's methodological remarks in
2.2; here, I am concerned principally with his ontological
position, though I will inevitably deal with methodological
issues in relation to these.
A central set of distinctions in Itkonen's work is that
between spatiotemporal events, which are not intentional in
nature, actions, which are intentional and are carried out by
conscious agents, and socially agreed upon norms, which
constitute the basis for our rule-governed activities. This set
of distinctions is important because it means, among other
things, that grammatical inquiry is qualitatively distinct from
physical inquiry. Physics has as its testing area spatiotemporal
events, whereas grammar has as its testing ground intuitive
* Revised version of Itkonen (1974).
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reactions of native speakers, which are actions rather than
spatiotemporal events. Defining empirical sciences as those
which are falsifiable on the basis of spatiotemporal occurences,
it follows for Itkonen that grammatical inquiry is a non-
empirical science.
Two points ought to be made about this conclusion.
Firstly, it assumes that we take grammar to exclude
psycholinguistics and sociolinguistics, which are both partly
empirical (they both involve experimentation and corpus-based
investigation, as in physics). Secondly, it assumes that
Itkonen's definition of empiricalness should be accepted.
Itkonen's statement that theoretical linguistics is not an
empirical activity has, not surprisingly, generated a certain
amount of hostility (cf Dahl 1975, Linell 1976, Sampson 1976 for
some of these, and Itkonen's replies in his 1976). I think we
have to accept his distinction, which seems hard to deny; at the
least, one would have to provide a theory of grammaticality
judgements as spatiotemporal events to counter it.
However, one must distinguish between the validity of this
methodological observation and the terminological matter of
whether we do actually use the term 'empirical' for only the
former of the two sorts of falsifiable activity. If we use
'empirical' for both, we had better distinguish between
empirical, , say, and empirical^ to distinguish the two.
Itkonen's use of the term 'science' for disciplines which are
based on axiomatisation, and 'empirical science' for that
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subset whose testing is spatiotemporal in nature seems as clear
a decision about the terminological problem as any. And at least
Itkonen has a clear conception of what he takes 'empirical' to
mean, which is perhaps more than can be said for much current
work in linguistics, where the expression is used without its
meaning being spelled^out explicitly. In fact, one suspects
that much of the heat in the reaction to Itkonen's use of the
term comes from an assumption that any activity, to be
scientific , must be empirical, i.e. an assumption which equates
'empirical' with 'testable'. What most people, including
myself, dislike about Itkonen's claim is that he does appear to
be saying that grammatical theories are not testable, where
testable means falsifiable (this is what I take it to mean,
following Popper).
Let's distinguish three positions on this matter: (i) the
A
cases in which the theories within a discipline are falsiifable
v
spatiotemporally, (ii) those where they are falsifiable, but not
spatiotemporally, and (iii) those where they are not falsifiable
at all. Under Popper's definition of science, where scientific
theories are characterised by their falsifiability, only those
under (i) and (ii) count as scientific endeavours. Under
Itkonen's, where sciences are characterised by axiomatisation,
all three may count, so long as the discipline in question is of
the axiomatic sort. Now to theoretical linguistics. There are
clearly those who feel that it belongs in category (i). I am
not one of them, nor is Itkonen. Then there is Itkonen's
position, which is that theoretical linguistics belongs in
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category (iii). It is not clear to me whether Itkonen allows
that there is a category (ii), but I do, for reasons to be
explained, and it is here that I think theoretical linguistics
belongs. Thus, I agree with Itkonen that linguistic theories
are not falsifiable via the observation of spatioteinporal
events, but I disagree with him that they are not falsifiable at
all. I will have more to say about this in due course.
So much for the terminological and conceptual
preliminaries. Continuing with the fundamentals of Itkonen's
proposals: connected with the above distinctions is the
distinction between observable regularities (for instance, the
regularities observable in the movements of planets and stars
within a solar system) and spatiotemporal manifestations of
social norms, i.e. patterns of observable behaviour which are
rule-governed. It is clear that the former are properties of
events whereas the latter are poperties of actions. Or it is
when we characterise these. In the former case, there is no
question of the observed regularities being correct in any
sense, whereas correctness in the latter case is an essential
part of the action (or so Itkonen wants to claim; I'll go along
with him for the sake of the argument). To take an example, the
uttering of the following could not be counted as a potentially
falsifying fact about for our claims about tense marking in the
English verb group ('verb phrase' if you don't like verb groups
or think that auxiliaries fall outside of them; 'sentence' if
you think auxiliaries fall outside of the verb phrase; I'll
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ignore those who want to argue about the auxiliary/main verb
distinction):
Maynard have be eats the spinach.
We simply disregard the fact that this has been uttered, on the
grounds that it is 'incorrect' (In Itkonen's sense) and does not
therefore even count in our attempt to falsify particular
grammatical hypotheses, at least not if it is taken to represent
a syntactically well-formed sentence of English. On the other
hand, and in contradistinction to this case, no observable event
in the solar system can be written off as being 'incorrect',
since the term does not apply to physical phenomena (this isn't
to say that potentially falsifying observable events can't be
written off on other grounds).
I will not pursue the question of the status of the
expression 'observable' in relation to 'events' here, though it
is interesting to note that Itkonen's use of this fundamental
distinction relies rather heavily on some sort of observation vs
theory distinction, which is rather worrying, considering the
theory-laden nature of observation. Those of a variationist and
anti- competence vs performance disposition will be somewhat
disturbed at the use of the notion 'correct' here, and at the
claim that we can simply ignore much of the data in a recorded
corpus on the grounds that it does not count as instantiating
well-formed expressions in English. Itkonen has always allowed
that there are non-clear cases when it comes to grammaticality,
but claims that these do not impugn the status of the clear
cases. For my part, I am happy to ignore the worries of the
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variationists, and to dispense with much of what is in a given
corpus; it is clear that corpora play little or no part in
theoretical linguistics.
Itkonen further points out that while it is clear that
actions have a spatiotemporal aspect, it is not the case that
they can be reduced to purely spatiotemporal events. This, I
pointed out, is true of my example about acts of monetary
exchange in chapter 3: what constitutes an act of monetary
exchange is not the physical event of, say, coins passing from
one hand to another, but the underlying conceptual scheme which
determines what will and what will not count correctly as a
monetary exchange. Actions, then, are irreducible to events,
and furthermore, the norms which function as the basis for
actions are not reducible to actions. Thus, if actions are
characterised by the fact that they are carried out by conscious
agents, and are therefore intentional in nature, as oppose)to
events, which are not, then intentionality and normativity are
not reducible to ontologically more primitive factors.
This approach is hermeneutic in that it stresses the
hermeneutic understanding we achieve in investigating our rule-
based social actions as opposed to the observation we engage in
when investigating spatiotemporal phenomena. While I wish
explicitly to accept Itkonen's view of physical sciences as
being qualitatively distinct from sciences such as theoretical
linguistics, it is unfortunate, I think, to restrict the term
'understanding' to the knowledge we achieve in non-physical
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investigation; under almost any philosophy of science, it is
common practice to assume that we do in fact achieve
understanding of the physical universe within the physical
sciences. Perhaps it is as well to mention another
terminological point here. Hermeneutic sciences for Itkonen are
opposed to physical sciences, and the term 'hermeneutic' is
taken to characterise all those schools of thought whereby a
qualitative distinction is made between physical and human
sciences. This he opposes to the 1positivistic' view which
takes physical and human sciences to be methodologically
parallel. Thus Chomsky is a positivist under this scheme,
whereas the approach to the methodology of theoretical
linguistics adopted by Lass (cf 2.2) is hermeneutic.
My approach to this question is not easily characterised
under Itkonen's dichotomy; whereas I agree that the methodology
and object of inquiry of theoretical linguistics is
qualitatively distinct from those of the physical sciences, I
still take them both as involving the construction of
falsifiable theories about their respective objects of inquiry,
and attempting to falsify them in their respective manners. It
is this which, under my Popperian definition of what counts as a
science, characterises both as sciences. As I've indicated, I
am dealing with a trichotomy here wheras Itkonen is dealing with
a dichotomy.
Itkonen's distinction between positivism and hermeneutics
is likely to cause confusion since the term 'positivism' is also
used to refer to the sorts of philosophy of science proposed by
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the Vienna Circle, as discussed in chapter 2. Under this
latter defintion of positivism, Popper is clearly not a
positivist, but a realist (he claims responsibility for having
'killed' logical positivism, and I've shown, in 2.2 , how his
views differ from theirs), whereas under Itkonen's definition,
Popper is a positivist, since he adopts a version of
methodological monism: he takes human and non-human sciences
alike to be characterised by the same method. Itkonen is aware
of this, and notes the problem in his GTM; I mention it mainly
to avoid confusion with terms discussed in earlier chapters, and
to note an unfortunate terminological problem (actually,
terminological problems are rarely 'merely' so, and this is
certainly true in this case: the explication of the
terminological problems reveals interesting differences between
Popper's, the Vienna Circle's, and Itkonen's philosophies of
science).
It is clear that Itkonen wishes to see norms and actions as
entirely social, rather than psychological, realities, thus:
'It is possible to abstract from every action the
intentional element which, properly speaking, constitutes an
action qua action. (This 'intentional element' is to be
understood, not as some psychical substance, but as a
'pattern'.)'
Furthermore:
'....intentions, which are necessary constituents of
actions, must be at least potentially conscious: to do
something, one must be able to know. at least under some
description, what one is doing. Thus knowledge is, in
principle, inseparable from action.... knowledge is necessarily
social. '
(GTM: 122-123, emphasis in original)
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It should be stressed just how strong this claim is: that
norms are not only socially established as the basis for our
actions, but are entirely constituted by their social context.
They constitute a kind of mutual knowledge, which he refers
to as 'common knowledge', an inter-subjective reality:
'Common knowledge literally constitutes concepts and rules
as what they are, whereas their (social) existence is
independent of the subjective knowledge of any individual
person...'
(op cit: 322, n.67)
This argument derives from his adoption of the
Wittgensteinian argument against the possibility of private
languages; I will summarise Itkonen's statement of it now, as
it is relevant to the social vs psychological distinction which
constitutes the rationale behind this, the preceding, and the
following chapters.
Firstly, he argues (GTM:109-110) that there can be no
concept of 'I' without the corresponding concepts of 'you',
'we' and 'he/she'. From this he concludes that an individual
could not privately invent and follow a rule of language since,
without the concept of others, the individual in question could
not even have the concept of 'myself'. This appears to me to be
fairly weak. Notice that Itkonen does not mention the concept
'it'. I would have thought that, even if one existed in a world
without other people, one could acquire the concept 'myself' in
contradistinction to the concept 'it' (relating to inanimate and
animate, non-human, objects).
However, his second point is more convincing. Here he
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takes the case of someone's living in the public world and
speaking an intersubjective language, but then attempting to
invent a private language which is independent of any
intersubjective language. Each term in this language would have
to refer only to purely subjective experiences which are private
to the individual in question, and which are therefore not
susceptible to public identification. Itkonen makes the
Wittgensteinian point that if such experiences do exist, there
is nothing that can be said about them, and that if this is so,
we cannot even begin to discuss the question whether we could
devise a private language referring to them. I intend to accept
this argument as being the most convincing of all his anti-
private language arguments; the main purpose of this discussion
is to establish the fundamentals of Itkonen's philosophy of
linguistics and to criticise them, rather than to attempt to
tackle the private language argument per se and its related
philosophical problems, so I shall not devote much space to
arguments against the possibility of private languages. (It does
strike me that we may well have private experiences which turn
out to be similar to other people's private experiences, and
that we try to establish this via language, but I assume that
this is irrelevant to the point that language is necessarily
public and that the notion 'private language' is therefore
incoherent or contradictory, a point which I accept.)
A third and final argument is cited by Itkonen against the
possibility of private languages; I mention it only briefly as
137
it strikes me as being rather unimpressive. Here he considers
the objection I raised above that one could conceivably have the
concept 'myself' in a world where there are no other persons but
only natural objects. His reply to this is that the concept
'myself' thus acquired would not in any way resemble our concept
of person. I take this to be an unimpressive reply in that it is
circular: our concept of person is arrived at intersubjectively
(or so Itkonen claims) and any concept of person arrived at
without reference to other persons is not really a concept of
person because it is not arrived at intersubjectively.
However, he does make the point that one could have no
independent checks, in such a situation, on whether one was
following a rule (of language) correctly. One would simply use
a given linguistic element in exactly the same way as one first
used it, with the result that one could never manage to evolve
the notion of correctness.
All of this is important for Itkonen because from it he
concludes that rules of language are social rather than
psychological realities. Among other things, this results in a
rejection of the Chomskyan competence/performance distinction by
Itkonen, since knowledge of linguistic rules is inseparable
from language use, both being social in nature. And while he
would not deny that we have some sort of internalised
representation of linguistic rules, such rules are primarily
objects of common knowledge rather than objects of a subjective,
psychological nature. (Itkonen does allow that psycho- and
socio-linguistics have their own methodology and object of
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inquiry, but he takes these to be distinct form those of
theoretical linguistics: more on this below.)
Before leaving the private language issue, I should stress
that Itkonen's use-based view of linguistic rules is not only
social but also functional: rules exist in response to some
social function. I want to argue below, following Lass(1980),
that this functionalism is untenable, and that one can reject
the possibility of private rules without having to accept a
functionalist interpretation of linguistic structure. This is
done by distinguishing between the clearly social processes
whereby language emerges and the non-social aspects of
linguistic structure as a product. I deal with this later,
however.
I want to introduce one further distinction of Itkonen's at
this point, that between rule and rule-sentence, and to point
out what I think is a rather serious problem for him. The term
'rule' may refer, either to a socially constituted norm, outside
of the grammarian's analysis and available to us by means of
intuitive awareness, or to a statement in a grammarian's
analysis of a language. The first of these is a rule in
Itkonen's dichotomy, the latter a rule-sentence. The
distinction is one between an atheoretical object (rule), which
is normative in nature, an object of mutual knowledge, and a
theoretical one (rule-sentence).
Just what Itkonen takes to constitute the object of
theoretical linguistic inquiry is an interesting question. I
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want to suggest that he does not succeed in isolating an object
of inquiry. It has become clear that use is central to
Itkonen's conception of language, and this suggests that speech
actions may be possible candidates as Itkonen's primary objects
of inquiry:
'According to this functional or pragmatic conception, the
speech act* is the primary unit of language. Within the speech
act, one may go on to distinguish between the level of
intersubjective interaction between speaker and hearer.... and
the level of a reference to extra-theoretical reality.... The
traditional concept of a 'sentence' proves to be a unit
secondarily abstracted from the (primary) speech act.'
(GTM:120)
In addition to this:
'Sentences and types of speech act are equally normative
entities: the former are concepts exemplified by utterances
which in turn are results of act-tokens exemplifying the latter.
Speech act grammars analyse the concept 'correct (type of)
speech act' just as sentence grammars analyse the concept
'correct sentence' ....Since sentence grammars are much more
well-established than speech-act grammars, it is
understandable that I shall concentrate on the former, in spite
of the fact that they have just been shown to be logically
secondary with respect to the latter.'
(op cit)
I confess to not understanding all of this. Let's assume
that we follow Itkonen for the time being in taking
traditional grammars to be 'analysing the concept 'correct
sentence' ' (though most theoretical linguists wouldn't, I
suspect). Even then, it is not clear precisely what
relationship holds between sentences, utterances, and 'speech
* The term 'speech act' here means speech action, and is
therefore distinct fromn, and not to be confused with, the
normal Searlean/Austinian use of the term.
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act types'. Itkonen's statement that sentences themselves are
concepts is not readily understandable; nor is his claim that,
as concepts, they are 'exemplified' by utterances, which are
said to be 'results' of act-tokens 'exemplifying' speech-act
types, I am not at all sure what this relationship
'exemplification' amounts to. Nor can I see what precisely
Itkonen takes to be the difference between speech act tokens and
utterances. Lyons' (1977:26) distinction between utterance act
and utterance signal springs to mind here; perhaps utterance
signals are equivalent to Itkonen's utterances, and utterance
acts equivalent to speech act tokens. At any rate, the onus is
on Itkonen to spell out these rather vague remarks more
explicitly; they do, after all, constitute the basis of his
claims as to what constitutes the primary object of study in
theoretical linguistics.
One thing that does emerge from all this is that sentences
do not play a particularly central role in Itkonen's scheme of
things. Furthermore, if Itkonen is serious in insisting on a
use-based view of language where norms as the basis for speech
actions are central, it is not clear that he need utilise the
notion 'sentence': one could easily dispense with it altogether
and assume that the grammarian is engaged in formulating and
then systematising rule-sentences which define 'correct speech
act type', whereby speech act types are instantiated by speech
act tokens.
The most worrying aspect of this schema so far is that it
not only diminishes the status of the sentence as a unit of
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analysis, and as theoretical construct whose methodological role
in grammatical inquiry is crucial but it allows us to dispense
with it altogether. This is worrying because the construct
'sentence' does so much work in current grammatical frameworks,
and is in fact a central part of the methodological basis of the
generative enterpise: one would have to have very strong grounds
for dispensing with it, or taking it to be of derivative status,
as Itkonen does. Furthermore, when one considers that Itkonen
takes his characterisation of AL to represent the tradition in
grammatical inquiry, and that this tradition has been almost
exclusively concerned with the sentence as an object of inquiry,
one wonders just how close Itkonen's characterisation actually
comes to mirroring what grammarians actually do.
All of this is quite distinct from the standard Chomskyan
conception of the object of inquiry which, with languages as
sets of sentences and grammars as sets of rules which generate
these, taking the object to be the 'internalised grammar' or
even the principles underlying this. It is different on two
(closely related) major counts: in its assumptions as to (a)
what the object of inquiry is and (b) what the ontological
status of that object is. These may even amount to the same
thing in this case. Itkonen does not even allow that the object
is a set of any sort, even of rules-as-norms.
As I've said, it is doubtful whether Itkonen's framework of
assumptions even ties in at any point with the sorts of
grammatical analysis that have actually been done (despite his
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claim, which I agree with, that the tradition in linguistic
inquiry for centuries has been of an 'autonomous' linguistics
sort). A 'grammar' (I doubt if the term is appropriate) which
has as its only, or as its primary, task the formulating of rule
sentences specifying or defining 'correct speech act type' is a
rather uninteresting object. However, Itkonen does allow, as I
pointed out in 2.2, that grammars are 'systematisations' of sets
of rule-sentences. Unfortunately, these are nothing more than
systematisations since the systematisation itself is interpreted
instrumentally, such that one does not assume that there is some
extratheoretical object of which the systematisation is a
description. Thus the bulk of grammatical description and
analysis carried out in the past is little more than a
systematisation of rule-sentences. My proposal is that all of
these systematisations were actually about something, and
something other than rules of the sort described by the rule-
sentence 'In English the definite article precedes the
noun'(GTM:158).
This is best demonstrated by considering this innocuous-
looking rule-sentence, which Itkonen takes be descriptive of a
norm. It is true that such a rule-sentence can easily be
related to speech actions in the way that Itkonen describes: it
is concerned with linear ordering, and our actions display
temporal linearity in what Itkonen calls their spatiotemporal
aspect. There are serious problems, though, in maintaining the
claim that what the rule-sentence describes is entirely
normative. Even simple and relatively uninteresting rule-
143
sentences like this involve more than simply linearity.
Consider why this rule-sentence is so uninformative: it does not
distinguish between immediate and non-immediate precedence, nor
does it tell us anything about what elements may or may not
intervene between the definite article and the noun, whether
those intervening elements are more closely bound up with the
noun or the article, what elements may follow the noun, how
closely they are bound up with the noun and in what way, and how
all of the elements preceding and following the noun (and we'd
be obliged totsay 'head' noun) relate to the article. We'd need
some account of when the article can and cannot be ommitted too.
In short, all of the concerns of the grammarian need to be dealt
with before we could turn the rule-sentence into an insightful
statement about the language in question.
Of course, it is evident that in attempting to improve on
this uninteresting and rather uninformative rule-sentence, we
need to appeal to notions such as function, constituency,
hierarchicality, modification, complementation, and so forth.
And just how these can be characterised as normative is not
clear, and they would have to be for Itkonen's claims to stand.
It will not do to say that such notions are part of some
systematisation of rule-sentences, since rule-sentences must
contain grammatical terms, and grammatical terms are defined by
the grammatical theory they are contained within, which, of
course, is what Itkonen insists on calling a 'systematisation of
rule-sentences'. Itkonen gets it the wrong way round, surely:
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rather than the grammatical framework being built up as a
systematisation of sets of rule-sentences, the grammatical
framework is what allows us to frame rule-sentences in the first
place. And if the referents of the grammatical terms aren't
normative, rule-sentences cannot be about normative states of
affairs. Whether such terms can be defined as conventions in a
normative way remains to be seen; Itkonen has not done this. We
can conclude that even if rule-sentences describe purely
normative objects, sets of these alone would be hopelessly
insufficient as grammars.
This seems to me to be a fairly major defect in Itkonen's
proposals: he excludes the objects of grammatical inquiry
(sentences and their properties) in his philosophy of
linguistics by claiming that the objects of inquiry are
normative rules describable by means of rule-sentences. I've
tried to show that, even if we wanted to accept that rule-
sentences describe rules-as-norms (which I do not), the terms
contained in rule-sentences have not been shown to refer to
normative objects. And if the terms contained in rule-sentences
do not refer to normative objects, I cannot see how the rule-
sentences themselves can be said to refer to normative states of
affairs.
There is a further problem, closely connected to this one,
with Itkonen's views on what grammars are: the question of
whether they are testable. Itkonen allows (GTM:252) that a
grammar must be more than a collection of rule-sentences, that
it must be a systematisation of those which captures
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generalisations, but claims that these are not themselves
falsifiable. He further claims that simple rule-sentences of
the sort he cites about the relative order of the definite
article and 'the noun' in English are not testable, since they
are either clearly true or clearly not true, according to our
intuitive grammaticality judgements. This is mistaken, however,
and the best way to demonstrate this is to show that his example
rule-sentence, as it stands, can be shown to be false ( and
therefore falsifiable), and to consider why it is false.
Consider: I knew the man the woman shot. This sort of
sentence, with no overt relativiser, is grammatical; it contains
an instance of a definitie article following a noun rather than
preceding it. Thus the rule-sentence, as it stands, is false.
However, consider why it is false. It is because it is not
sufficiently theoretically sophisticated. We need to say a
great deal more about constituency, function and order to change
it into a statement which fits the facts and tells us something
about the object of inquiry. This is a case, surely, of
venturing a hypothesis about the object, amending it in the face
of contradictory facts, and doing so by means of constructing a
theoretical framework which not only accomodates the facts, but
allows us some insight into why the facts happen to be as they
are.
This demonstrates that there is no simple dichotomy between
rule-sentences and grammars: all rule-sentences will be
theoretically informed, and the better the theoretical framework
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which determines their meaning, the better they will be as rule-
sentences. This exemplifies what I have said about the
relationship between theory and observation in relation to
physical sciences. Although the data in grammatical inquiry are
not, as Itkonen so accurately points out, spatiotemporal events,
what I have been calling 'observations', and what Itkonen calls
rule-sentences, interact with and are related to theoretical
assumptions, in a way which is very similar way to the way in
which observation and theory inter-relate in the physical
sciences. The realist assumptions which I have made appear to be
better suited to explicating the nature of method in theoretical
linguistics than those adopted by Itkonen.
These are what I see as the principal problems in Itkonen's
proposals; I now turn to another aspect of Itkonen's
interpretation of linguistic objects as social objects, the
functionalism which is evident throughout his work, which I take
to be unsatisfactory in various ways.
(ii) The Failure of Functionalism
I begin by restating Itkonen's position on the use-
orientated nature of language. He states that the
competence/performance distinction is to be rejected on the
following grounds: if the definition of 'performance' includes
what Itkonen calls speech actions, and if competence is the
knowledge underlying performance, but distinct from it, then the
distinction is invalid since, in Itkonen's view, speech actions
are the primary object of inquiry, and the knowledge we
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investigate in linguistic inquiry is necessarily social, and
embedded in use. Thus the centrality of the term 'correct',
referring to actions, in Itkonen's work.
There are two distinct points at issue here. One is the
question of whether we want to make a distinction of the
competence/performance or of the langue/parole sort (in this
case, we needn't worry about precisely which of these
distinctions we make, so long as we are only treating of the
question of distinguishing between linguistic behaviour and
something 'underlying' it). The other is the question of what
sort of distinction one wants to make if one considers that it
is necessary to distinguish linguistic behaviour from something
over and above that behaviour. On the first count, it is not
clear to me what Itkonen's position is. On the one hand, he
seems to want to insist that we not divorce linguistic objects
from actions. On the other hand, he seems to do precisely this,
in that he distinguishes actions and the socially constituted
norms which act as their basis. On the second count, it is
perfectly clear that Itkonen, if insofar as he is making a
distinction here, is insisting that the nature of the knowledge
'underlying' speech actions is social, that is intersubjective,
and not psychological and therefore private. To repeat the
quotation cited above, 'common knowledge literally constitutes
concepts and rules as what they are....their social existence is
independent of the subjective knowledge of any individual
person' (GTM:322, n.67).
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I am inclined to agree that the object of inquiry is
intersubjective in nature, but not in the normative way that
Itkonen suggests. Rather, I want to suggest that the
intersubjectivity of linguistic objects is something over and
above social conventions and social functions. I have shown
above what I take to be the principal problems with the claim
that linguistic objects are normative; here I will concentrate
on why I think linguistic objects exist independently of their
social function and why stressing function as a means of
explicating the nature of linguistic objects is bound to fail.
Consider the rule-sentence we have been discussing,
ignoring its inadequacies for the moment, and assuming that it
accurately describes a piece of mutual knowledge of the sort
that Itkonen describes. What social function does this norm
fulfil? We may say that having a rule (norm) at all fulfils our
social need to perform speech acts in an interpretable way, but
this is a feature of rules in general. What of the substantive
content of the rule? Definite articles may, in principle,
either precede or follow their (head) nouns. What the rule does
is to tell us which is the case; it does not matter, from the
point of view of function, which is the case, so long as their
is a determinate state of affairs which will allow us to
communicate. Either way, it is only by virtue of being a rule
that this particular rule could be said to have any function.
And, in fact, if both possibilities were correct, then the rule-
sentence 'In English, the definite article may either precede or
follow its (head) noun' would describe the social norm.
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It is clear that in none of these cases can the rule be
said to fulfil any specific function. This is because of the
following rather simple fact: once we accept the very general
idea that rules of language serve the general function of
enabling intersubjective communication to take place, we must
proceed from the general to the substantive, and begin looking
at substantive questions as to the structure of the language in
question. Because, in investigating substantive issues, we
presuppose this very general fact about rules, it is redundant,
and therefore uninformative, to state, for any given rule, that
it fulfils this very general function. Whatever we might find
out about definite articles and nouns in English, the fact that
their linear ordering can be interpreted as a socially agreed
(
upon norm is not going to count as finding out anything about
them. And this very general point concerning the overall
function of rules is all that we can come up with in terms of
interpreting rules as use-orientated. We can never say what
particular social function is being served by this, or any
other, rule, only that, qua rule, it is social in nature.
Interestingly, if we take Itkonen's point about the
questions WHAT and HOW, we discover a contradiction. Consider
the following observation made by Itkonen in his review of Katz
(1981):
'Linguists typically try to answer two different types of
question: What are the properties of, for example, English
sentences? and How are such properties acquired, stored,
perceived, or changed? The what-question, to be answered by
grammatical theory, is the logically prior one, which means that
the how-question, to be answered by different forms of causal
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linguistics, is in reality a what-and-how-question.'
(Itkonen 1983b;i4<?)
In this I am entirely in agreement with Itkonen. However,
his philosophy of linguistics tells us to substitute the
question 'what are the properties of English sentences' for the
question 'how do these function socially? '. He thus fails to
satisfy his own methodological criterion, and ought to abandon
either the criterion or the set of ontological assumptions on
which it is based. I suggest that the criterion if valid, that
we ought to distinguish what and how questions, and that it is
social functionalism that should be abandoned.
Interestingly, both social functionalism of this sort, and
psychologism conflate the what and how questions. If we accept
that they ought to be distinguished, then we need a new set of
ontological assumptions to replace social functionalism and
psychologism. This I attempt to do below (chapter 5). First, I
consider another attempt at characterising the object of inquiry
as a social reality.
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4.2 Naturalism
(i) Languages as natural kinds
While it is true that both Pateman and Itkonen take the
object of inquiry in theoretical linguistics to be social in
nature, they differ considerably in their methodological and
ontological views. Methodologically, Itkonen opposes what he
calls positivism, the view that both the natural and the human
sciences exemplify the same methods. Pateman's approach, on the
other hand, is entirely positivistic in this sense. This is
largely because he takes languages to be 'natural kinds',
parallel with the sorts of natural kind investigated in the
natural sciences. Furthermore, he sees languages as objects of
social theory. It is this combination of languages as natural
kinds and as objects of social theory which constitute the core
of Pateman's proposals.
As ever, some terminological and conceptual preliminaries
are necessary before I go into Pateman's proposals in any
detail. And these preliminaries turn out to be more than merely
terminological. I have been using terms like 'linguistic
structure' and 'linguistic objects' to describe the object of
grammatical (theoretical linguistic) inquiry. I pointed out
that the term 'language' was insufficiently narrowly defined to
be useful for my purposes, since it does not allow us to
distinguish the objects of sociolinguistic, psycholinguistic and
theoretical linguistic inquiry, nor very general, non-linguistic
issues ('language and sexism', for example) from linguistic
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ones. Pateman does, however, use the term 'language' throughout
his work. In doing so, he emphasises the distinction between
the expressions 'a language' and 'language'. He distinguishes
both of these from the expression 'languages'. I offer a few
comments on these, principally to establish whether, and when,
Pateman and I are talking about the same thing.
Taking the first two of these ('a language' and
'language'): there can be no doubt that there are many problems
relating to both of these terms. One is the question of whether
the accepted view of terms such as 'English', 'Urdu', etc as
socio-political notions is in fact justified, and another is the
question of what we decide to subsume under the very general
heading 'language'.
Consider the commonplace (in linguistics) distinction
between a derivative socio-political notion such as 'Urdu' and
some more specifically linguistic notion (a language as a set
of sentences) which would count as one of my 'linguistic
objects'. In an attempt to elucidate the terminological problem
one faces with the expression 'a language', I want to
distinguish between 'a language^', which corresponds to the
standard generative definition of a language as a set of
sentences, and 'a language^' , which is the sort of thing we are
referring to in propositions of the sort 'Urdu is a language
distinct from Hindi'. That these are distinct is clear from the
fact that we have many linguistic means of assessing the truth
value of propositions about the objects described under 'a
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language £)', but no linguistic means of assessesing the truth
value of propositions such as 'Urdu is a language distinct from
Hindi'. There is more to this than the fact that there are
difficulties in maintaining a language/dialect distinction: our
linguistic theories do not treat of objects such as 'Urdu' and
'Hindi', and consequently there is simply nothing at issue, from
the point of view of linguistic theory, when it comes to arguing
over the truth or falsity of such propositions. Whatever
arguments over such propositions might be about, it seems clear
that they are more likely to be about socio-political matters
than linguistic ones.
If this distinction is well-founded, then we can define
pluralities of these by distinguishing between 'languages^', in
comparing and making theoretical claims about the objects which
grammars define, and 'languages^', the sorts of object under
discussion in the 'Are Urdu and Hindi distinct languages?'
cases. The question then arises as to the status of the
expression 'language'. I can see a clear sense in which we can
talk of 'language' when we are treating of 'languages^', but not
when we are dealing with 'languages^'. This is unsurprising if
indeed discussions of the sort centred around the Urdu/Hindi
distinction are not linguistic questions (not questions which
bear upon linguistic theory).
I am inclined, therefore, to accept the standard Chomskyan
line on the socio-political nature of (the referents of)
expressions such as 'Urdu' in propositions such as these.
However, like many of the most fundamental notions in Chomskyan
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linguistics, it is a line that has come to be challenged of
late. Both Hurford (forthcoming) and Katz (1981) want to claim
(albeit from entirely distinct methodological viewpoints) that
expressions such as 'English' and 'Urdu' may reasonably be taken
to be used to refer to objects of linguistic theorising. I
discuss Katz' specifically Platonistic version of this claim
below; for the moment I want to consider Hurford's remarks. He
maintains that 'the study of language starts most naturally with
languages' and that
'although in some sense fuzzy, languages are in practice
sufficiently clearly defined to be susceptible to solid factual
description, which in turn can support theorising. Discussions
of how many languages there are spoken in the world correctly
hedge their statements by pointing out the indeterminacy
involved in the language/dialect distinction, but are usually
not thereby deterred from concluding that there are in the
region of 4 - 5000 of them. So languages are,at least roughly
speaking, countable.... it is clear that languages are very
generally known as individual, describable, countable, and
nameable objects. And it is with these pretheoretically
available objects that the study of language can get to work.'
(Hurford forthcoming: 19 - 21)
My reaction to this is that what matters here is not so
much the problem in maintaining the dialect/language
distinction, but the factors which create the problem in the
first place. If languages^, as the objects which expressions
such as 'Urdu' denote, are not discrete (if it is simply not
possible to identify their boundaries), then they are not
countable in principle, and the question 'How many languages
are there spoken in the world?' is methodologically ill-formed.
We cannot answer it because it has no answer; it has no answer
because the referents of expressions such as 'Urdu' and
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'English' are not countable (because they are not discrete). I
have also suggested that they are not linguistic. Rather than
simply assert this, I want to observe that an object can
reasonably be called linguistic in nature if it needs to be
referred to in a linguistic theory. But there is no motivation
for theoretical constructs such as 'Urdu' 'English' or 'a
language^ '. Discussions in which the discussants are not
deterred from answering the question ('How many languages^are
there spoken in the world?') are therefore methodologically ill-
conceived. And such questions have no linguistic status.
I am unable, however, to resolve the problem of just what
'Modern Greek' means in the expression 'a generative grammar of
Modern Greek'. Given that I take 'a language^ ' to be an
abstract, intersubjectively real object (not of the Platonistic
sort: cf chapter 5), and that I take generative grammars to
define such objects, it is not clear just how justified we are
in referring to a given grammar of this sort as a grammar of,
say, Modern Greek. But I am also not certain that there is
anything at issue when it comes considering how justified we are
in thus referring to them.
If Hurford's remarks above cause me some measure of
disquiet, his comments (20 - 21) on the undefinability of
expressions such as 'Urdu' or 'English' in political terms do
not. I agree with him that there has never been a political
definition of such terms, and that this is probably not
possible. However, the standard Chomskyan line need not include
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the assertion that this is possible. One need only remark that
whatever discussions of the above sort about 'Urdu' are
concerned with, it is more likely to be socio-political/cultural
than linguistic. One needn't say that 'Urdu' is defined socio-
politically.
If it is important, and I think it is, to maintain the
distinction between 'a language' and 'language', then it is
important not to use the term 'languages' ambiguously to mean,
on the one hand, languages^ and on the other, to mean languages^
or to indicate the more general notion 'language'. It seems to
me that Pateman does just this.
The third chapter of his 1983 work Language as an Object of
Social Theory is entitled 'What is a language?', and concerns
themeaning of the expression 'a language':
'Though this chapter seeks to order some of the uses of 'a
language', its concern is not with verbal definitions but with
real definitions - definitions of the essence* of a thing - and
in that way is a contribution to ontological arguments about
languages - about their mode of existence.'
(80)
There are two expressions being used here, 'a language',
which may mean either 'a language(a set of sentences) or 'a
language^', and 'languages', which, again, is used in both the
'languages^ ' and 'languages^' senses. Unfortunately, Pateman
confuses 'languages' with 'language'. He begins by discussing
Smith and Wilson's (1979) account of the notion 'a language' and
* Real definitions need not be essentialist: cf chapter 1.
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concludes that it is confused, or at the very least, confusing.
It is best to cite the material from S&W which he uses. Firstly,
concerning 'a language':
'...a language is definable in terms of a set of rules.'
(S & W: 13)
Secondly:
'Since everyone will have heard a different set of
utterances, it is not surprising the he comes to possess a
slightly different grammar from those around him. Strictly
speaking, then, we cannot talk of the grammar of English, but
only of the grammars of individual speakers of English.'
(26)
Pateman observes that the reader is left concluding that 'a
language has been given a definition which excludes English from
the class of languages, though 'English' continues to be used in
some pre-theoretical (or alternative theoretical) sense to
gesture at something unavoidably present but not theoretically
allowed for' (Pateman 1983:81).
There are undoubtedly problems for S&W's definitions,
relating to the status of 'idiolects' and the intersubjective
nature of linguistic rules: it should be clear from the
preceding chapters that I follow Itkonen in not accepting that
one can legitimately talk of the grammars of individual
speakers. In this connection, note S & W's reference to the
fact that each speaker has heard a different set of utterances:
this fact is relevant to the Chomskyan notion of grammar, but
its significance is not that it leads us to conclude that each
speaker has a distinct, individual grammar. Rather, it leads
Chomsky to conclude that the particular set of utterances that a
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given individual is exposed to is not especially significant.
However, I do not think their account is confused in the way
Pateman takes it to be. If we adopt the Chomskyan account of
'English' as a derivative, non-linguistic notion, of a socio¬
political sort, as I have, and if the expression 'a language'
is defined linguistically in the usual Chomskyan way as a set of
sentences ('a language^'), then we see clearly what linguistic
content expressions like 'English' might have. As I have
suggested, questions such as 'Is it the case that Scots is a
language distinct from English?' or 'Is Urdu a language distinct
from Hindi?' are clearly non-linguistic questions. The
expressions 'a language' and 'English', if they refer to
anything in these cases, do not refer to linguistic objects.
When we speak of a generative grammar of English, on the other
hand, we cannot be claiming that the set of sentences, the
language^ generated by our grammar, can be referred to as
English in any strict way. Whatever the nature of the abstract
object we attempt to characterise when we devise a generative
grammar which generates a particular set of sentences, there is
no clear sense in which that set can be referred to as
'English'. Nor , as I've pointed out, is it possible to
conceive of a linguistic theory which had as a theoretical
construct the notion 'English'.
With these preliminary remarks on the notions 'a language',
'language', and 'languages', Pateman goes on to present his view
of the ontological status of languages. He wants to claim that
'a language' is both a linguistic entity and a 'natural kind'.
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In attempting both to explicate 'a language' and advance his
'natural kind and linguistic kind' definition, he lists five
different answers to the question 'what is a language?'. Note
that the question is neither 'what is language' nor 'what are
languages?'.
Pateman's five answers provide a set of (apparently)
competing positions on the subject. I reproduce them here:
' (I) A language is a natural kind. (NATURALISM)
(II) A language is an abstract object (PLATONISM)
(III) A language is a name given to a set of objects (for
example, a set of grammars, lects or idiolects,
characteristically taken to be properties of individual
speakers). (NOMINALISM)
(IV) A language is a social fact, and that social fact is also
a (or in a stronger version, the only) linguistic fact.
(SOCIOLOGISM)
(V) A language is a social fact, but that social fact is not a
linguistic fact. (DUALISM, for want of a better word to indicate
a view of reality as stratified and with at least 'wattk'
emergent properties)'
(op cit:81)
A few observations need to be made before I examine these
positions: the expression ' a language is a (particular kind of)
fact' is slightly odd. Since only propositions can be facts, and
not languages directly, I take this to be a circumlocution for
'the existence of a language is a (particular sort of) fact' or
perhaps 'That a given language exists is a fact of a particular
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sort, depending on what sort of existence one supposes a
language to have'. Alternatively, we can dispense with the use
of the term 'fact' and simply say that 'a language' is a
particular sort of entity'. Bearing this in mind, it seems that
Itkonen's view comes closest to position IV (sociologism), but
only if he defines 'a language^' this way as opposed to language
in the general sense. Chomsky's position probably corresponds to
V (what Pateman calls dualism; not to be confused with dualism
in the philosophy of mind), with 'a language' defined
sociopolitically but not linguistically, my 'a language^'. I
will ignore II (Platonism) for the moment, but I should note
that it can be adopted as an ontological position for language
in general without its being adopted as an interpretation of the
ontological interpretation of 'a language'(either 1 or 2); cf
chapter 5 on this.
Pateman wants to combine view I (Naturalism) with a view of
a language as a social fact (which one of IV and V, I discuss
below). Considering the first of these, Pateman has this to say:
'The knock-down argument against languages (emphasis in
original: PC) as natural kinds is surely and simply this: that
tiger cubs brought up among humans become tigers, not humans,
whereas Vietnamese orphans brought up in England talk English,
not Vietnamese.'
'But this is not the end of the matter. For from the fact
that a language is not a natural kind, it does not follow that
languages are not a natural kind, that is to say, from the fact
that English is not distinguishable from Vietnamese by
essential , natural, replicable properties it does not follow
that languages are not distinguishable from other human or




I think that what Pateman has done here is to shift the
expression to be explicated from 'a language' to 'languages',
where 'languages' corresponds to 'language' in the general sense
described above. That is, unless Pateman is using the expression
'a language' (presumably 'a language^') in a generic sense, he
has not defended the stated definition that 'a language is a
natural kind'. Rather, he has used the expression 'languages are
a natural kind' where he simply means 'language is a natural
kind'. If this is so, then what we are left with is the familiar
Chomskyan conception of language, or the human language faculty,
as a natural kind. And, of course, Chomsky adopts this view
without committing himself to the claim that a language is a
natural kind. I assume here that by 'natural kind', Pateman is
referring to a physical type which is a product of natural
evolutionary forces, in much the same way that tigers, or 'a
tiger', taken generically, are natural types/kinds.
If we interpret 'a language ' generically, then Pateman's
statements are not subject to the criticisms I have given, but
it is not clear precisely what sense he is using the expression
in, given that he precedes this discussion with comments about
English as 'a language'. We need to add that for Chomsky
(1980:217-218), both positions III and V are true. That is, 'a
language^' is only a name, so far as linguistic investigation is
concerned, but 'a language^ is a social object when considered
independently of linguistic inquiry, and that object is not a
linguistic one. As far as I can see, Pateman gives us no reason
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to reject the Chomskyan position ( an adoption of nominalism and
dualism combined with a rejection of naturalism, Platonism and
sociologism).
Interestingly, and rather oddly I think, Pateman considers
that Chomsky's adopting position V (dualism) precludes his
adopting III (nominalism), thus:
'....by saying that languages are socio-political facts,
Chomsky allows us to avoid resort to the kind of nominalist
position already discussed, while leaving it open what sort of
socio-political fact a language is.'
(110)
As I have just argued, this is not the case. It is true,
however, that Chomsky does leave open the question of what sort
of socio-political object 'a language^'is, and if Pateman could
argue that it is interpretable under a version of naturalism,
then he could arrive at a definition of a language as a social
object and a natural kind. However, this would be uninteresting
from a linguistic point of view, since we are concerned with
'languages^ '. If the expression 'language' is only of
linguistic interest in relation to 'a language^' and
'languages^ ', then it remains for Pateman to make a case for
such objects as natural kinds and objects of social theory. I
believe that his set of distinctions rests upon a confusion of
languages^, which undoubtedly are social in some sense, and are
not an object of linguistic inquiry, with languages^, which are
objects of linguistic inquiry but are not social in the way that
languages^ are (they may be taken to be intersubjective, and
thus social, objects, but this sense of 'social' is distinct
from the one just mentioned).
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I argued in chapter 3 that linguistic objects cannot be
taken to constitute natural objects if one means by that
physically-defined objects of an evolutionary sort (cf the
discussion of type physicalism, which is what Pateman is
adopting, I think). It should be rather obvious, therefore, that
I am not inclined to accept Pateman's ontological claim that 'a
language' (I prefer the expression 'linguistic objects' or 'the
object of grammatical inquiry', since I am talking about 'a
language^') is 'a natural kind'.
I have not said what Pateman wants to make of positions IV
(sociologism) and V (dualism). His views can be summarised as
follows: there are linguistic objects which are not social
objects; thus any extreme sociologism (such as Itkonen's) is
ruled out. Those linguistic objects which are not social
objects are psychological in nature; at least some of these
psychological objects are natural objects. There are facts
about language which are social facts but not linguistic facts,
and these must be viewed, under Pateman's type of social theory,
as being constrained by 'natural processes'.
Some impression of the differences between my assumptions
and Pateman's can be gained if I repeat that I recognise the
following four-way distinction: physical objects as opposed to
psychological states of affairs, as opposed to social objects,
as opposed to objects which are a product of social and
psychological processes, such as linguistic objects as
investigated in theoretical (ie 'autonomous') linguistics.
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Because I take it that linguistic objects are thus ontologically
differentiated from social and psychological objects, and
because I adopt a realist interpretation of linguistic theories,
I am happy to adopt a 'radical autonomy thesis' of the sort
mentioned by Lass and Itkonen, but without adopting either Lass'
instrumentalism or Itkonen's ontology. Pateman, on the other
hand, opposes autonomous linguistics (cf his introduction, in
which he takes it to be 'abstractive linguistics', a position I
criticise in chapters 3 and 5), and this follows from his
ontological assumptions, which are largely physicalistic.
Since Itkonen's and Lass' views, as well as mine, entail a
defence of autonomism, I want briefly to discuss Pateman's
criticisms of Itkonen's autonomism, and to show that they need
not worry proponents of autonomism.
(ii) Naturalism and the autonomy thesis
In discussing the fourth answer to the question 'what is a
language?' (sociologism: the view that language is a social
object and that this is also a linguistic object), Pateman cites
Itkonen as a proponent of this view. This is the case only if
Itkonen defines 'a language' this way, and it appears that he
does not. Rather, he defines linguistic rules this way.
Pateman notes this:
'Itkonen is concerned with the ontology of individual
rules, and not with the ontology of languages. As for the
latter, he sometimes seems to treat these nominalistically and




If Itkonen is not in fact proposing answer IV
(sociologism), should we conclude that Pateman has simply failed
to discuss what he purports to? In this case, I think we can
still examine some important aspects of sociologism if we bear
in mind that we are dealing with (some) linguistic objects,
rather than 'a language'. That is, it is certainly true that
Itkonen is proposing the following: that linguistic objects
(not ably rules of language) are social objects. And this view
is fairly labelled sociologism, as long as we do not interpret
this to mean that Itkonen takes linguistic investigation to be a
form of empirical sociology. Given that this is reasonable, it
is interesting to note Pateman's criticism of Itkonen's
sociologism.
The principal line of argument that Pateman follows is
this: Itkonen's linguistic-objects-as-social-objects approach
rests upon his adoption of and interpretation of the
Wittgensteinian argument against private languages. If either
the application of this to the methodology of theoretical
linguistics or Itkonen's interpretation can be countered, then
his sociologism can be countered.
Pateman attempts mostly to counter Itkonen's application of
the private language argument to theoretical linguistics, on the
grounds that the conclusions Itkonen draws from Wittgenstein
concerning grammatical inquiry are insupportable. Pateman's
arguments relate to the various issues raised by an innateness
view of creolisation, second language learning and the signing
systems developed by deaf children of hearing parents. What
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Pateman wants to do is to show that there is strong evidence for
an innateness account of these, and that this is in conflict
with Itkonen's anti-private language thesis.
It is vital that we bear in mind that Itkonen has never
shown any aversion to the notion of an innately-specified
language acquistion device, and has frequently stated that the
innateness/anti-innateness debate is simply a debate about how
richly developed innate specifications are. Itkonen's
objection to Chomskyan linguistics is that 'it maintains a
conception of language which is demonstrably equivalent to the
private-language conception' (1978:113). Now, while it may be
the case that Chomsky arrives at this private language
conception on the basis of his assumptions about innateness, it
is not the innateness hypothesis itself which Itkonen is objecting
to. Rather, it is the competence/performance distinction and
the fact that Chomsky distinguishes knowledge from use. A
defence of the innateness hypothesis need not, therefore, count
against Itkonen's anti-private language stance.
To take one of Pateman's criticisms: he argues that
Bickerton's (1981) account of creolisation constitutes evidence
against the claim that linguistic rules cannot be private. He
bases this on the fact that 'it appears to be empirically false
that there is a pre-existing language to be acquired by
(creolising) children' (1983:104), the point being that these
children are following linguistic rules which are not
constituted as shared knowledge in a pre-existing speech
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community. From this he concludes that such children are
following private language rules, by which he means rules which
are privately invented on the basis of some innately specified
'bioprogram' (to use Bickerton's term).
However, the fact that there is no pre-existing creole-
speaking community in these cases does not impugn Itkonen's
argument at all. It will still remain the case that any given
speech action within the set of first generation creole-speaking
children will be subject to Itkonen's 'correctness' criterion,
which lies at the heart of his argument aginst private language
rules. That is, it need not be the previous generation who
define 'correctness' for the creolising generation; it may well
be the creolising generation themselves. It remains the case
that the linguistic rules developed by the new generation are of
an intersubjective sort, regardless of whether they are
'invented' on the basis of some sort of innately-specified 'ur-
language' or not. The point for the private language argument is
that the internal processes whereby a speech action comes to be
performed are distinct from the intersubjective 'check' on well-
formedness which Itkonen takes to characterise the following of
a linguistic rule.
It is for this reason that I have not discussed Fodor's
(1975) 'arguments in favour of a private language': what Fodor
refers to as a 'private language' is simply some sort of
internal 'mode of computation' which each human being presumably
has in common. But this is not what Wittgenstein was talking
about; and in fact it would make no sense at all, were we to
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discover that such an internal mode of computing existed, to
refer to it as either 'correct' or 'incorrect'. Nor would it
make sense, and Itkonen himself makes this point (1978:320), to
refer to any particular computation on the basis of such a
'language' as being 'correct' or 'incorrect'. Both Pateman and
Fodor fail to see that internally specified means of encoding
and decoding are simply not germane to what Wittgenstein, and
therefore Itkonen, are claiming.
Pateman claims that there are two problems for Itkonen with
regard to this supposed conflict between the innateness
hypothesis and the anti-private language position. First, he
claims that
'if there are innate and other cognitive structures which
can legitimately be talked about and theorised, then there is
the problem of determining the concepts which can legitimately
be used in this enterprise, currently dominated by the
computational paradigm in which concepts of 'rules' and its
cognates are central'
(109)
I take this first problem to be, at best, a matter of
division of labour , and certainly not a problem for Itkonen,
who has made it clear what he takes 'rule' to mean, and has
shown what he finds objectionable in the Chomskyan paradigm.
That the existence of innate structures need not undermine the
computational paradigm is clear from the fact that Fodor
combines these: he proceeds on the hypothesis that the object of
inquiry is both innately specified and that thought is
computational.
The second purported problem for Itkonen concerns the
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nature of what he has achieved. Pateman argues that
Itkonen (1978) is best seen as 'a contribution to the study of
the social side of language' (109). That is, he claims that
Itkonen has most probably 'theorised the domain of a discipline
parallel to psycholiN^uistics - namely sociolinguistics' (loc
cit). This is quite mistaken. Firstly, the expression 'the
social side of language' is hopelessly broad and vague. It
simply begs the question 'what do you mean by the term
language?'. I choose to avoid the term, and refer to
'linguistic objects' instead (though if one uses it, it is in
relation to 'a language^and 'languages^ '). Itkonen carefully
distinguishes atheoretical rule and rule-sentence, corpus-based
investigation in psycho- and socio-linguistics as oppsed to non-
corpus-based grammars, and intersubjective rules of language vs
private inner states. Secondly, it is not possible to interpret
Itkonen as having theorised sociolinguistics; I will not even
argue that this is so, since a reading of my summary of
Itkonen's proposals will make this clear (or better still, a
reading of the opening chapters of Itkonen 1978).
I think I have made it clear that none of the arguments in
favour of innately-specified cognitive structures is even
relevant to the private language argument. Thus, this line of
attack upon Itkonen, and upon autonomous linguistics, cannot
proceed. Nor, I think, can Pateman's attempt to introduce a
version of naturalism into the philosphy of linguistics via
arguments in favour of innateness. Neither my, nor Itkonen's
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versions of autonomous linguistics rests on an anti-
innateness argument. I proceed in the following chapter to
flesh out more of the details of my own autonomy thesis, and I
also consider the Platonist version of autonomism which,




BEYOND SOCIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL INTERPRETATIONS
In this chapter, I deal with philosophies of theoretical
linguistics which take the object of inquiry to be neither
psychological nor social in nature. I examine a version of
Platonism, as expounded in Katz (1981), and discuss some of the
objections to Katz' proposals made by Pulman (forthcoming),
Pateman (1983) and Itkonen (1983). I also state my own
objections to Platonism and present my version of an autonomous
linguistics based on interactionism, which I think preserves the




(i) Abstract objects, causality, and emergence
Katz' (1981) work Language and Other Abstract Objects
constitutes a major departure from his earlier published views
on the ontological status of linguistic objects. His paper
'Mentalism in linguistics' (1964), for example, argues for the
sort of psychologism discussed in chapter 3. It is quite clear
that Katz arrived at a Platonist philosophy of linguistics
because of his interpretation of semantic representations in
particular: his (1977) 'The Real Status of Semantic
Representations' constitutes his first public statement of an
overtly Platonist line on linguistic representation. And in
fact, it is arguable that in this paper, Katz merely makes
explicit what had been an immanent Platonism in his approach to
semantics since his Semantic Theory (1972)*.
However this may be, we can now take Katz, along with
Postal, Langendoen and other members of the 'New York School of
Platonism' (cf Postal & Langendoen 1984) to be the
principal advocate of an explicitly non-psychologistic, non-
social, ontology of linguistic objects, the details of which are
as follows.
* I am grateful to Noel Burton-Roberts for pointing this out to
me; notice that it lends credence to the Popperian notion that
our hypotheses may contain certain properties, such as
contradictions, even if we as authors fail to perceive them. In
this case, Katz' mentalism was contradicted by the Platonistic,
non-mentalistic, nature of his view of semantic representation.
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Katz adopts the tripartite distinction traditionally made
in the philosophy of mathematics (and of logic), the
nominalist/conceptualist/ realist distinction. He argues that
there have been two principal philosophies of linguistics in the
twentieth century, namely nominalism and conceptualism. The
first of these is reflected in the works of many of the American
Structuralist linguists whose work I described as
instrumentalist in 2.2. He refers to it as being nominalist
since, under this philosophy of linguistics, theoretical terms
are no more than names and do not refer to extratheoretical
realities. What Katz calls conceptualism is the view that
theoretical terms refer to mental entities. He takes this to
characterise the Chomskyan position which I have called
psychologism. Both of these are taken to be distinct from
realism which, in Katz' view means Platonic realism. In this1
>
respect, 'realism' here is not synonymous with what is referred
to as 'realism' in the philosophy of science. Thus, under the
latter use of the term, both Chomsky's and Katz' philosophies of
linguistics are realist (albeit of very different sorts) whereas
in the former, only Katz' proposals are realist, and not
Chomsky's.
I do not want to pursue at length the matter of whether the
trichotomy in the philosophy of mathematics and logic, or the
realist/instrumentalist dichotomy in the philosophy of science
is the most appropriate means of identifying positions in the
philosophy of linguistics. However, it is noticeable that one's
choice between the two appears to be at least partly determined
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by one's methodological and ontological assumptions about
theoretical linguistics. The fact that Katz wants to identify
theoretical linguistics as a discipline parallel in method to
mathematics and logic, rather than the natural sciences, is
reflected in his use of a philosophy of mathematics orientation.
On the other hand, my use of a philosophy of science orientation
might be taken to reflect the view that theoretical linguistics
is a discipline parallel to those in the natural sciences. The
choice of orientation thus begins to sound rather circular, that
is, as if one's philosophy of linguistics determines how one is
to go about talking about one's philosophy of linguistics.
While this may be the case for Katz (I do not argue that it
is), I think I can defend myself from the accusation of
methodological circularity. As I have mentioned (2.2), my
approach to the question 'Is the realist/instrumentalist debate
relevant to the philosophy of linguistics?' is that we need to
examine the issues raised in the debate and find out whether
they help shed light on problems in the philosophy of
linguistics. I think I have shown that they do. Thus, my
adoption of a philosophy of science approach to the philosophy
of linguistics does not necessarily presuppose a version of
'scientism' (what Itkonen calls positivism), otherwise known as
methodological monism, the view that the method in the natural
sciences parallels that in the human sciences. In order to
establish whether theoretical linguistics adopts the same
methods as the natural sciences or not, one must go into the
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methodological and ontological details, which is what I have
done. I think I have established fairly clearly in what
respects I take natural sciences to be parallel to theoretical
linguistics, and in what respects they differ.
One further point needs to be made in this connection: it
is mistaken, I think, to assume that these three positions
(nominalism, conceptualism and realism) encompass the entire
range of twentieth century philosophies of linguistics. I
have already discussed such a philosophy which does not
correspond to nominalism conceptualism or realism, namely
Itkonen's mutual knowledge anti-positivism. Saussure and
Hjelmslev can also be interpreted as embracing none of these
three. Indeed, one could be forgiven for assuming, on a reading
of Katz' book, that the entire philosophy of linguistics in the
twentieth century took place within the United States; his
account takes Sapir, Bloomfield, Harris and Chomsky to be the
principal figures in this history, and excludes reference to
Saussure. Hjelmslev is mentioned once, interestingly, as a
possible forerunner of the sort of approach Katz takes. This is
regrettable, as it leads Katz to assume, on several occassions,
that Platonism is the only current alternative to nominalism and
conceptualism, which it certainly is not.
Bearing this in mind, Katz' position can be identified by
observing that he takes linguistic objects to be 'abstract' in
nature, where 'abstract' means non-spatial, non-temporal,
Platonic. Specifically, both sentences and languages (ie
particular languages such as English) are abstract objects of a
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Platonic sort. A reminder here of a point I made in 4.1:
'abstract' for Katz is not equivalent to 'abstract' for Chomsky.
Chomsky's object is spatiotemporal, and his representations of
it are abstract in that they attempt to describe aspects of
speakers' knowledge abstracted away from individual speakers and
non-linguistic factors. Despite being thus abstract, Chomsky's
representations are taken to be potentially descriptive of (or
'characterising') spatiotemporal entities and processes (though
note the problems with identifying functions spatially: 1.1).
Katz' abstract objects, on the other hand, are not
spatiotemporal at all. One could equally use the terms 'ideal'
in relation to Katz' objects and 'idealised' in relation to
Chomsky's, as I noted in 4.1.
Before I go on to discuss Katz' abstract objects, it should
be stressed that Katz' ontology (of Platonic objects) is
separable from his epistemology. That is, having established a
case for Platonically real objects, Katz must erect an
epistemology of how it is we come to have knowledge of such
objects. This he does in the final chapter of the work, but it
is conceivable that that Katz might abandon this
epistemological framework and erect another which might fit his
ontological assumptions better (of course, one may find it
rather hard to conceive of what epistemology could possibly fit
Platonism, but that ii to anticipate). I mention this for two
reasons: one, (i) I intend discussing ontology first, and
epistemology second and (ii) the distinction between the two is
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important when it comes to examining the details of Katz'
proposals.
Katz* arguments for taking the object of inquiry to be
abstract objects are as follows. Knowledge of something is
distinct from that which we have knowledge of. That is, the
'knowledge of' relation is a two-place predicate. If we accept
that this is so, it is clear that our knowledge of the structure
of a sentence is distinct from the structure of the sentence per
se. It follows from this that sentences themselves, as the
objects of our inquiry, are not competence units, are not units
of knowledge, but are objects of which we have knowledge. In
engaging in acts of intuition, we gain direct access to these
objects; thus grammaticality judgements involve the accessing of
linguistic objects per se, rather than some internal cognitive
structure. Katz claims that, in this respect, linguistics is
like mathematics or logic, which equally involve intuitive access
to extra-psychological entities and relationships. His claim is
that mathematical theory is a theory of numbers per se, rather
than the human cognitive capacity for storing and processing
representations of numbers. Likewise, logic involves the study
of logical relations via intuitive judgements as to what are and
are not valid inferences.
This interpretation of logic and mathematics is of course
defensible, but is not universally accepted; to support it, Katz
cites Frege and Husserl as proponents of such an interpretation
of logic, and Hardy (1940) for this interpretation of
mathematics. However, even if one were to argue that logic and
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mathematics are incorrectly construed as 'sciences of the
intuition' in Katz' Platonistic sense, Katz could still argue
for such an interpretation of theoretical linguistics. That is,
Katz' Platonistic interpretation of grammatical inquiry is not
dependent on the supposed parallel between it and mathematics
and logic.
It is clear that intuition is thus distinct from
psychological acts such as remembering, perceiving and
introspecting. While the latter might seem similar to the act
of intuiting, in that both appear to be 'mental' acts in some
sense, it is important to bear in mind that for Katz, the object
which one gains access to in an act of introspection is quite
distinct from that which one acccesses during intuition: one is
an internal cognitive state of affairs, while the other is a
non-subjective, and for Katz, Platonic, object.■
These considerations lead Katz to argue that theoretical
linguistics is an autonomous science with respect to psychology,
which he takes to include psycholinguistics. Being a science of
the intuition, theoretical linguistics is not an empirical
science at all, whereas psycholinguistics is. It is interesting
that Katz does not give the same detailed consideration to the
question of what is meant by 'empirical' as is given by Itkonen,
but he does define empirical sciences as being about 'experience
or the external world itself' (Katz 1981: 23). While it is at
least a reasonable approximation to say that the term means
'about experience', this is rather vague, in that acts of
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intuition are experiences of a sort. The notion 'external
world' is of little help either, as mathematical and logical
realities could well be said to constitute elements of the
external world, even when interpreted Platonistically. However,
since Katz takes Platonic realities to be non-spatiotemporal, it
is as well to assume that in Katz' view empirical sciences
relate to the spatiotemporal, or, in Itkonen's more precise
formulation, are spatiotemporally falsifiable. Katz is right in
arguing, as I have , that it is mistaken to equate 'empirical'
with 'falsifiable', and that nonempirical (in this sense)
theories may nonetheless be falsifiable.
In addition to these proposals, Katz argues that
psychologism is both too restrictive and not sufficiently
restrictive a framework for linguistic theorising. His
arguments are as follows. Psychologism is too restrictive in
that it takes linguistic objects to be psychological objects and
thus constrains the class of possible grammars to those that
happen to be compatible with the contingent facts concerning
human cognitive make-up. That is, anything which happens to be
a factor in the human cognitive machinery can potentially count
as a factor in the grammatical description of a sentence (or,
more generally, in the grammar of a language). Katz argues that
this may often turn out to be undesirable. He cites the case
whereby a set of grammars contains all of the simplest
grammars which 'predict and explain every grammatical fact about
each sentence of English (86), but which are psychologically
implausible, as opposed to a more complex grammar (ie
180
notationally more complex or more complex in its set of rules)
which is plausible psychologically. He points out that the
conceptualist would have to choose the grammar which falls
outside of our original set of economic and explanatorily
successful grammars, simply because it fulfills our
psychological criterion for the evaluation of grammars. Thus, it
is possible, Katz claims, that our strictly methodological
criteria (simplicity, generality, descriptive and explanatory
adequacy) may clash with our general metatheoretical demand that
grammars be psychologically plausible.
By the same token, Katz claims (90-91) that such a
requirement would be insufficiently restrictive in that it would
not exclude from the class of permissible grammars those which
are psychologically plausible but linguistically impoverished
(ie which conatin inelegant sets of rules which fail to capture
significant generalisations).
Consider some of the objections one might have to these
claims. The conceptualist may doubt that it is likely that we
would end up with such a clash, that is, it is anticipated that
simplicity, generality, etc are themselves likely to be the
basis upon which procesing, storage, etc take place. Under this
view, we take the methodological criteria to be not merely a set
of principles for the construction of grammars, but a reflection
of the principles underlying human cognitive makeup. Thus, both
our grammar, as formulated by the linguist, and the object
grammar function according to the same general principles, which
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of course is what psychologism is all about. The trouble with
this objection to Katz is that it appears to fit badly with
actual practice in theoretical linguistics. Considerations as
to psychological plausibility rarely seem to figure in
grammatical descriptions, and what linguists do seem to care
about is the capturing of linguistic generalisations per se; it
is thus perfectly easy to violate psychological plausibility
while devising an elegant analysis. A case in point must be
the emergence of tranformational analyses during the heyday of
the standard model, where such analyses were not guided by the
desire to attain psychological plausibility, nor did they in
fact satisfy any such desire. And yet such analyses were
methodologically very appealing, and notions such as Raising and
Equi still feature as descriptively useful constructs in much
grammatical analysis (one still ses these constructs being used
within more recent, non-transformational, grammar: cf Gazdar^LL lf$S
for example).
Consider another objection that might be raised by the
conceptualist. It may be argued that it is vital to
distinguish, in any theory of processing, between two or more
logically equivalent grammars on the one hand and the set of
possible modes of implementation of such grammars on the other.
We might call these algorithms for grammars, by analogy with the
computational distinction between a function to be computed and
an algorithm or means of implementation for the computation of
that function (say, in a particular programme written in a
particular programming language). Conceptualism does not
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require us, it might be argued, to reject a particular grammar
just because some algorithm or other for that grammar5'' is
psychologically implausible. The grammar is not equivalent to
any particular algorithm and conceptualism could be said to
require us only to adopt an algorithm which is plausible.
Precisely this sort of objection to Katz' argument is raised by
Pulman (forthcoming), which I discuss in (ii) below.
The most interesting facet of such an objection is that it
incorporates a tripartite distinction between the following: a
level of hardware, to be taken into account in any theory of
processing, the algorithmic level, where a given grammar is made
to work by means of a series of implementation instructions, and
the level of the grammar itself, which is the level at which two
or more grammars can be said to be logically equivalent (or
not). The question that is begged by this set of distinctions
is: what sort of thing is this highest level object? If we take
the human cognitive apparatus to contain a finite stock of
hardware and a particular algorithm, or set of implementation
instructions, then where does the internalised grammar fit in
* The expression 'algorithm for a grammar' may seem odd here. If
so, perhaps I can explain what I mean by using another, very
similar, computational analogy, used by Fodor (1983). One can
distinguish between a function to be computed by some system,
the virtual architecture of the system, which specifies the set
of instructions that need to be incorporated into a programme to
get the function to be computed, and the physical architecture
of the programme which embodies these instructions. The level of
virtual architecture here corresponds to the algorithmic level
mentioned above. It seems to me that one can view linguistic
systems and their realisations in precisely this way (and indeed
Pulman, forthcoming, does).
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with these? And if we allow that machines and /or alien
species may possess differ ing algorithms for the same grammar
in the cases where such beings/machines can decode a natural
language, what is the status of the grammar for which they have
distinct algorithms?
It is very tempting to draw a parallel between this sort of
tripartite distinction and that drawn by Popper, which is what I
propose in 5.2. However, without pre-empting the discussion
there, it is interesting to note that in anticipating this sort
of objection by the conceptualist, Katz concludes (rightly, in
my opinion) that if the conceptualist adopts such a set of
distinctions, he collapses conceptualism into autonomism. This
is because it amounts to autonomism to allow a third ontological
category distinct from the hardware and the algorithmic levels.
Recall Fodor1s token physicalism and its faults (4.2): not only
can we not expect grammatical kinds to turn out to correlate
directly with algorithmic kinds, where the algorithm is some
specific physical means of representing the grammar (type
physicalism), but neither can we expect (physical) algorithmic
tokens to correlate directly with grammatical tokens (token
physicalism). This is because it is only by virtue of being a
representation of a grammar that an algorithm has any meaning.
We are compelled, therefore, to distinguish the grammar from
both the algorithm and the hardware, and to allow that the
grammar belongs to an ontic category distinct from either of
these.
For Katz, this category is Platonic, thus:
184
'There are also incompatibilities between aspects of the mental
or neural structures in these various groups of creatures. We
cannot abstract away from them without abstracting away from the
psychological medium in which competences are realised and
paying attention only to invariances across the range of
cognitive systems that reflect the grammatical properties and
relations of English sentences. Such abstraction would collapse
conceptualism into Platonism.'
(91)
While I agree with Katz that an attempt on the part of the
conceptualist to distinguish grammars from their algorithms
would collapse conceptualism into autonomism, I think Katz is
mistaken in assuming that it is Platonism in particular, as a
brand of autonomism, which would result from such attempt.
There is no reason why, having allowed that grammars are
distinct from their modes of implementation, we need asume that
they are therefore Platonic in nature. This is one of the
points at which my autonomism differs radically from Katz'. I
will try to show (5.2) that this kind of autonomism is much more
comprehensible than Platonism, and overcomes some of its major
problems.
One of the principal problems with the notion that
linguistic objects are Platonic concerns the possibility of our
coming to have knowledge of such objects, that is the question
of supplying an epistemology to fit the ontological assumptions.
Katz attempts to do just this in the final chapter of his book,
where he assumes that intuition is fallible, that is, that our
intutive judgements may turn out to be mistaken. Katz does not
consider that this weakens the role of intuition in Platonist
linguistics, since he assumes that fallibility and certainty are
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properties of the knower rather than the known. Katz argues that
it has been a mistake in the history of Platonism to draw an
analogy between intuition on the one hand and both introspection
and perception on the other, and to assume that intuition
involves some kind of direct contact between the knower and the
abstract object. This, he argues (201), amounts to claiming
that knowledge of abstract objects is knowledge by acquaintance.
He believes that this is mistaken, because it is not possible
for abstract objects, being atemporal and aspatial, to exert
causal influences upon a knower:
'Being objective, abstract objects do not occur as a
constituent of the conscious experience of a knower, and, being
aspatial and atemporal, they cannot act on a knower through a
causal process to produce a representation of themselves in the
manner of sense perception.'
The immediate question this begs is that of how we can
possibly come to have knowledge of these objects if they cannot
act upon us to induce some representation, for it is quite clear
that we do have such representations.
Katz answers this by proposing a Kantian epistemology
whereby intuitive awareness is the effect of an 'internal
construction'. That is, we internally construct intuitive
judgements, and these either do or do not correspond to external
abstract objects (thus fallible intuitionism). These internal
constructions are therefore representations of abstract objects
rather than abstract objects per se. The reader may by now be
amazed that our internal constructions happen so often to
correspond to external abstract objects. Katz responds to this
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by clairaimg that this apparently chance correspondence is not
chance at all: we are endowed with an innately specified notion
of 'abstract object' which 'specifies the ontological
characteristics of the object that grammatical knowledge is
knowledge of' (205).
Katz thus transforms Chomskyan nativism into a native
knowledge of 'abstract object'. None of this gives us any idea
of how we are supposed to have come to possess such an innate
knowledge, especially when one considers that abstract objects
are not available for causal interaction during the evolutionary
process. And this is the principal problem with Platonism: if
we cannot in principle interact causally with Platonic objects,
how can we know they exist? And how can we come to have
knowledge of them? This is in marked contrast with my version
of autonomism, which stresses interaction, and furthermore,
following Popper (1972), uses the fact of interaction as
evidence that it is coherent to talk of objective knowledge.
Interactionism also assumes that the emergence of such a kind of
knowledge is an evolutionary phenomenon.
Another interesting problem with Katz' philosophy of
linguistics, which has been pointed out by Pateman (1983),
concerns the conflict between his methodological criteria for
the assessment of linguistic theories and his epsitemological
and ontological proposals. Katz adopts a simplicity criterion
for the assessment of linguistic theories (66-67; 234-237) and
specifically urges us to adopt Occam's razor as a general
principle of scientific methodology (237). Now, given that
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Katz adopts both a nativism akin to Chomsky's (but with
knowledge of 'abstract object' as the innately endowed
knowledge) in addition to an ontology of abstract objects,
Pateman argues that Katz ought to apply his own simplicity
principle and dispense with abstract objects, leaving us with
straightforward Chomskyan innateness. Certainly, Occam's razor
was devised precisely for this purpose (sometimes referred to as
the trimming of 'Plato's beard': cf Quine 1953: 2).
Katz might, I suppose, argue that his simplicity criterion
is a requirement for the assessment of linguistic theories and
not metatheories, and that we cannot overcome the problems of
psychologism without recognising the existence of Platonic
abstract objects. While I am inclined to agree that we need to
avoid the possibility of there being 'more in the world than
there is in our ontology' just as much as we need to avoid the
possibility of there being more in our ontology than there is in
the world (Occam's view, and Quine's for that matter), I think
that Katz must concede that his Platonic abstract objects are
rather difficult to take seriously precisely because they are
said not to be capable of entering into causal relations with
human minds.
There is a further point that I want to make about Katz'
abstract objects, concerning the question of what counts as a
linguistic, and therefore Platonic, object. As I have said,
Katz argues that both sentences and particular languages count
as objects of linguistic theory and are therefore subject to
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this Platonic interpretation. This is relatively controversial;
while it is perfectly reasonable to assume that sentences are
linguistic objects and thus susceptible to such a Platonic
interpretation, it is rather novel to argue that particular
languages (and, in principle, any and all future and past
languages) should be taken to be objects of linguistic theory.
The received view on this subject (Chomsky's) is that
expressions like 'English' are best interpreted
sociopolitically, such that 'English' is not a linguistic
object, and it is a (linguistically) arbitrary matter whether
Hindi and Urdu, for example, are or are not 'the same language'
(I have shown, in chapter 4, why I accept this).,
Katz, however, argues that such expressions do denote
lingusitic objects, which of course he interprets
Platonistically:
'...claiming that notions like 'English', 'French', etc and
'natural language' are not proper concepts of linguistics... is
like claiming that the concept of number is not a concept of
mathematics, but a sociopolitical one (or that the concept of
implication is not a logical concept but a sociopolitical one)'
(79)
'The claim that linguistic theories are not about
psychological phenomena but straightforwardly about sentences
and languages rests on the general epistemological distinction
between knowledge that we have of something and the thing(s)
that we have knowledge of.'
(77)
I think that the first of these passages reflects a
confusion. Quite apart from the fact that the concept 'natural
language' is quite clearly a concept of linguistic theory, and
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quite different in status from concepts such as 'French', it is
very clear that 'French' does not bear the same relation to
linguistics as 'number' does to mathematics, or 'implication' to
logic. The act of intuition, which Katz makes agreat deal of,
does not, for example, involve judgements about a language. It
does involve judgements about sentences, however, and if we then
take such judgements to constitute the data and sentences to
constitute the central objects of our inquiry, we can go on to
characterise their properties and structure, yielding a whole
set of objects within this domain such as 'constituent',
'syllable', 'complement', etc. While it is true to say that
notions like 'sentence' are as much a central concept of
linguistics as 'number' and 'implication' in mathematics and
logic, it is not at all the case that any linguistic theory need
make reference to notions such as 'French'.
I beleive that Katz is also mistaken, in the second of
these passages, in utilising the 'knowledge of' relation to
justify taking 'French' etc as linguistic objects. He claims
that what we have knowledge of are, not just sentences, but
particular languages. One can take the knowledge of relation to
have sentences and their properties as its object without having
to make this claim. In having knowledge of a given set of
sentences and their properties, or the grammar which underlies
these, it is an arbitrary matter whether we refer to that
grammar as 'French', 'Spanish' or whatever. Of course, part of
the problem in discussing the notion 'a language' arises from
the dual definition given for the term within the Chomskyan
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framework (cf 4.2), where 'a language' is both 'a set of
sentences' and 'a non-linguistic, sociopolitically defined
entity'. I argued there that while this can cause confusion,
there is not in fact any contradiction involved. One of these
defines the object of inquiry, the other simply makes it clear
that terms such as 'Japanese' have no explicit linguistic
function. It matters not at all that once we have come up with
a characterisation of what a speaker knows ('a language' in the
formal sense: my 'a language^'), we may not be able to decide
whether this should be sociopolitically labelled as 'Dutch' or
'German'. Katz is therefore mistaken in making the following
remark:
'Thus, we have to know from the outset what 'English'
refers to in the characterisation "the ideal speaker-hearer's
knowledge of English". The characterisation employs the term
"English" to specify the knowledge in question, just as the
characterisation "the ideal reasoner's knowledge of
propositional logic" employs the term "propositional logic" to
specify the knowledge in question.'
(80)
Even if Katz had not made the mistake of taking expressions
like 'French' to denote a linguistic (and therefore abstract)
object, and had restricted his abstract objects to include only
sentences and their properties, his Platonism would still run
into the sorts of problem I have mentioned. He has, however,
multiplied entities beyond necessity even more so than he might
have done. The emergence of a Platonist philosophy of
linguistics has, however, provoked a response, which can only
help stimulate debate on matters methodological. Some of these
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responses have been spurious, others important; I briefly
examine some of these now.
(ii) Objections to Platonism
Pulman (forthcoming) gives several arguments against
Platonism and in favour of a standard Chomskyan psychological
ontology, for which he uses the term 'rationalism'. As above, I
do not intend to discuss the empiricist/rationalist debate
directly. For my purposes, rationalism means psychologism plus
an innateness hypothesis; it is the former that I am interested
in. I want to suggest that Pulman's criticisms, where they are
arguments directed against autonomism in general, are mistaken.
The first of Pulman's arguments is that Katz is mistaken in
claiming that the conceptualist (in Katz' terminology) or
rationalist (in Pulman's) must make implicit appeal to the
notion 'a language' as a linguistic object. I discussed this
claim of Katz' in (i) and hope to have shown that it is based on
a confusion. Pulman, however, reacts by trying to show that the
Rationalist may in fact define the notion 'a language' (such as
English or French) in a way that does not presuppose any
reference to abstract objects. That is, he wants to show that
talk of 'a language' is merely a convenient shorthand for talk
about native speakers of natural language. His argument is as
follows: talk of a language can be reconstructed as talk about
speakers by assuming that the linguist collects samples of
speech data, with utterance tokens as the raw data, and
utterance types as abstractions away from those. The linguist
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thus assembles a corpus, and his object of inquiry is an
idealisation over this corpus (Pulman forthcoming: 10).
It is interesting that Pulman attempts to answer Katz: I
think that he need not, since the rationalist is not guilty of
the circularity which Katz accuses him of, as I hope I have
shown in (i). As a reply to Katz, Pulman's account of
linguistic methodology is not, I think, plausible, or
attractive, for the rationalist. Itkonen's arguments against
the myth that theoretical linguistics is corpus-based need not
be rehearsed here; suffice to say that, as discussed in 4.1,
theoretical linguistics neither is, nor needs to be, a corpus-
based activity. Since it would be redundant for the theoretical
linguist to collect utterance tokens coresponding to the
sentences he analyses, there is no reason for Pulman to observe
that 1 in practice, linguists are seldom so virtuous ' as to
collect the corpus examples. If the sentences we analyse are
indeed abstracted away from utterances, it remains a mystery how
we can arrive at a set of sentences without having a corpus to
abstract away from. Virtue does not enter into the picture;
rather, we arrive at a set of sentences on the basis of some
sort of knowledge which we possess (for Itkonen, mutual
knowledge of intersubjective norms; for Chomsky, knowledge
constituting the internalised grammar), and which we are trying
to characterise. Oddly, this is precisely the standard Chomskyan
rationalist view on the matter; Pulman, in attempting to defend
rationalism from a cricticism which is mistaken, abandons one of
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the central components of rationalism.
Pulinan's next criticism concerns the status of grammars in
relation to Katz' claim that psychologism is over-restrictive.
Pulman claims that a grammar can be interpreted either as a
'logical characterisation of the ability it describes' (15) or
as a 'description of an actual algorithm, or program, for
carrying out the computation of that function, or modelling the
exercise of the ability in question' (15). He goes on to argue
that Katz ignores these two different interpretations of
grammars, taking only the algorithmic interpretation to be
valid. He argues that if we adopt the logical interpretation,
we can see that a psychologically implausible algorithm might
still reflect an adequate logical-level grammatical
characterisation. I discussed this argument in 5.1 (i) and
pointed out, as indeed Katz has, that it presupposes a
trichotomy of the sort any autonomist would want to propose.
Thus, in constructing an argument against autonomism, Pulman
collapses non-autonomist rationalism into autonomism.
Finally, Pulman objects to Katz' claim that the rationalist
must take any species which is different in cognitive makeup
from humans to possess a different grammar from ours even when
the output is the same. This follows, Katz argues, from the
fact that the rationalist takes internal cognitive structure to
constitute the grammar. Pulman replies that Katz is ascribing
to the rationalist an extreme version of reductionism, and that
this need not be adopted by the rationalist. He cites Fodor
(1981) in trying to show that such a reductionism is in no way
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necessary for the formulation of an adequate psychological
interpretation of grammars. This he takes to boil down to the
fact that the same program can run on radically different sorts
of 'architecture and hardware characteristics'.
Thus, he proposes a set of distinctions which consists of
(i) the hardware characteristics of the machine, (ii) the
particular program for computing the function, (iii) the
algorithm which constitutes the set of instructions to be
embodied in the program, and (iv) the grammar or function to be
computed. If (i) and (ii) correspond in humans to neural
hardware and its architecture (ie physical architecture) and
(iii) corresponds to some set of psychological processes
(virtual architecture*), one wonders what (iv) corresponds to.
Unless one adopts a purely instrumentalist interpretation of
(iv), which would be odd, given that it is primary with respect
to (iii), one will have to assign it real status, distinct from
the psychological object in (iii). This is what autonomism
does, and what Pulman fails to do. I have already argued (3.3)
that Fodor's token physicalism results in an untenable
reductionism, and cannot reconcile the difference between (iii)
and (iv) with the claim that objects in (iv) are describable in
a physical vocabulary.
While I share Pulman's reservations about the likelihood
that linguistic objects are Platonic, I think his arguments
* On the distinction between virtual and physical architecture, cf
the footnote to my discussion of algorithms for grammars: p. 182
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against autonomism in general are weak. The first of his
arguments is unnecessary and in any case mistaken, the second
collapses psychologism into autonomism, and the third both
collapses these two and fails to avoid the pitfalls of
reductionism. Thus autonomism, and even Platonism in
particular, is left largely intact in the face of Pulman's
objections.
Pateman (1983a,b) does, however, develop a very impressive
case against Katz' epistemology, which has serious consequences
for the ontological framewok Katz proposes. Firstly, he proposes
the sort of argument discussed in (i), that Katz ought to wtiild
his own methodological criterion (Occam's Razor) and dispense
with abstract objects altogether; leaving only a standard
Chomskyan innateness view of linguistic objects. I suggested
there that Katz might reply that his methodological criterion is
one for the assessment of theories rather than metatheories, and
that Pateman ought to give philosophical objections at the
metatheoretical level to attack Platonism. In his 1983 (a), he
does just this by showing that all of the properties possessed
by abstract objects can be seen to be possessed by the kinds of
mutual knowldege proposed by Itkonen. Thus, linguistic objects
are not spatiotemporal because they are not regularities, but
rules of mutual knowledge. And since Itkonen's mutual knowledge
ontology poses fewer problems in terms of both epistemological
and ontological difficulties, it is advisbale to adopt
Itkonen's.
In addition to this, Pateman argues that in a Kantian
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epistemology, entities such as the abstract objects Katz
proposes are unknowable in themselves, our knowledge being
confined to the world of non-abstract objects. The most
interesting conseuqnce of this is that it would lead us to
abandon abstract objects as entities to which our theories may
refer.
It is clear that Platonism faces severe epistemological
problems, and that it does not fit easily with the notions of
emergence of linguistic objects and causal interaction between
these and human cognitive capacities. However, autonomism
still emerges as a plausible way of looking at such objects, and
I hope to show in 5.2 that it is possible to propose an




Having argued for a version of realism, and that neither
psychological nor social interpretations of linguistic realities
are satisfactory, I want to present my version of autonomism
which I think overcomes the problems discussed in chapters 3 and
4, as well as the problems with regard to emergence and
interaction which beset Platonism.
Perhaps the most counter-intuitive aspect of Platonism is
its assumption that linguistic objects are not products of human
activity; along with this rather unfortunate fact come the
problems associated with emergence and interaction which I have
mentioned. If we reverse these Platonistic claims, however, and
adopt some of Popper's proposals concerning emergent realities,
we claim that linguistic objects are emergent, man-made products
which interact with other physical and cognitive systems.
However, if we still maintain the one viable aspect of
Platonism, namely its autonomistic element, we claim that such
objects are largely autonomous, in much the same way that the
modules in a modular account of a linguistic system may be said
to be autonomous but interacting. This seems to me much more
intuitively appealing than Platonism; since it is based on some
of Popper's proposals, I first outline these and then show how
they can be extended to linguistic objects.
(i) Popper's proposals
As part of his attempt to understand the nature of the
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growth of scientific knowledge, Popper has proposed that we
ought not to take scientific theories to be psychological in
nature. That is, while some subjective, psychological process
occurs, internal to the scientist, as a part of the formulating
of a scientific theory, that is no reason to assume that the
theory, qua theory, is a psychological entity. Rather, it is
the objective content of the theory which is important, and
this, Popper argues, is not psychological in nature, but
intersubjective. If one considers, for example, the following
properties of a theory, one need make no reference to the
psychology of the scientist: its falsifiability, its internal
consistency, its relationship to other theories, the relations
between its sub-parts, its relationship to the problem situation
it is designed to resolve and the context in which it is
proposed (the context would in fact include the problem
situation and any competing theories designed to resolve that
situation: the two are closely interconnected).
As an illustration of this, Popper (1972: 170 - 80)
considers the case of Galileo's heliocentric hypothesis in
general, and his theory of the tides in particular. Taking the
first of these, it is clear that regardless of either
Copernicus' or Galileo's psychological states, the heliocentric
hypothesis was falsifiable. Whether Copernicus was aware of it
or not, it was possible to deduce from this hypothesis that the
inner planets of the solar system would show phases parallel to
those seen on the moon. The most important point about this is
that it is a consequence of the theory that phases will be
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observable on the inner planets, and this relation 'consequence
of' is a relation between theory, corollary and object. And
while this is no doubt a complex relationship, it is not a
psychological one. We do not invent this particular
consequence, though we do invent the theory which leads to it;
rather, we discover it, if we are fortunate and clever enough.
A particular proposition which is derivable from a theory may,
in fact, never be discovered; but this is not to say that it
does not exist. And the fact that a consequence of a theory may
exist without anyone's ever noticing it shows that its existence
does not depend on factors regarding the cognitive makeup of its
creator.
While it is clear that internal processes and states enter
into the growth of scientific knowledge, it is a mistake to
confuse these with objectively existing properties of theories
and objective problem-situations. Popper demonstrates this by
showing the non-psychological nature of Galileo's adoption of an
untenable, and ultimately false, theory of the tides. The
psychologistic interpretation of Galileo's position on the
subject claims that some sort of psychological state internal to
Galileo caused him to reject the notion of lunar influence upon
the tides. Of the many psychologistic - 'explanations'
(jealousy, ambition, dogmatism, aggressiveness, etc) for
Galileo's rejection of this notion, one is the hypothesis that
he was 'psychologically attracted' to the idea of a circular
motion (rather than an elliptical one).
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Against this, Popper (op cit: 174) argues that such
speculations are superfluous to an understanding of the relation
between the theory and the problem situation; he points out
that Galileo adopted a mechanical conservation principle for
rotary motions, and that this principle, rather than Galileo's
inner state, ruled out the possibility of interplanetary
influences, such as the influence of the moon upon the tides.
Thus, not only does Popper's approach allow us a greater
understanding of the problem, its intellectual context, and
Galileo's response, it makes it clear that, even if Galileo were
'psychologically attracted' to the notion of a circular motion,
this would be irrelevant to the the problem, its theoretical
context, and the validity of Galileo's theory.
Popper argues that it is a mistake to interpret scientific
knowledge exclusively as a kind of psychological state, and that
this mistake stems from a tradition in philosophy whereby
'knowledge' is interpreted solely in a subjective manner. Thus
the term is taken to refer to, for example, states of mind such
as certainty or strong belief (Musgrave 1970 gives a good survey
of this tradition). Popper argues that these are quite distinct
from objective contents of theories, which have nothing to do
with belief. As an illustration of this, he cites Newton's
attitude to the theory of interplanetary influence: Newton found
{>it very difficult to beleive that the theory could be valid, and
thus was possessed of nothing like certainty or strong belief;
and yet he still saw that the evidence suggested that the theory
was valid. From this, we see that the attitude or mental state
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of the proposer of a theory is quite distinct from the
properties of the theory itself, which constitutes scientific
knowledge.
Having thus argued for the autonomous existence of
theories, their properties, and the problem situations they
relate to, Popper goes on to argue that we ought to recognise
the fact of interaction between such objective realities and our
subjective internal states. He illustrates this (1972: 109)
with a quotation from Heyting concerning Brouwer's invention of
the theory of the continuum:
' If recursive functions had been invented before, he (Brouwer)
would perhaps not have formed the notion of a choice sequence
which, I think, would have been unlucky.'
(Heyting 1962: 195)
We can follow Popper in analysing this state of affairs
thus: the forming of the notion of a choice sequence is an
internal, subjective process. It arises in response to an
external, objectively existing, problem situation. Part of that
situation is the set of then extant theories, and Heyting is
pointing out that, had this situation been different (had
recursive functions been invented), then Brouwer's internal
process of invention might not have occurred. The interaction
occurs, then, between the external problem situation and the
inner mental processes whereby we invent hypotheses, and also
between the product of this invention and the problem situation,
which is altered once our product becomes part of it and its
resolution.
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This strikes me as being not only appealing as a picture of
the complexity of the process of the growth of scientific
knowledge, but as a picture which stresses the objectivity of
science; as such it has been attacked, naturally, by relativists
such as Kuhn (1962), and even more extremely relativistic,
Feyerabend. However, since Feyerabend (1975) actively denies
that rationality is of any value as an intellectual tool, I
think we can take that as a point in favour of Popper's
objectivism.
The idea of interaction seems fruitful too; I have
mentioned the notion that psychological states ('world 2 '
objects) can be said to interact with objective products of
cognitive activity (which are 'world 3' in their ontological
status), but one can also see the physical world ('world 1') and
our psychological states interacting. Popper wants to say that
our intellectual products may have an effect on, and be
affected by, the physical world via our psychological states.
Thus, our theories may influence our physical environment in any
manipulation of the physical world we carry out, such as the
building of bridges, tools, machines. In these cases, we can
say that our theories are in fact embodied in the very stuff of
the physical world: a machine is more than a collection of
physical objects, its structure and function are embodiments of
theoretical constructs.
Notice how distinct this approach is from that of the
Platonists: for them, we would have to take these 'world 3'
objects to be pre-existing objects which cannot interact
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causally with our mental states. In Popper's framework, it is
assumed that both mental states and objectively existing
intellectual products are emergent realities, resulting from the
evolutionary process:
'...in a material universe something new can emerge. Dead
matter seems to have more potentialities than merely to produce
dead matter. In particular, it has produced minds - no doubt in
slow stages- and in the end the human brain and the human
mind...'
(Popper & Eccles 1977: 11)
'I suggest that the universe, or its evolution, is creative, and
that the evolution of sentient animals with conscious experience
has brought about something new. These experiences were first
of a more rudimentary and later of a higher kind; and in the end
that kind of consciousness of self and that kind of creativity
emerged which, I suggest, we find in man.
With the emergence of man, the creativity of the universe
has, I think, become obvious. For man has created a new
objective world of the products of the human mind.'
(op cit: 16)
It is important to bear in mind that this notion of
emergence is closely linked with Popper's philosophy of physics,
in particular his view of emergence and interaction in the
physical world itself, and along with these, the idea that the
physical world is not a closed system. Popper illustrates this
view thus:
'...in a universe in which there once existed (according to
our present theories) no elements other than, say, hydrogen and
helium, no theorist who knew the laws then operative and
exemplified in this universe could have predicted all the
properties of the heavier elements not yet emerged, or that they
would emerge; or all the properties of even the simplest compund
molecules such as water.'
(loc cit)
Popper is therefore taking the physical world itself to be
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'open-ended', capable of evolving in ways that cannot be
predicted. This is important, I believe, because it means that
if we adopt Popper's suggestions and try to apply them to
linguistic objects, we at least adopt an ontology which rests
on a clear conception of the nature of the physical world. This
seems to me to be better than either assuming that we already
have such a conception, without spelling out what form it takes
(Botha, Smart), or assuming that our conception of the physical
world might somehow change to allow us to interpret our
theoretical constructs as 'physical' in some way (Chomsky).
Exactly how interaction between different emergent objects
takes place is something that needs to be investigated in an
interactionist programme, but that, of course, is what the
research programme is set up to establish. A good example of how
we can go about establishing the nature of such interactions is
the study of the relationship between numeral systems and number
in Hurford (forthcoming); it seems to me that this sort of work
allows us progress in research and discovery because it is based
on the idea that both numeral systems and numbers are emergent
rather than Platonic. And with this sort of approach, we have a
richer basis for proceeding with such research than we do with
Botha's idea that somehow we can find specific neurons that will
correspond directly with postulated linguistic objects.
Popper's framework suggests that the picture is much more
complex than this, and that such a reductionism would fail to
reflect the richly articulated nature of the relationship
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between physical systems, cognitive systems, and products of
cognitive systems.
By adopting something along the lines of Popper's
proposals, we avoid the pitfalls of reductionism
(oversimplification, impoverished conception of ontological
diversity) and the excesses of Platonism (excessive ontological
diversity, absence of a conception of emergent realities).
This strikes me as being a potentially fruitful way of
interpreting, and building, our theories. In particular, it is
interesting to apply Popper's notions to the study of linguistic
objects themselves.
(ii) Their application to linguistic objects.
Popper has repeatedly argued that the emergence of language
must have been central to the emergence both of higher mental
capacities and of other world 3 objects such as scientific
theories:
'One of the first products of the human mind is human
language. In fact, I conjecture that it was the very first of
these products, and that the human brain and the human mind
evolved in interaction with language.'
(op cit: 11)
The emergence of language, with its descriptive and
argumentative functions, is important for Popper, since by means
of the language faculty, we are able to begin to formulate the
beginnings of what later became scientific theories. And Popper
makes a great deal of these functions of language in the
evolutionary process (cf Popper 1972: 120, for example). My
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concerns are less broad than Popper's; I want to disregard any
particular function of language and the details of the question
of how it emerged (as I've said in 4.1, I think these are
irrelevant to the concerns of the grammarian). Rather, I want
assume that it is emergent*, and has such functions, and to
concentrate on its form, on what I have referred to as
linguistic objects and their properties.
If we apply Popper's autonomism to linguistic objects per
se, we assume that linguistic objects, such as linguistic
systems*, are products of human activity but have an existence
which is very largely independent of the cognitive, social, and
physical factors which contributed to its creation, but which
nonetheless interacts with these. A great many interesting
consequences follow from the adoption of this view. Under such
a view of the emergence of language, we would expect to find,
for instance, that we would have to distinguish between
historical changes within the system itself and change which
involves interaction with physical, cognitive and social
factors. Certainly there would be no question of denying that
there could be such a thing as change within the system
independently of these other factors. This would rule out the
sort of functionalist approach (such as that expressed by
* Naturally, Katz could not deny that our language faculty is
emergent; what he would have to deny is that linguistic objects
themselves are emergent. Rather, he would say that they are
pre-existent and that it is our innately specified knowledge of
the notion 'abstract object' that is emergent. Unfortunately,
this is no less unimpressive than the cloim that the language
faculty itself is pre-existent, as I have pointed out.
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Itkonen 1978 where changes are said always to be triggered by
changing 'social needs') which I have argued against above (4.2)
This means that, for this particular issue concerning
historical change, that I want to follow Lass (1980) in arguing
that there is nothing about the form of a linguistic change that
can be accounted for on the basis of social factors. Rather,
what these tell us about is the implementation of some change of
form within a speech community; this in fact follows from the
Saussurean arbitrariness of the sign principle.
The same line of approach would apply to the relationship
between historical change and cognitive factors, such as
perceptual constraints. While it is clear that any linguistic
system must function within the bounds of the constraints on our
perceptual system, it is equally clear that there is no reason
to include such non-linguistic phenomena (such as limitations on
short-term memory) in any grammatical description. Thus, even
if we establish, for instance, that centre-embedding is
difficult for humans to decode and that it therefore tends to be
eliminated when it arises, this would not lead us to
incorporate the perceptual constraint on centre-embedding into
linguistic theory. For the interesting thing is that centre-
embedding does arise and is then eliminated. This seems to me
to suggest that the emergence of such a state of affairs is a
purely linguistic phenomenon, describable solely in terms of the
system itself, independently of perceptual factors, whereas the
elimination, or lack of adoption, of such strategies as centre-
embedding, is best described in terms of the interaction between
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the linguistic and perceptual systems.
One could, of course, argue that speaking of linguistic
change in this way is merely a 'facon de parler', and that this
gives us no reason to assume that there really is an independent
linguistic reality whose existence is distinct from that of the
perceptual system. But such a response is in conflict with the
sort of realism that I have proposed. Under my realist
assumptions, the very fact that the adoption of certain
constructs in speaking about the phenomena makes it easier to
account for them is the basis on which we claim that such
constructs be given a realist interpretation.
This sort of distinction between linguistic objects on the
one hand, and the factors involved in their production and
implementation is one that Popper stresses, under the notions
product vs process:
'...few things are as important as the awareness of the
distinction between the two categories of problems: production
problems on the one hand and problems connected with the
structures produced themselves on the other. My second thesis
is that we should realise that the second category of problems,
those concerned with the products in themselves, is in almost
every respect more important than the first category, the
problems of production. My third thesis is that the problems
of the second category are basic for understanding the
production problems: contrary to first impressions, we can learn
more about production problems by studying the products
themselves than we can learn about the products by studying
production behaviour. This third thesis can be described as an
anti-behaviouristic and anti-psychologistic thesis.'
(Popper 1972: 113-4)
There are many other interesting consequences which follow
from the adoption of these theses for the investigation of
linguistic objects, and also the relationship between autonomous
209
linguistics (theoretical linguistics) on the one hand, and
psycholinguistics and sociolinguistic on the other. I have
suggested what sort of view of the nature of historical
linguistic change this allows us; it also has interesting
implications for, among other things, the way we look as the
relationship between (i) phonetics and phonology, (ii) syntax
and discourse, and (iii) autonomous and non-autonomous
linguistics. There is also a point about modularity in
generative linguistics which ties in very nicely with these
theses.
Before I proceed to these, however, I must mention a
reaction to the sorts of methodological issue I have been
discussing which goes something like this: such issues are
largely peripheral to the business of actually doing
linguistics; the position one adopts on them has no bearing on
actual analysis and theory construction, and they are thus at
best an interesting luxury, at worst a waste of time. What I
want to suggest, and hope will become clear, in the following
sections is that methodological matters are not just a question
of how one interprets what one is doing, but are at the root of
how one actually does it. Thus they are tied in to the actual
business of linguistic analysis in a very fundamental way. What
follows will therefore have a dual function: I want to give an
idea of the sorts of approach to analysis that follow as a
consequence of adopting interactionism, and at the same time I
want to demonstrate that, with the adoption such a
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methodological position, certain ways of doing linguistics are
characterised as being methodologically ill-conceived.
I deal with the three areas mentioned above in order; I do
not think that these by any means exhaust all of the
consequences of an interactionist methodology, but I do hope
that they give an impression of the range of these consequences.
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5.3 Consequences of interactionism
(i) Phonetics and phonology
If we adopt a metatheoretical framework* of the
interactionist sort, incorporating the assumptions about
reductionism and emergence that I have described, then it shapes
the sorts of theoretical framework that one is willing to
develop. That is, since one's metatheoretical assumptions have
a direct influence 011 the content of one's theories, the
particular metatheoretical assumptions I make will rule out
reductionistic theoretical frameworks. This is well exemplified
in the case of phonological theory and its relation to general
phonetic theory.
If we accept that linguistic objects are emergent in the way
that I have suggested they are, and that one needs a non-
reductionist theory to fully account for them, one will be
inclined to take as methodologically ill-founded a phonological
theory which takes phonological phenomena to be explained
principally in terms of purely phonetic factors. I will refer
to such a metatheoretical position as phonetic reductionism or
phoneticism.
To demonstrate the validity of my anti-phoneticist
position, I will consider Natural Phonology (Stampe & Donegan
1979), Hooper's (1976) Natural Generative Phonology, and
* I also use the expression 'metaphysical research programme',
following Popper, to describe the set of assumptions on which a
theory is founded; cf chapter 2.1 for discussion of this notion.
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Ohala's metatheoretical claims about 'phonetic explanation' in
phonology, all of which contain, in varying degrees, versions of
phoneticism*. I then discuss Foley's (1977) proposals for a
phonetics-independent phonology, which I also take to be
methodologically ill-conceived.
Since I have said, pace Boyd (1973), that metatheoretical
frameworks are not themselves falsifiable, the only way to
assess my anti-reductionist metatheory in relation to the
phoneticist position as exemplified to a greater or lesser
extent by Ohala, Hooper and others, is to see what sorts of
theory they give rise to. If phoneticism yields theoretical
frameworks which are of greater explanatory value than their
non-reductionist counterparts, then it is to be more highly
valued as a metatheoretical stance. I will argue that
phoneticist phonological theories are in fact impoverished from
an explanatory point of view, and that non-reductionistic
frameworks possess a higher explanatory yield, thus lending
credence to the kind of non-reductionist metatheory that I
propose.
I will also argue that the particular sort of non-
reductionist programme I assume, with its emphasis on
interaction between ontologically distinct objects and systems,
is especially attractive when one considers the inter-
* These are, of course, quite distinct theoretical frameworks,
and I do not suggest that they amount to the same theoretical
position. However, they all incoporate versions of
phoneticism, as I will show.
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relationship between phonological and phonetic domains. I
suggest that phonological theories which do not assume such an
interaction, such as that proposed by Foley (1977) are just as
impoverished as phoneticist theories. The position on the
relationship between phonetics and phonology that emerges from
my interactionist framework is this: that phonetic
considerations are a necessary, but not a sufficient, part of
the explication of phonological phenomena. Phoneticism amounts
to the claim that such considerations are both necessary and
sufficient in this way, and Foley's position (which I will call
'abstractism') amounts to the claim that they are neither
necessary nor sufficient.
Firstly, then, Donegan & Stampe's (1979) proposals. They
propose that explanation in phonology can only be achieved in
terms of 'forces implicit in human vocalisation and perception'
(126), thus:
'Natural Phonology properly excludes the topic of
unmotivated and morphologically motivated alternations.
Although these have often been lumped together with natural
alternations in generative phonology, they should be excluded
from phonology if it can, in principle, furnish no understanding
of them. Of course, such alternations typically stem
historically from phonetically motivated alternations, and these
are in the province of phonological theory, as are the factors
whereby the phonetic motivations were lost. The natural subject
matter of explanatory theory includes all and only what the
theory can, in principle, explain. In the case of natural
phonology, this means everything that language owes to the fact
that it is spoken. This includes far more than it excludes.
Most topics which in conventional phonology have been viewed as
sources of 'external evidence' are in the province of natural




D & S tie these metatheoretical claims in with a hypothesis
about the child's acquisition of phonological structure, namely
that there are a set of 'natural' processes (eg word-final
devoicing of obstruents) which the child will bring to bear 011
its language, but which may be 'supressed' in response to the
state of affairs in the language of its learning (eg the child
may simply have to supress the natural,process of tvord-final
devoicing, as in English).
Some aspects of D & S's metatheoretical claims are rather
worrying. For instance, if phonological theory is to include
'all and only what language owes to the fact that it is spoken',
it is likely to be greatly impoverished as a result. Take their
discussion of the [s]:[z] alternation in German (as in
[haus]: [hauza^i]). They claim that their anti-conventionalist
approach to language, whereby it is seen as a 'natural
reflection of the needs'"', capacities, and world of its users,
rather than as a merely conventional institution' (127) enables
them to single out the important and 'natural' fact that the
[s]:[z] alternation is 'distinct in its nature, evolution,
psychological status, and causality from the phonetically
conventional aspects (of phonology)' (127). I find this odd.
It is surely only by virtue of the fact that there is a
phonological opposition between [s] and [z] in German that there
can be said to be an alternation (as opposed to a free
variation) between these; since this opposition is at the very
* For comments on the limitations of this sort of functionalism,
cf 5.1 (ii).
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least fairly largely conventional, I cannot see how D & S can
avoid reference to conventionality in order to make any sense of
this particular aspect of German consonantal phonology.
I accept, of course, that the voiced/voiceless distinction
among consonants is hardly uncommon, and that it is a phonetic
phenomenon which is natural in D & S's sense. However, 1 think
the limits of D & S's phoneticism are evident even where this
extremely widely phonologised distinction is concerned. Rather
simple cases such as the German alternations cannot be
adequately explicated without reference to the conventional
aspect of phonological alternations. And nor can the more
complex, and more interesting, cases such as the (by now classic
in the history of phonological theory) Russian devoicing rule,
involving as it does a situation where there is an assymetry in
the system as far as the voiced/voiceless distinction in
obstruents is concerned.
It is not clear to me how D & S are to account for the
facts of the devoicing process here. This assymetry, whereby
voicing is distinctive among one subset of the Russian
obstruents, but non-distinctive amongst another is an instance
of the conventional nature of phonological systems; in order to
capture the nature of the devoicing process, it is essential
that we demonstrate that it operates over both sets, such that
we end up with two distinct consequnces of the devoicing
process, one in which 'phonemic overlapping' occurs, and another
in which it does not.
A rather less extremely phoneticist approach is adopted by
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Hooper (1976), and also by Venneman (1974 and elsewhere).
Natural Generative Phonology* rests upon the supposition that
the object of phonological theory is a speaker-internal reality
(a representation stored and accessed by the speaker. Hooper
makes specific claims about how the speaker arrives at this
representation, as follows: she claims that speakers make
generalisations across surface forms, ie from one surface form
to another, rather than from an underlying representation to a
set of surface forms. This is the essence of her True
Generalisation Condition:
'...all rules express transparent surface generalisations,
generalisations that are true for all surface forms and that,
furthermore, express the relation between surface forms in the
most direct manner possible...the rules speakers formulate are
based directly on surface forms... these rules relate one surface
form to another, rather than relating underlying to surface
form.'
(Hooper 1976: 13)
Hooper takes this to be an important contribution towards
constraining the notion 'possible rule' in phonology, since
rules will not be of the sort that relate underlying to surface
forms. This would be a gain, of course, assuming that one did
* An interesting historical note: this section was written
when these frameworks still constituted the most recent
developments in phonological theory since the heyday of the SPE
model. They now appear to have faded into the background
considerably, and traditionally (in generative work) non-
phoneticist models of phonological structure (Lexical Phonology,
Autosegmental Phonology) have emerged as the most attractive new
developments. This may, of course, be taken to reflect the
faddish nature of theory development in linguistics, but it just
might reflect the fact that phoneticism was bearing little
fruit, perhaps because it is methodologically unsound in the way
that I suggest.
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not in the process diminish the explantory power of one's
phonological theory. However, I think it can be shown that this
is precisely what happens, and it is not surprising that this
should be so if my metatheoretical assumptions are on the right
track.
Consider a particular case in which Hooper's principle is
applied. She proposes that the /e/ epenthesis phenomenon in
Spanish is not describable in terms of a phonological rule,
since all surface sequences of /s/ + C are preceded by /e/ in
word initial-position: there is no alternation between surface
forms here over which a generalisation can be made, and there is
thus no methodological justification for a rule of /e/
epenthesis of the sort Harris (1969) describes, thus:
0 > £ej/ s [+cons]
Her methodological position therefore forces her to abandon
this as a phonological rule of Spanish and to opt for an
analysis whereby all the esC forms are entered with the
epenthetic vowel in the lexicon. This leaves Hooper with the
problem of accounting for Spanish speakers' pronunciation of
foreign words with sC initial clusters. She achieves this by
proposing a syllable structure constrainst on Spanish which
syllabifies sC clusters with a syllable boundary between the
/s/ and the C and inserts a V before the /s/ (it is said to be
'preferred' for the epenthetic vowel to be inserted before,
rather than after, the /s/ since this allows the original order
of C's to remain). Hooper's task is still not complete,
however, since she is still left with the problem of specifying
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the nature of the vowel insertion.
Hooper appeals here to one of two putative universal
principles: (i) that an epenthetic vowel must always be the
'minimal' (ie the weakest) one and (ii) that it must be a V
whose features are copied from a nearby segment (she does not
specify how 'nearby' is defined, and her formalisation of this
second principle fails to indicate what it means). She claims
that Spanish utilises the first of these, on the basis of
factors to do with 'the prosodic characteristics of the
language'*.
The final analysis is still not accomplished, even after
this amount of theoretical apparatus has been brought to bear on
the problem: Hooper must still specify the precise quality of
the epenthesised vowel. She does this by appealing to a
language-specific strength scale for Spanish vowels, whereby
/e/ is the weakest, and therefore the one to be inserted (in
accordance with the principle mentioned above).
Now, quite apart from the clearly over-elaborate nature of
this analysis in comparison with the traditional one, there is
evidence that supports the traditional analysis. Harris has
pointed out (1979: 290 -291) that allomorphs of the diminutive
suffix vary according to the syllabic structure of their base
forms, with /_cita/ occurring with bisyllabic bases and /_ita/
with bases consisting of more than two syllables
* Specifically, to do with the notion that Spanish is stress-timed
and therefore has vowel weakening.
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(madre:madrecita vs comadre:comadrita). He points out that
/esC/ forms, which have a phonetically trisyllabic structure,
pattern like bisyllabic forms (estudio:estudiecito,
espacio: espaciecita, but *estudito, ,vespacito). This is
evidence that the proper lexical representation for these forms
is just as Harris' analysis would suggest, ie without epenthetic
vowel.
Thus, there do seem to be strong reasons for preferring the
traditional (Harris-type) analysis over the Natural Generative
Phonological one, and the metatheoretical implications of this
are clear. The adoption of the sort of metatheory which Hooper
proposes stresses the priority of (phonetic) substance over
(phonological) form:
'A growing body of data shows that an interest in the way
speakers analyse their language seems inevitably to lead to the
study of substantive rather than formal principles of analysis,
and substantive rather than purely structural evidence...NGP is
an appropriate framework for the study of substantive
principles.'
(op cit: 106)
This is a statement of what I have called phoneticism,
and it is subject to the following criticism: that there is no
reason why we should be forced to choose between a metatheory
for phonological investigation which allows only for purely
structural/formal evidence and analysis (Foley's is, as we shall
see, and is consequently impoversihed) and one which relies
over-heavily on substantive principles of analysis (in the way
that Hooper's does). Rather, an interactionist programme of the
sort that I propose allows for the interaction of substance and
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form in a way that neither phoneticist nor abstractionist
frameworks do.
Additionally, it appears that this sort of phoneticism
fails to provide us with heuristically more fruitful theories:
the sorts of analysis one gets in adopting it are impoverished.
There is an interesting historical slant to the emergence
of phoneticist metatheory in phonology in the seventies too: it
is reminiscent of a very similar metatheoretical position
adopted by structuralist phonologists in the thirties and
forties (cf 2.2 for discussion of this), with its insistence on
divorcing morphologised alternations from phonetically motivated
ones, and the concomitant notion of giving priority to purely
substantive factors*. There are parallels in the consequences
which follow from this, too: just as reductionistic phonological
metatheories forced structuralist analysts to tolerate analyses
which failed to capture the generalisations at hand (one is
reminded of the famous Bloch problem regarding phonemic
overlapping, or the much cited problem with Russian obstruent
devoicing which I referred to above), so Hooper's NGP fails to
capture generalisations and over-complicates the analysis of
* It may well be the case that one wants, counter to the spirit of
the SPE framework, to distinguish between morphologically-
orientated alternations and those which are motivated on a purely
phonetic basis. Thus, a recent theoretical development, Lexical
Phonology, as outlined in Mohanan 1986, proposes a change in the
way a model of phonological organisation represents these two
sorts of alternation. However, the adoption of such a distinction
need have no basis whatsoever in phoneticist metatheory, as indeed
is the case with Lexical Phonology.
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phonological phenomena.
I have one final remark to make on the methodological
underpinnings of NGP, and it concerns Hooper's view that the
object of analysis crucially relates to 'how speakers analyse
their language'. I have suggested that an interactionist
version of autonomism would allow for the possibility of dealing
with linguistic objects per se, to a large extent independently
of facts about speakers. This means that one need not be over-
concerned with facts about speakers; at the very least, the
interactionist can point to the fact that Hooper's concern with
the idea that speakers generalise over surface forms does not
lead to noticeably improved phonological analyses (if anything,
the reverse is the case).
However, what if we had some kind of reliable evidence that
speakers do indeed generalise over surface forms and utilise the
sort of complex apparatus Hooper's analysis involves? Would we
then be forced to abandon our rather simple and insightful
analysis? I think not; I would be willing to say that in such a
case, speakers are going about the task of computing a given
function in a rather inefficient manner. However, it may be
that speakers incorporate inefficient algorithms for the
computation of a given function. What we can claim for our
elegant analysis is that it is an efficient algorithm for the
function in question, and furthermore, that if speaking about
the phenomena in this way is fruitful, then we are justified in
claiming real status for the analysis we propose (real status
independently of the facts about speakers). However, as this
222
is, I suspect, the most difficult of my suggestions to swallow,
and no doubt appears eccentric if not perverse, I will not
pursue the point here.
It might be argued that I have not attacked phoneticism at
its strongest point, and to deal with this possible objection, I
want to consider Ohala's metatheoretical position on the
relationship between phonetics and phonology. In his 1974
paper 'Phonetic explanation in phonology', he argues that the
phonologist begins his task with 'sound patterns'* and must
then, if he is to be taken to be engaging in a scientific
enterprise, seek to explain these. He may, of course, opt
merely to construct a taxonomy and avoid the business of
explanation.
However, science, claims Ohala, is essentially about
explanation, and a scientific approach to the investigation of
sound patterns would mean constructing an explanatory theory
rather than a non-explanatory taxonomy. The bulk of Ohala's
argument is that much of the theory construction in modern
phonology is taxonomy masquerading as theory. That is, Ohala
wants to say that the theoretical constructs devised and used by
theoretical phonologists are lacking in 'empirical content'
(253) and therefore are to be taken to be mere labels with no
explanatory force. Such theoreticians are therefore, Ohala
* By 'sound patterns', Ohala means 'regularities in the
behaviour of speech sounds' (251). As examples of what he takes
these to be, he cites historical sound changes and synchronic
alternations (as products of such changes).
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argues, crypto-taxonomists. Since Ohala wants to engage in what
he takes to be genuine explanation in phonology, he argues that
phonologists must abandon such crytpo-taxonomic labels and seek
genuine explanations of phonological phenomena. These, he
argues, are to be found in a wide variety of areas, but most
notably in phonetics (phonetics is 'one of the most important
tools' (270) we have in attempting to provide explanations for
phonological phenomena).
Thus, his view of the relationship between phonetics and
phonology is this: that phonetics is a sub-part of phonology,
and that phonological phenomena cannot be explained without
reference to phonetic factors. To claim that phonetics is a
distinct discipline from phonology is absurd, lie claims (270: n.
3), since phonology is about explanation, and explanation in
phonology is achieved principally by means of reference to
phonetics. This view he takes to be in opposition to that
expressed by Ladefoged (1971), who argues that a discipline must
have a set of primitives which are defined outside of the theory
in question, and that these primitives in phonology are provided
by articulatory and acoustic phonetics, taken to constitute a
domain outside of phonology proper.
It is perhaps best to assess Ohala's metatheory in relation
to a particular problem of analysis, as I have done with
Hooper's and Donegan & Stampe's proposals. In Ohala & Lorentz
(1977), the analysis and status of labial-velars is discussed as
a means of exemplifying the metatheoretical stance adopted by
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Ohala. Here, it is argued that constructs in theoretical
phonology are not to be granted a realistic interpretation, that
it does not make sense to speak of a phonological reality
distinct from phonetic reality, and that explanation in
phonology is only achieved when phonological statements are
reduced to phonetic statements (which, I assume, are taken by 0
& L to be interpreted realistically), thus:
'It is unnecessary to posit that the phonetic character of
a segment differs from its phonological or 'underlying'
character unless the latter terms are defined in fairly
innocuous ways.'
(578)
By 'innocuous', they mean definitions whereby terms in
phonology are merely 'descriptively convenient' (591), ie to be
given an instrumental, rather than a realistic, interpretation.
They distinguish between truly explanatory scientific theories
and 'impressionistically-based, pre-theoretical taxonomies'
(577), associating phonological descriptions with the latter and
phonetic ones with the former. They take the SPE phonological
framework to be an instance of such a pre-theoretical taxonomy
which is awaiting proper 'scientific' reduction into the
'explanatory' terms of phonetics. The SPE treatment of labial-
velars (in Chomsky & Halle 1968 and Anderson 1976, for instance)
is thus seen by 0 & L as mere taxonomic pigeonholing; they
suggest that a purely phonetic account of labial-velars would be
truly explanatory.
Let us consider their proposed phonetic explanation. They
take the acoustic properties of labial-velars to be the phonetic
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key to an explanation of their behaviour, as follows:
'...labials and back velars produce similar acoustic
effects...the explanation for this requires reference to the
standing wave patterns of the resonant frequencies of the vocal
tract...the rule is: a constriction at a velocity minimum raises
the resonant frequency from what it would be for a uniform tube;
a constriction at a velocity maximum lowers the resonant
frequency from what it would be for a uniform tube...(this)
explains why a constriction in either the labial or back velar
position will have the similar acoustic effect of lowering the
second formant and why simultaneous constrictions at both labial
and velar regions will lower it even more.'
(582)
Taking this acoustic data combined with the articulatory
and acoustic properties of nasals, they show that it will always
turn out that labial-velars will behave like velars when it
comes to nasal assimilation (we expect [nw] to assimilate to
[ijw] but not [mw], for instance). They then conclude, contra
Anderson (1976), that labial-velars are not 'phonologically'
either labial or velar, but, as their phonetic description
suggests, both labial and velar; they are unitary, not
ambiguous, in character, and their variable behaviour, whereby
they function in some cases like velars and in others like
labials, can be explained on the basis of either purely phonetic
data (as in the case of nasal assimilation) or on the basis of
historical development, which itself is to be accounted for in
terms of purely phonetic motivation of sound changes.
What 0 & L especially object to in the 'mere pigeonholing'
of labial-velars into either a velar or a labial phonological
category, is the suggestion that a single phonetic phenomenon
might be said to have variable systematic status in different
languages (or, as we shall see, within a single language). In
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fact, Ohala disparages the idea of gaining insight into
linguistic organisation by reference to linguistic systems:
'...the behaviour of speech sounds is better understood by
reference to system-external factors than system-internal
factors.'
(Ohala 1979: 46)
It seems to me that Ohala's evidence is very encouraging
for the sort of Interactionist methodology I propose. Recall
that I propose a realistic interpretation (assuming it is
justified for a particular construct) of constructs in
phonetics, and also of those in phonology (again, assuming that
we satisfy 'warranted assertibilty' conditions). That is, I want
to allow that it is coherent to take phonological systems,
phonological rules and phonological representations to be
realities (of what sort, our theories will hopefully allow us to
guess) in addition to allowing of phonetic realities.
To try to spell this out, and to show how it contrasts with
Ohala's view, consider his comments on the status of labial
velars. He allows that there may be straightforward acoustic
phonetic accounts of why these behave as they do under nasal
assimilation. I am perfectly happy to accept that this is
indeed an explanation for the assimilation facts. It is
parallel, but in acoustic terms, to the phonetic explanation as
to why velars front before front vowels. I am also willing to
accept that synchronic alternations between velar-like and
labial-like behaviour of labial-velars (and between velars and
palatals in my acoustic example) may well stem from such purely
phonetically-motivated states of affairs.
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However, these purely phonetic phenomena (assimilations in
this case) are rather dull in and of themselves, from a
theoretical point of view. What is of linguistic interest is
the effect such phenomena have on linguistic systems. Thus, a
fronting of velars to palatal place of articulation can have
interesting effects on the way the linguistic system is
structured (and linguistic systems are real, as far as I'm
concerned). This is true, for instance, for French, where
realisations of /k/ collapsed into realisations of /s/. Indeed,
this sort of phenomenon (mergers, splits, in phonological
systems) is part of the stock in trade of the historical
phonologist. One does not doubt that, as Ohala points out,
synchronic states of affairs can result from purely
phonetically-motivated processes, but it is the effect these
have on a linguistic system that is of interest to the linguist.
What we are dealing with in these cases is the interaction of
form and substance, not the reduction of formal (systematic)
states of affairs to substantive ones.
To illustrate this, consider Anderson's (1981) reply to
Ohala. He cites data from Fula to show that we must postulate
two distinct phonological units (segments, in SPE terminology)
underlying surface occurrences of the phonetic segment [w]. In
stems with initial consonants which are continuants, there are
alternations, in certain environments, which consist of
prenasalised stops at the same place of articulation as the
underlying continuant (he does not actually cite any other than
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the labial velar, but I take it these are of the /l/ —> [nd]
sort). The interesting cases are the alternants for underlying
/w/. It turns out that these are of two different sorts, as
follows:
(a) underlying /war/ ('kill') has alternants [war] and [mbar]
(b) underlying /war/ ('come') has alternants [war] and [ijgar].
These two sets of alternants are symptomatic of the
behaviour of two large sets of morphemes which consistently have
labial, but not velar, alternants, as in the 'kill' morpheme, or
velar, but not labial, alternants, as in the case of 'come'.
This data leaves us with the rather evident phonological
solution of distinguishing, within a single syetm, between two
different labial-velars: one which we must represent as
primarily a labial segment, and the other as primarily a velar
one. The fact that there may have been a strictly phonetic
motivation for this in the historical development of the
language does not alter the synchronic fact that a single
phonetic segment is phonologically ambiguous, rather than
unitary.
There seems to me to be little methodological justification
for interpreting the phonological analysis here as 'merely
taxonomic pigeonholing': we simply cannot give an adequate
analysis of the data without reference to the constructs
'system' and 'systematic unit', and according to the version of
realism I adopt, this constitutes a satisfaction of the
warranted assertibility condition.
In asserting that these postulated phonological units are
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real, we are doing precisely what we do when we assert that
phonetic constructs are to be interpreted realistically. To
take an example, the construct 'wave', so crucial to acoustic
phonetics, could be interpreted instrumentally as a kind of
shorthand for a set of sense experiences and their properties
in the Mach (1893) 'economy of expression' sense, but we are
justified in interpreting it realistically in just the same way
that we are justified in interpreting .phonological constructs
realistically: in terms of heuristic fertility. .
Let us assume, then, that we can speak of a phonetic and a
phonological reality and of an interaction between the two
(phonetic events will often have far-reaching consequences for
phonological systems, for instance), and that something like
Interactionism is the appropriate framework for constructing
phonological theories. We will be inclined to reject
phoneticism on the grounds that it forces us to adopt
impoverished analyses and reject elegant analyses which capture
interesting generalisations. With such a framework, we will
also be inclined to reject abstractionist methodologies which do
not allow for the often complex ways in which phonetic and
phonological realities interact. Such a metatheoretical position
is argued for by Foley (1977).
Foley's position on the nature of phonological theory could
not be further removed from that of Ohala. While Ohala thinks
that theoretical constructs in phonology should not be
interpreted realistically, and are to be reduced to acoustic and
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articulatory states of affairs, Foley's view is as follows:
'The basic phonological elements are defined not by
physical acoustic or articulatory parameters, but rather by
their participation in rules.'
(Foley 1977: Foreword)
That he takes phonetic reductionism to be a methodological
error (as I do) is evident:
'In the construction of a theory, the basic elements must
be germane to the theory; just as the basic elements of a
psychological theory must be psychological, so the basic
elements of a phonological theory must be phonological elements.
Chomsky & Halle, in attempting to create a phonological theory*
based on phonetic elements, consequently commit the reductionist
error. A scientific linguistic theory would be based, not on
physical properties of elements, but on abstract relations.
Conceptually we can recognise two types of features,
phonological features, which refer to phonological relations,
and phonetic features, which characterise the manifestations of
the phonological units as sounds.'
(op cit: 5)
Foley cites the argument concerning the linguistic nature
of systems which do not use speech sounds as their mode of
manifestation to show that phonology is essentially not about
speech sounds, but about relations between units in an absrtact
system. He takes rules to be the object of theoretical
phonology, not speech sounds, and argues that a conflation of
these two distinct realities constitutes an impoverishment of
any theory of phonology. In this I am very much in agreement
* It is interesting to consider the extent to which this
framework has functioned as an orientation point for a multitude
of theoretical issues, as well as metatheoretical ones. Ohala
and Foley, representing metatheoretical poles, are equally
critical of its methodological basis; I suggest that this is
because its methodological basis is not sufficiently explicitly
spelled out: cf chapter 2 for discussion.
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with him. I will not attempt to argue about his characterisation
of the SPE framework as being based upon a reductionistic
methodology, though see my comments in chapter 2 on Chomsky's
interpretation of 'systems' and Halle's metatheoretical remarks.
Rather, I will concentrate on his views on the relationship
between the phonetic and phonological domains.
Having made the entirely reasonable point that phonological
realities are not phonetic realities, Foley isolates specific
phonological elements and their phonetic realisations for
discussion. He cites strengthening and weakening phenomena as
evidence of phonological strength scales, and sees these as
consisting of abstract phonological units, ordered according to
their strength or weakness. Thus there is a scale which
indicates propensity to spirantisation; this propensity is taken
to be 'a manifestation of an abstract relation among
phonological elements' (28) which Foley labels . The scale
indicates that velars are the weakest category in relation to
spirantisation propensity, followed by dentals, with labials as
the strongest.
Foley then establishes a relation, which looks rather
like a version of the sonority hierarchy and denotes the
relation between, for instance, voiced stops and voiced
continuants, the latter being weaker than the former. This is
then followed by the citing of several other labelled relations
concerning the phonological strength relations among different
phonological units.
It is difficult, even considering the nature of the
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elements mentioned so far, to escape the temptation to view
these units and scales as being in some way tied in to phonetic
factors. Spirantisation, for instance, typically occurs
intervocalically, whose articulation, with a stricture of open
approximation, and whose typically voiced nature suggest a
correlation between the environment in which spirantisation
occurs and the articulatory propeties of the affected segments.
Voiced fricatives seem plausibly viewed as intermediate between
voiced stops and vowels, in terms of degree of stricture, and
the process whereby voiced stops spirantise looks overwhelmingly
like a simple case of assimilation of degree of stricture. In
fact, it seems rather over-apparent even to mention this.
Articulatorily-based versions of Foley's scale have been
proposed (cf Lass 1976, Anderson & Ewen 1980 for suggested
phonetically-based interpretations of this scale) and are very
feasible.
Foley, however, is obliged to treat this sort of scale as a
purely formal scale demonstrating relations among entirely
abstract phonological units, without any specific
interpretation. On the question of the phonetic realisation of
phonological units, he claims (48 - 49) that the same
phonological elements receive different phonetic manifestations
in different languages, but identical manifestations in a single
language. However, to admit that this scale has a phonetic
basis is not to commit the error of phonetic reductionism, but
to allow for complex modes of interaction between phonological
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and phonetic realities. Thus, while spirantisation effects are
themselves phonetically motivated, the effect of spirantisation
on an abstract phonological system will depend on factors
peculiar to the system in question. To quote Saussure
(1916/1965: 142), 'the system, in other words, contains the
seeds of its own evolution'.
It is interesting to note, finally, that both Ohala and
Foley consider that the adoption of their respective
methodologies would amount to assuring that the enterprise of
constructing phonological theories is a truly scientific one.
In Ohala's case, consideration of the realist/instrumentalist
debate and its relevance for linguistic theory construction
casts doubt on his conception of generative phonology as a pre-
theoretical taxonomy. In Foley's case, there is no explicit
statement of an ontological framework in which purely abstract
phonological units are to be interpreted. With the adoption of
a realist and interactionist methodology, I think we go some way
towards characterising the nature of phonological inquiry, both
in its methods and object of inquiry. And I think there are
interesting observations about the methodological status of
syntactic inquiry that emerge from interactionism.
(ii) Syntax and discourse
In this section I want to make a few observations on
the consequences of an interactionist methodology for the way we
regard the relationship between syntax and discourse. Just as I
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argued against the reduction of phonology to phonetics, so 1
will argue that linguistic realities of a syntactic sort must
not be confused with, and cannot be reduced to, facts about
discourse, or communication in general. This is a consequence of
adopting a fairly strong version of the autonomy thesis; if one
accepts that autonomous linguistics is a valid enterprise, one
is bound to reject the sort of metatheoretical position adopted
by (among others) Givon. Givon's approach to the study of
linguistic objects 'views data of language use, variation,
development, behaviour, discourse processing and experimental
cognitive psychology as part and parcel of one empirical
complex.' (Givon 1984: 10). Givon takes the separation of
linguistic systems from facts about the speaker, hearer and
communicative context to be only a necessary preliminary
methodological step which if practised (in the way it has been
in generative linguistics) is 'bound to yield unsatisfactory
results' (loc cit).
That is, Givon is arguing, as I have, that one can evaluate
a methodological framework in terms of the results of the
theories it gives rise to. However, that is as far as we agree,
since Givon assumes that the putting into practice of autonomism
yields poor results in comparison with the adoption of what
might be called a holistic methodology, where facts about, among
other things, communicative function and general cognitive
abilities are able to serve as explanatory devices. I argue
that it is this holistic methodology which yields poor results.
Far from assuming^ as Givon does, that the division between
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theoretical linguistics and the general study of human behaviour
and psychology is artificial, I will argue that it is only sucli
divisions that allow us to make any progress, and this, in
accordance with the sort of realism I adopt, is sufficient
reason for assuming that it is a reasonable guess at the way the
object of inquiry actually is. Nor does this prevent my
allowing that strictly linguistic states of affairs cannot be
somehow tied in with facts about general cognitive abilities,
communication, etc. What I want to maintain is that it is only
through a non-holistic methodology, one where there are distinct
but interacting domains, that we can make any headway;
and if this is so, that is our justification for saying that
things really are the way our theories (and their accompanying
metatheory) say they are.
Consider Givon's comments on the status of the
investigation of sentences. The theoretical construct
'sentence' is at the very heart of all theorising about syntax
in the generative framework. It is part of the foundations upon
which generative syntactic theories are built; if they have
allowed us insight into the nature of human language, then the
'sentence' construct has been crucial in our achieving what we
have achieved. Yet Givon allows only that sentence grammars are
a necessary methodological preliminary, and that in practicing
sentence-level description and analysis, one must beware the
danger of ignoring the 'semantic-functional correlates of
syntactic structure' (loc cit). This danger can only be avoided
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if one proceeds onto 'the next stage of syntactic investigation
- the study of texts, and the study of the functional
distribution of various morpho-syntactic structures within the
text.' (loc cit). Of this first stage, sentence-level
analysis, Givon points out that it 'only tells the linguist
that some structures are possible, may occur. It reveals
nothing about the context and purpose of their occurrence, or
how often they occur in comparison with other constructions that
seemingly perform "the same" or similar function(s)' (11).
Thus, the linguist, to establish these things, must engage in
quantification and statistical or probabilistic analysis.
Several comments are in order here. Givon assumes that
sentences (he uses the term interchangeably with 'structures': I
do not know what the metatheoretical status of 'structures' may
be in his overall conception of the nature of linguistic
inquiry) may or may not occur. It is not at all clear that they
may. If these linguistic objects can be said to be real (I have
argued that they are to be taken to be real) then they cannot
be viewed as spatiotemporally located events, as Itkonen rightly
observes. But nor can they be argued to be acts either (one
cannot perform a sentence). That is, sentences are not the
sorts of thing that may happen. Rather, they are the sorts of
thing that I have described as belonging to an ontic category of
the Popperian 'objective knowledge' sort.
If this is so, then sentences cannot, by definition, occur
in sequences in a text (this is simply a more restricted version
of the more general claim that they cannot occur at all). And,
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naturally, one cannot determine their frequency of occurrence.
Nor does this mean that we take them to be Platonic objects (I
have explicitly rejected such a view), as Givon (12-13)
assumes*. And this is the point (it is very much a
metatheoretical one) at which autonomists and holists, such as
Givon, depart. I am suggesting, therefore, that Givon is
simply committing a category mistake here, which is unfortunate,
as it is located within the very foundations of his
metatheoretical position.
The autonomist is not committed to Platonism here since, in
order to avoid Platonism, it is incumbent upon him only to show
that sentences are not pre-existing objects, unavailable for
causal interaction with mental processes. We do this by showing
that in syntax there is something to be explicated; in order
thus to understand and gain insight into our object, it turns
out to be essential to make a distinction between sentences and
the sorts of object that occur in texts, namely utterances. If
this distinction is essential, that is our warrant in asserting
the reality of the two entities postulated. That the first of
these, the sentence, is not either a spatiotemporal event or an
act is one of its defining properties: it is this fact that
causes us to want to make the distinction in the first place.
* One of Givon's more peculiar claims is that Chomsky's
interpretation of syntactic categories is Platonic. Note 'that
his error here is similar to that made by Botha, discussed in
3.1. One might say that the meaning assigned by both of these
writers to this term is something like 'more abstract than my
world view can tolerate'.
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This point is, to say the least, of great methodological
importance: it is at the heart of what the generative enterprise
is all about (and it is Givon's rejection of the
sentence/utterance distinction as more than an expedient
preliminary that marks off his work as non-generative). It has
recently been made, very explicitly, by Burton-Roberts (1985) in
relation to the work of another non-generativist, Werth (1984),
who shares many of Givon's methodological predilections.
Burton-Roberts (henceforth B-R) points out some of the
confusions which arise if the sentence-utterance distinction is
collapsed in the way that Givon and Werth have collapsed it.
One ends up with conceptually confused notions such as
'incomplete utterance', where incompleteness is predicated of
utterances. But such a predication is surely incoherent: every
utterance is complete: it is by virtue of their having a
temporal beginning and end that they count as spatio-temporal
objects. As B-R points out, the locution 'incomplete utterance'
can only make sense if we interpret it as 'the (completed)
utterance of a sentence fragment rather than a complete
sentence'. And if we have to adopt the sentence/utterance
distinction to make sense of our object of inquiry, we are
warranted in interpreting it realistically.
A parallel conclusion must be drawn from the attempt (on
the part of Lyons 1971, for instance) to predicate
grammaticality of utterances. B-R argues that it is only in
virtue of the 'sentence' construct that we can make any sense of
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utterances, and therefore of texts. I think that this point is
parallel to the one I have been making about phonetic objects:
speech sounds become an object of theoretical inquiry only in
virtue of their relationship to phonological objects, which are
not spatio-temporal. It is not mere 'artificial modularism',
therefore, to draw a sharp ontological distinction between
phonology and phonetics and between syntax and discourse; rather
it is essential to the business of gaining insight into our
object of inquiry. I think this becomes apparent when one
considers modularist and holist issues when examining the
relationship between theoretical linguistics and neighbouring
disciplines.
(iii) Modularity and holism
A few comments are necessary, at this stage, on the sort of
overall picture of the organisation of linguistic models which
follows from the adoption of interactionism. I have said that
its adoption supports the notion of an autonomous theoretical
linguistics, and that this is crucially linked to the idea of
autonomism within theoretical linguistics, to the modular
picture of the organisation of a grammatical model containing
descriptive devices for syntactic, semantic and phonological
phenomena.
It is clear that this kind of modular approach is most
commonly countered by a different sort of metatheoretical
approach in which modularity is abandoned, and some version of
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what might be called 'holism' is adopted. These two differing
metaphysical research programmes might be summed up, rather
superficially, as follows: modularism, interpreted realistically
(in the way I want to interpret it) amounts to the claim that
the object of inquiry is best characterised in terms of a set of
discrete but interacting sub-parts, whereas holism typically
incorporates the assumption that the notion of 'interaction
between modules' is not a fruitful one. Just what a given holist
wants to replace this idea with varies from one writer to
another (and very often, it is not clear precisely what
conception of the organisation of linguistic objects and their
structure the holist is proposing).
An interesting example of such an approach is that taken by
Russell (1987 a), who describes the notion of 'interaction' as
'promissory and pseudo-scientific' (224). I try to show, here
and in Carr (1987 b), that the version of holism that Russell
proposes leads to hypotheses that, at least as far as the
explication of linguistic phenomena goes, are unfalsifiable
(and therefore non-scientific). Thus, although it would be not
quite accurate to say that holism itself (or at least Russell's
version of it) is unscientific (it is a metaphysical research
programme, not a theory, and is not in itself falsifiable), it
would be accurate to say that, as a metatheoretical position, it
does not lead to falsifiable hypotheses, and is therefore to be
less highly valued that one which does. Of course, nor can one
say that modularism is falsifiable itself, but one can point to
the successes of falsifiable theories based upon the modular
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approach as evidence that it is to be more highly valued than
holism.
Notice that modularism has tended to be embedded within
what has come to be called the 'computational theory of thought'
or the 'computation theory of the mind', in the sense in which
Fodor (1976, 1983, and elsewhere) uses the expression. And it
is the computational theory of thought , including modularism,
that Russell is attacking.
A couple of points are in order here. The first is that one
should really be speaking of the computational meta-theory of
thought, since this view of mental representations and processes
is an overall picture, a metaphysical research programme, from
which particular theories may be evolved. The second is that
there is no necessary link between a broadly 'compuational'
metatheory and modularity. While it is evident that
computational models can be devised on a modular basis, non-
modular computational models are entirely feasible (cf the work
of Schank for this sort of non-modular computational approach to
models of natural language understanding). It would be
mistaken, therefore, to assume that arguments against
modularism are necessarily arguments against a broadly
computational theory of cognitive processes.
My response to the version of holism that Russell outlines
might be termed the 'what else?' defence of modularism (to use a
phrase of Dennett's). An example of a problem that Russell
wants to deal with from a holistic point of view, or rather the
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syntactic problem which Russell claims is not a problem,
syntactic or otherwise, is that dealt with in transformational
work by means of the NP-Aux Inversion rule. Consider Russell's
holistic response to the fact that the following is
ungrammatical (Russell will not use the expressions
'grammatical' and 'ungrammatical', since he does not recognise
either these or the construct 'sentence' to which they relate):
*Is the car which late will leave first?
Russell's comment on this is that 'action is hierarchical' and
that one cannot 'lift the first occurrence of 'is' out of a wh-
clause to form an interrogative for the same reason that one
cannot release one's hand from a cup of hot coffee in order to
position a saucer whilst returning the cup from the lips' (227).
The former creates 'gibberish' while the latter creates a nasty
accident. He wants to say that there is some form of 'mental
scaffolding' which ensures that the hand stays on the cup and
the verb BE stays in the wh-clause; to quote Russell: 'things
that belong together stay together' (loc cit).
Thus the explanation Russell gives us for why verbs in some
clauses (main clauses) can be inverted around their subjects
and why others cannot is that the subordinate clause verbs
'belong' in the subordinate clause. Why he restricts his
attentions to wh subordiante clauses is unclear; the fact that
the subordinate clause in question is of the 'wh' sort is, of
course, irrelevant. Russell's 'explanation' amounts to little
more than asserting that one cannot invert verbs in some clauses
because they cannot be inverted, but that we can invert verbs in
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others because they can be. If a verb in a subordinate clause
'belongs there', so does a main clause verb 'belong' there,
assuming that 'belonging' is to be explicated in any sort of
coherent way (in terms of constituency, for instance).
What is objectionable about Russell's metatheoretical
position is the fact that he does not give us any indication of
what exactly 'belonging' amounts to, and with such vague and
undefined notions, one cannot come up with falsifiable
hypotheses. One must tackle hierarchicality, as a fairly
clearly defined construct in linguistic theory, in a much more
coherent way if one is to counter the claims made with it and
about it in theoretical linguistics (or in its associated
philosophical claims). My response to Russell's holism is
therefore to say that if this is holistic explanation, it leaves
much to be desired, and in the absence of a better articulated
holism, we are as well to stick with modularising.
If Russell's holism constitutes no real challenge to the
idea of interaction between ontologically distinct domains,
there are serious coherent accounts of hierarchicality which
have been developed, and which might be considered to threaten
the sort of interactionism I propose. The work of Simon (1962,
1981, for example) springs to mind; it is clear that in Simon's
*The remainder of Russell's comments, on the realist assumptions
inherent in my version of interactionism, are unworrying. This
is because, in replying (in his 1987 b) to the comments I make
on realism in AL (in Carr 1987a) he mistakenly equates all
versions of linguistic realism with Platonism, which I overtly
reject both there and in 5.1 above.
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case we are dealing with a means of shedding light on the nature
and origin of hierarchicality rather than constructing a vague
'things that belong together stay together' holism. Simon's
proposals are best not described as holistic, and do not
necessarily build a case for holism against modularism, but they
may seem to undermine interactionism nonetheless. If, as he
suggests, hierarchicality is likely to turn out to be a property
of the internal structure (and, presumably, internal
representations) of any complex organism, then it is seen not to
be solely a property of specifically linguistic objects, and the
idea of a linguistic, as opposed to a non-linguistic, capacity
is in jeopardy.
It is not surprising, therefore, that Simon's work has
been used to tackle the philosophical underpinnings of the
Chomskyan innateness hypothesis, notably in Sampson (1978).
While I have little to add to the rationalist/empiricist debate,
I should say that I do not think interactionism commits me to a
version of the innateness hypothesis. Even if there is a good
case for denying that humans are possessed of a specifically
linguistic cognitive capacity, I am not claiming that the object
of theoretical linguistic inquiry is of a mental (speaker-
internal) sort, and the interaction I visualise is between
speaker-internal states of affairs (innately endowed or
otherwise) and specifically linguistic, speaker-external,
objects such as sentences.
However, it remains to be seen whether such purely
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linguistic constructs as sentences will remain a valuable tool
in linguistic research; I imagine that they wiil, since it is
difficult to imagine a coherent linguistic" without them. Moore
and Carling's (1987) attempt at explicating what they call the
'problem of correspondence', for example, suffers precisely
because it does not take the construct 'sentence' seriously as a
notion that may be interpreted realistically. In an attempt to
say what the correspondence there may be between sentences as
objects generated by the grammar and 'our everyday notion of
sentence', they construct a sentoid/sentence distinction to
distinguish between the former and the latter. But they give no
idea of what our everyday notion of sentence is, and one cannot
elevate this notion to the status of theoretical construct, as
they do, simply because it itself is in need of explication.
And this, of course, is precisely what the sentence/utterance
distinction is designed to do (and will do if we take it
seriously: cf the remarks on Burton-Roberts and Lyons in (ii)
above).
I am relatively confident, therefore, that my linguistic
objects in and of themselves will have to be recognised, and
that a picture of the relationship between them and non-
linguistic, sociolinguistic and psycholinguistic states of
affairs will have to be formulated which recognises their
existence. The principal threats I see to this sort of
autonomism-plus-interaction come from work in AI on the validity
of modularism, but it is interesting to note, as a closing
comment, that work in AI does not collapse cognitive psychology,
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theoretical linguistics and computational modelling of
cognitive processing (as the surveys in Thompson 1983, Biggs
1987 and Wilks 1987 show). There are clearly distinct Al-type
problems, cognitive psychological problems, and theoretical
linguistic problems, and much of the argumentation between AI,
AL and psycholinguistics researchers (as reported by Biggs and
by Wilks in Modgil & Modgil 1987, for instance) centres around
questions of the inter-relationship between these disciplines.
I think that an awareness that these fields are concerned with
distinct, but interacting, domains, in the way that I suggest
they are, can only shed light on what each discipline can and
cannot achieve. As Biggs (1987: 194) states, many of the
problems one faces in understanding the relationships between
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